Perceptual knowledge derailed

Philosophical Studies 112 (1):31-45 (2003)
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Abstract

The tracking theory treats knowledge as counterfactual covariation of belief and truth through a sphere of possibilities. I argue that the tracking theory cannot respect perceptual knowledge, because perceptual belief covaries with truth through a discontinuous scatter of possibilities.

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Jonathan Schaffer
Rutgers University - New Brunswick

Citations of this work

Before the law.Mark Eli Kalderon - 2011 - Philosophical Issues 21 (1):219-244.
Relevant alternatives, contextualism included.Ernest Sosa - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 119 (1-2):35-65.
Stumbling in Nozick’s Tracks.John Turri - 2012 - Logos and Episteme 3 (2):291-293.
Relevant possibilities.Joshua Allen Smith - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 138 (1):55-71.

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References found in this work

Vagueness.Timothy Williamson - 1996 - New York: Routledge.
Solving the skeptical problem.Keith DeRose - 1995 - Philosophical Review 104 (1):1-52.
Philosophical Explanations.Robert Nozick - 1981 - Mind 93 (371):450-455.
How to defeat opposition to Moore.Ernest Sosa - 1999 - Philosophical Perspectives 13:137-49.

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