The unity of normative judgement: On Ridge’s Impassioned Belief

Analysis 75 (3):460-471 (2015)
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Karl Schafer
University of Texas at Austin

Citations of this work

Hybrid Accounts of Ethical Thought and Talk.Teemu Toppinen - 2017 - In Tristram Colin McPherson & David Plunkett (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics. New York: Routledge. pp. 243-259.

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References found in this work

Relativism (and expressivism) and the problem of disagreement.James Dreier - 2009 - Philosophical Perspectives 23 (1):79-110.
Constructivism and Three Forms of Perspective‐Dependence in Metaethics 1.Karl Schafer - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (1):68-101.
Assessor Relativism and the Problem of Moral Disagreement.Karl Schafer - 2012 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 50 (4):602-620.

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