Abstract

This paper aims to provide a critique of commonsense nationalism by means of critiquing the intrinsic argument for the conational partiality thesis. I.e. the thesis that we ought to, in our moral deliberation, prioritize our conationals. In particular the argument that we have associative duties towards our conationals in virtue of the intrinsic value of our conational relationship. Prima facie the intrinsic argument is understood as the most plausible vehicle for the normative claims of commonsense nationalism. The particular accounts of the intrinsic argument that are chosen are the accounts espoused by Thomas Hurka and David Miller respectively. Very simply put, the accounts argue that the conational relationship is intrinsically valuable or valued, and this intrinsic value or valuing constitutes a source of partiality and associative duties. In the end, it is argued that the accounts either fails with regards to their internal plausibility or in the sense that they do not properly account for the normative claims of commonsense nationalism. The intrinsic argument thus fails to provide a sufficient defense of commonsense nationalism.