Why do we need perceptual content?

Philosophical Psychology 29 (5):776-788 (2016)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Most representationalists argue that perceptual experience has to be representational because phenomenal looks are, by themselves, representational. Charles Travis argues that looks cannot represent. I argue that perceptual experience has to be representational due to the way the visual system works.

Categories

Keywords

Reprint years

DOI

10.1080/09515089.2016.1142071

Links

PhilArchive

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

My notes

Similar books and articles

Perceptual experience, conscious content, and nonconceptual content.Uriah Kriegel - 2004 - Essays in Philosophy 5 (1):1-14.
Perceptual Content Defended.Susanna Schellenberg - 2011 - Noûs 45 (4):714 - 750.
The Relational and Representational Character of Perceptual Experience.Susanna Schellenberg - 2014 - In B. Brogaard (ed.), Does Perception Have Content. Oxford University Press. pp. 199-219.
Representationalism and Anti-Representationalism About Perceptual Experience.Keith A. Wilson - 2013 - Dissertation, University of Warwick
Ambiguous figures and the spatial contents of perceptual experience: a defense of representationalism.René Jagnow - 2011 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (3):325-346.
The Phenomenological Problem of Perception.Boyd Millar - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (3):625-654.
A Nonrepresentational Approach to Perception.Jason Leddington - 2011 - In Georg Bertram, Robin Celikates, Christophe Laudou & David Lauer (eds.), Expérience et Réflexivité. L'Harmattan. pp. 45-54.
The phenomenological directness of perceptual experience.Boyd Millar - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (2):235-253.
The Nonconceptual Representational Content of Perceptual Experience.Wayne Thomas Wright - 1999 - Dissertation, Temple University
Strong representationalism and centered content.Berit Brogaard - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 151 (3):373 - 392.
Experience and content.Alex Byrne - 2009 - Philosophical Quarterly 59 (236):429-451.
Affordances and the nature of perceptual content.Jan Almäng - 2008 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 16 (2):161-177.
Recent Work on Naive Realism.James Genone - 2016 - American Philosophical Quarterly 53 (1).
Perception, Non-Propositional Content and the Justification of Perceptual Judgments.Jan Almäng - 2014 - Metaphysica 15 (1):1-23.
Does Perceptual Content Have to Be Objective? A Defence of Nonconceptualism.Eva Schmidt - 2015 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 46 (1):201-214.

Analytics

Added to PP
2016-01-12

Downloads
1,154 (#10,906)

6 months
115 (#35,428)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Ayoob Shahmoradi
University of California, San Diego

Citations of this work

The Disjunctive Theory of Perception.Matthew Soteriou - 2009 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2009 edition).

Add more citations

References found in this work

The Predictive Mind.Jakob Hohwy - 2013 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.
Reference and Consciousness.John Campbell - 2002 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
The representational character of experience.David J. Chalmers - 2004 - In Brian Leiter (ed.), The Future for Philosophy. Oxford University Press. pp. 153--181.
Perceiving: A Philosophical Study.Roderick M. Chisholm - 1957 - Ithaca,: Cornell University Press.

View all 45 references / Add more references