Can Selection Effects on Experience Influence its Rational Role?

In Tamar Szabó Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology: Volume 4. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK. pp. 240 (2013)
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Abstract

I distinguish between two kinds of selection effects on experience: selection of objects or features for experience, and anti-selection of experiences for cognitive uptake. I discuss the idea that both kinds of selection effects can lead to a form of confirmation bias at the level of perception, and argue that when this happens, selection effects can influence the rational role of experience.

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Susanna Siegel
Harvard University

Citations of this work

Scepticism and Implicit Bias.Jennifer Saul - 2013 - Disputatio 5 (37):243-263.
Perception and Its Modalities.Dustin Stokes, Mohan Matthen & Stephen Biggs (eds.) - 2014 - New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

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References found in this work

The origin of concepts.Susan Carey - 2009 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Perception and the fall from Eden.David J. Chalmers - 2006 - In Tamar Szabó Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press. pp. 49--125.
The Logic of Scientific Discovery.K. Popper - 1959 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 10 (37):55-57.
Evidentialism.Richard Feldman & Earl Conee - 1985 - Philosophical Studies 48 (1):15 - 34.
The transparency of experience.Michael G. F. Martin - 2002 - Mind and Language 17 (4):376-425.

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