Indiscriminability and the phenomenal

Philosophical Studies 120 (1-3):91-112 (2004)
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Abstract

In this paper, I describe and criticize M.G.F. Martin's version of disjunctivism, and his argument for it from premises about self-knowledge.

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Susanna Siegel
Harvard University

Citations of this work

Why Naive Realism?Heather Logue - 2012 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 112 (2pt2):211-237.
Why explain visual experience in terms of content?Adam Pautz - 2010 - In Bence Nanay (ed.), Perceiving the World. Oxford University Press. pp. 254--309.
Hallucination and Its Objects.Alex Byrne & Riccardo Manzotti - 2022 - Philosophical Review 131 (3):327-359.
Either / or.Alex Byrne & Heather Logue - 2008 - In Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: perception, action, knowledge. Oxford University Press. pp. 57-94.

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