Blame, punishment and intermediate options

Edinburgh Law Review 28 (2):235-241 (2024)
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Abstract

In this paper I explore some ideas inspired by Federico Picinali’s Justice In-Between: A Study of Intermediate Criminal Verdicts. Picinali makes a case for the introduction of intermediate options in criminal trials – verdicts with consequences that are harsher than an acquittal, but not so harsh as a conviction. From a certain perspective, the absence of intermediate options in criminal trials is puzzling – out of kilter with much of our everyday decision-making and, perhaps, with the recommendations of expected utility theory. I will argue, however, that the lack of intermediate options is much less puzzling when put in the context of our ordinary practices of blame and non-legal punishment.

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Martin Smith
University of Edinburgh

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References found in this work

Belief, credence, and norms.Lara Buchak - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (2):1-27.
The disvalue of knowledge.David Papineau - 2019 - Synthese 198 (6):5311-5332.
Legal Probabilism: A Qualified Defence.Brian Hedden & Mark Colyvan - 2019 - Journal of Political Philosophy 27 (4):448-468.
The Foundations of Criminal Law Epistemology.Lewis Ross - 2022 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 9.

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