Cartesian Dualism
Dissertation, Brown University (
1984)
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Abstract
"Cartesian Dualism" is a systematic examination of a version of mind-body dualism in light of recent work in the philosophy of mind and the theory of reference. I analyze Descartes' modal argument for dualism and argue that some of the principal objections against dualism are not decisive. The thesis is divided into five sections. ;The first section sets forth the main features of Descartes' ontology and his theory of mind. I defend Descartes' theory of individuation and discuss recent conceptions of physical objects and properties. ;In the second section I argue that there are serious problems facing theories of mind that eliminate a phenomenological first person perspective. I criticize several attempts to analyze inverted spectrum and qualia thought experiments from a functionalist perspective. I also consider recent theories of reference which hold that a person's identification of her psychological state is dependent upon her physical environment and the conventional meaning of words. ;The third section examines several treatments of first person reference that are incompatible with Cartesian dualism. I review work by Malcolm, Anscombe, Kenny, Strawson, and Mackie. ;The fourth section outlines Descartes' arguments for mind-body dualism which appear in his major works and correspondence. I clarify the use of de re and de dicto modality in different versions of the modal argument and formulate that I take to be an at least prima facie plausible version of the argument. ;Section five focuses upon two major objections to dualism. The first is the dualism leads to intractable problems concerning the individuation of persons. The second challenges the dualist interactionist on the basis of an ostensibly plausible principle of causation. It seems that causal relations among particulars derive from relations among the particulars' properties and relations. It is not clear what properties and relations a nonphysical person might instantiate that would account for the causal relations between it and some physical object. I maintain that neither objection is decisive