Belief Radicalism and Cognitive Viruses

Abstract

Abstract: What this paper proposes is 1) that Gettier problems are noticeably similar to a computer virus (I call it a cognitive virus) and 2) that the Gettier problems are an incredibly good argument for what I refer to as Belief Radicalism. I will argue that we never have more than beliefs based on evidential beliefs or evidential inferences and that all propositions including logical ones can be reformatted as beliefs with no loss of explanatory power. What we mean by true and fact is that there is a category of justified belief about which we believe there can be no substantial contrary evidence. The goal of this paper is to show that knowledge is a redundant concept deriving from “folk psychology” and that this concept can be eliminated and replaced with justified beliefs.

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Tristan Tondino
McGill University

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