Abstract
When Goodman put forward his “New Riddle of Induction”, he distinguished if from the old problem of justifying the so-called “Principle of Uniformity of Nature”: proving that the future will resemble the past, and that still standing lawful regularities will continue to hold. He intended to break with these ancient questions, while asking about lawlike generalizations and projectible predicates instead: how are we to separate those generalizations which are rightfully confirmed by their observed instances (i.e. nomological) and those accidental ones which are nonetheless empirically equivalent? One shall not seek a ground for induction anymore, but a criterion for nomological hypothesis. Therefore Goodman’s claim seems twofold: (A) one has to face a second problem of induction, which is distinct from the old one while genuinely being a problem about induction, and (B) this new problem is solvable by a criterion of empirical confirmability, which discriminates nomological from accidental generalizations. We claim that one cannot genuinely (A) face this new problem of induction while (B) looking for such a criterion. Indeed, we argue, when one compares several hypothesis or generalizations on the same observational basis, then they must appear as equally nomological. Conversely, if one is considering hypothesis or generalizations which are not equally nomological, then one is actually unable to compare them on the same observational basis, hence to formulate the “New Riddle”. Therefore the issue raised in (A) cannot be adequately solved in (B). Yet we do accept the claim (A) that a new and distinct problem of induction is to be confronted. Thus we deny that (B) offer an adequate type of solutions to this problem, which we shall finally formulate in a more suitable manner.