McCaghwell’s Reading of Scotus’s De Anima (1639)

Modern Schoolman 89 (1-2):95-115 (2012)
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Abstract

In this paper the authors deals with the relation between the Irish Franciscan Hugh McCaghwell’s commentary on Scotus’s De anima (1639) and Suárez’s (1621). It is shown that the latter provided a model and a reference text for McCaghwell who reproduces the philosopher’s thought within his commentary. Moreover, the explicit and implicit quotations of Suárez are taken into account: far from admitting his debt, McCaghwell criticizes the philosopher when he does not seem to follow the Scotist path. The commentary’s sections analysed are those concerning the Scotist account of abstraction and the cognition of material substances.

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