Abstract

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:155. REMARKS ON P. S. WADIA" S 'PHILO CONFOUNDED' In responding to Professor Wadia's paper in McGiIl Hume Studies, I will attempt to show why his analysis of the illustrative analogies in Part III of the Dialogues fails to capture what it is that Cleanthes sought to accomplish through them. On p. 285, Wadia begins his discussion of Part III and admits to being bewildered because one expects Cleanthes to confine his illustrations to familiar things in the world around him. One wonders, however, why Wadia thinks the ilustrations should be so confined, since it is precisely matters such as these for which the Design Argument is attempting to account through the hypothesis of an intelligent external artificer - an hypothesis which Philo refuses to accept in this regard. Contrary to what Wadia maintains, there is one occasion in Part III where Cleanthes' defense does have recourse to natural phenomena. On p. 154 he asks Philo to consider, anatomise the eye, and behold the male and female of each species, the correspondence of their parts and instincts, their passions and whole course of life before and after generation to be persuaded that the most obvious conclusion surely is in favour of design! Cleanthes explains Philo's resistance to this most obvious conclusion as due to too luxuriant a fertility, which suppresses your natural good sense, by a profusion of unnecessary scruples and objections. (DNR155) On two occasions in Part III-in the first paragraph and once again toward the end of the seventh - Cleanthes comments on Philo's 'blindness' in rejecting the inference from natural phenomena to an intelligent cause of design. Given this assessment of Philo by Cleanthes, the employment of imaginary examples is easily appreciated inasmuch as actual examples have been impotent in convincing Philo. Just how these imaginary examples are relevant to his position has yet to be discussed; but the use of imaginary illustrations is not bewildering. 156. In setting the stage for his central claim on Cleanthes* intended use of his illustrations, Wadia seriously misrepresents the disagreement between Philo and Cleanthes. At one point (p. 286) he takes Philo to be arguing that empirical evidence regarding an intelligent designer is actually inconceivable. But, in fact, this was not Philo's position in Part II at all. Philo finds it easy indeed to conceive of the empirical evidence required to support the conclusion of the Design Argument, namely, the world must sufficiently resemble some thing which is known to be intelligently contrived to enable us to classify it as a further instance of that kind of thing. If this could be done, the principle 'like effects prove like causes' could be used to infer an intelligent cause for the design of the world. Philo, of course, denies that the required resemblance can be found. However, as I have shown, he never denies that it is conceivable. One page earlier, Wadia offers an account of Philo's position in Part II which is also incorrect. He argues that since, for Philo, an inference to the existence of an intelligent designer of the world requires having seen worlds formed under our eyes, this claim amounts to saying that it is impossible for there to be empirical evidence relevant to the conclusion of the Design Argument, because no one can satisfy this condition. Philo's argument in Part II, however, is not this one. He begins by considering how the world must present itself to justify reasoning by analogy to an intelligent designer. And it is only because the required resemblances between the world and objects of human contrivance are not present, that he offers 'seeing worlds formed under our eyes' as a condition which must be satisfied if the inference to an intelligent designer is to be acceptable. Now since Philo himself entertains possible states of the world which, if they existed, would constitute evidence for an intelligent designer, Wadia is mistaken in attributing "the impossibility claim* 157. to Philo. For Wadia to argue successfully regarding Philo's adoption of 'the impossibility claim' he must show that Philo has argues that it is impossible for the world to resemble objects of human contrivance - a position which Philo never...