Abstract

Ethnic slurs have recently raised interest in philosophy of language. Consider (1) Yao is Chinese and (2) Yao is a chink. A theory of meaning should take into account the fact that sentence (2) has the property of containing a slur, a feature plausibly motivating an utterance of (2) rather than (1), and conveys contempt because it contains that word. According to multipropositionalism, two utterances can have the same official truth conditions and the same truth-value but differ in cognitive significance (Korta and Perry, 2011). I contend that (1) and (2) have the same official content, and say the same thing, but differ in cognitive significance. I argue that slurs have linguistic meaning as type conveying that the designated group (Chinese for example) is despicable because it is that very group. Knowing the use of a slur is knowing the group it targets and that that group is despicable because it is that group. The idea that that group, Chinese for example, is despicable because of being Chinese is conventionally implicated. Specific prejudices slurs convey are not semantically carried, and cannot be identified by using semantic competence only. My view account for slurs in propositional attitudes, and for the fact that ‘Yao is not a chink, he is Chinese’ is not a contradiction.