Abstract

Several of these essays--all but one-elucidate some aspect of Kant's new notion of "objectivity," that notion crucial to the transcendental foundation of universal and necessary knowledge intended to supersede the conflict of earlier "realisms" and "idealisms." And among these essays, all but one looks favorably upon Kant's effort. In the case of Moltke Gram's essay, a defense of Kant's refutations of idealism includes an argument for the consistency of the versions in the A and B editions of the Critique, and a denial that the refutations require proofs of things in themselves; Kant succeeds in proving the existence of objects external to us. In the argument of the Fourth Paralogism, transcendentality is the key to the victory of objectivity: "If you say with Kant that all perceptual objects are transcendentally ideal, you are saying that perceptual objects which are spatial are as immediately available as mental objects", or that objects as causes of effects in our sensory apparatus are not merely inferred from their effects. Direct awareness of objects, albeit only phenomenal, distinguishes "empirical realism" from inference-making "empirical idealism".