Abstract

This paper delves into Jody Azzouni's ideas on the ontology of fictional characters. Azzouni interestingly maintains that even though fictional characters like Hermione Granger, Sherlock Holmes, and Mickey Mouse do not exist in reality, assertions about them can still be true. However, Azzouni dismisses the necessity of these characters to be ontologically real to validate the truth of sentences concerning them. Instead, Azzouni proposes that truth in speech and thought corresponds with the world, but not necessarily by attributing properties and relations to tangible things in it. This stance opposes the conventional philosophical notion that every true statement must directly represent an aspect of reality. This paper scrutinizes Azzouni’s argument and appreciates his attempt to dissociate ontology from the truth in fictional discourse. Nonetheless, it also recognizes certain gaps in this perspective. The paper endeavors to refine and extend Azzouni's approach by introducing the concept of 'metaphysical explanation', which explains the truth of statements about fictional characters by correlating them to relevant acts of fiction, rather than positing the reality of fictional entities. This extension preserves the essence of Azzouni’s view while addressing its limitations, thus paving the way for a more comprehensive understanding of how we can talk truly about fictional characters without holding that such entities are real in any sense.