Free Agents as Cause

In Klaus Petrus (ed.), On Human Persons. Heusenstamm Nr Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag. pp. 183-194 (2003)
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Abstract

The dilemma of free will is that if actions are caused deterministically, then they are not free, and if they are not caused deterministically then they are not free either because then they happen by chance and are not up to the agent. I propose a conception of free will that solves this dilemma. It can be called agent causation but it differs from what Chisholm and others have called so

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10.1515/9783110324648.183

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Daniel von Wachter
International Academy of Philosophy In The Principality of Liechtenstein

Citations of this work

Defending design arguments against Plantinga.Daniel von Wachter - 2014 - Philosophia Reformata 79 (1):54-65.
Kein Gehirnereignis kann ein späteres festlegen.Daniel von Wachter - 2012 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 66 (3):393-408.
Wunder verletzen die Naturgesetze nicht.Daniel von Wachter - 2017 - In Benedikt Paul Göcke & Ruben Schneider (eds.), Gottes Handeln in der Welt. Regensburg: Verlag Friedrich Pustet. pp. 361-382.
Do the Results of Divine Actions Have Preceding Causes?Daniel von Wachter - 2011 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 3 (2):347-367.

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References found in this work

Autonomous Agents: From Self Control to Autonomy.Alfred R. Mele - 1995 - New York, US: Oxford University Press.
Persons and Causes: The Metaphysics of Free Will.Timothy O'Connor - 2000 - New York, US: Oxford University Press USA.
The facts of causation.D. H. Mellor - 1995 - New York: Routledge.
The Evolution of the Soul.Richard Swinburne - 1986 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Causal Asymmetries.Daniel M. Hausman - 1998 - New York: Cambridge University Press.

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