Self-Supporting Strategies and Equilibria in Games

American Philosophical Quarterly 36 (4):323 - 336 (1999)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

A strategic equilibrium is a profile of strategies that are each self-supporting given the profile. Strategic equilibria exist in games without Nash equilibria.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,497

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

The incompleteness of theories of games.Marcelo Tsuji, Newton C. A. Costa & Francisco A. Doria - 1998 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 27 (6):553-568.
Correlated strategies as Institutions.Daniel G. M. Arce - 1997 - Theory and Decision 42 (3):271-285.
Signalling games select horn strategies.Robert van Rooy - 2004 - Linguistics and Philosophy 27 (4):493-527.

Analytics

Added to PP
2011-05-29

Downloads
14 (#997,421)

6 months
3 (#984,719)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Paul Weirich
University of Missouri, Columbia

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references