Not knowing you know: a new objection to the defeasibility theory of knowledge

Analysis 75 (2):213-217 (2015)
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Abstract

Foley and Turri have recently given objections to the defeasibility theory of propositional knowledge. Here, I give an objection of a quite different stripe by looking at what the theory must say about knowing that you know. I end with some remarks on how this objection relates to rival theories and how this might be a worry for some of these

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John N. Williams
Singapore Management University

References found in this work

Knowledge: Undefeated justified true belief.Keith Lehrer & Thomas Paxson - 1969 - Journal of Philosophy 66 (8):225-237.
Assertion, Knowledge, and Lotteries.Jonathan L. Kvanvig - 2009 - In P. Greenough & D. Pritchard (eds.), Williamson on Knowledge. Oxford University Press. pp. 140--160.
Certainty, a refutation of scepticism.Peter David Klein - 1981 - Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Knowledge, Truth and Evidence.Keith Lehrer - 1965 - Analysis 25 (5):168 - 175.
A proposed definition of propositional knowledge.Peter D. Klein - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (16):471-482.

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