The Principal Principle Implies the Principle of Indifference

, , &
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 68 (1):123-131 (2017)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

We argue that David Lewis’s principal principle implies a version of the principle of indifference. The same is true for similar principles that need to appeal to the concept of admissibility. Such principles are thus in accord with objective Bayesianism, but in tension with subjective Bayesianism. 1 The Argument2 Some Objections Met.

Categories

Keywords

Reprint years

DOI

10.1093/bjps/axv030

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,075

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

My notes

Similar books and articles

Is it the Principal Principle that implies the Principle of Indifference?Balazs Gyenis & Leszek Wronski - 2017 - In Gábor Hofer-Szabó & Leszek Wroński (eds.), Making it Formally Explicit: Probability, Causality and Indeterminism. Cham: Springer International Publishing.
The Principal Principle Implies the Principle of Indifference.James Hawthorne, Jürgen Landes, Christian Wallmann & Jon Williamson - 2017 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 68 (1):axv030.
The Principal Principle, admissibility, and normal informal standards of what is reasonable.Jürgen Landes, Christian Wallmann & Jon Williamson - 2021 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 11 (2):1-15.
The Principal Principle does not imply the Principle of Indifference.Richard Pettigrew - 2017 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axx060.
The Principal Principle Does Not Imply the Principle of Indifference.Richard Pettigrew - 2020 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 71 (2):605-619.
The Principal Principle Does Not Imply the Principle of Indifference, Because Conditioning on Biconditionals Is Counterintuitive.Michael G. Titelbaum & Casey Hart - 2020 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 71 (2):621-632.
A closer look at the 'new' principle.Michael Strevens - 1995 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 46 (4):545-561.
The Typical Principle.Isaac Wilhelm - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
Chance, credence, and the principal principle.Robert Black - 1998 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 49 (3):371-385.
Explaining (One Aspect of) the Principal Principle without (Much) Metaphysics.Katrina Elliott - 2016 - Philosophy of Science 83 (4):480-499.
“The Thing To Do” Implies “Can”.Nicholas Southwood - 2016 - Noûs 50 (1):61-72.
Measure theoretic analysis of consistency of the Principal Principle.Miklós Rédei & Zalán Gyenis - 2016 - Philosophy of Science 83 (5):972-987.
On the principal principle and imprecise subjective Bayesianism: A reply to Christian Wallmann and Jon Williamson.Marc Fischer - 2021 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 11 (2):1-10.
The Principle of Indifference and Inductive Scepticism.Robert Smithson - 2017 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 68 (1):253-272.
Indifference to Anti-Humean Chances.J. Dmitri Gallow - 2022 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 52 (5):485-501.

Analytics

Added to PP
2023-06-13

Downloads
21 (#739,108)

6 months
17 (#149,054)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author Profiles

Jürgen Landes
Università degli Studi di Milano
Jon Williamson
University of Kent
James Hawthorne
University of Oklahoma

Citations of this work

Calibration for epistemic causality.Jon Williamson - 2021 - Erkenntnis 86 (4):941-960.
The Principal Principle and subjective Bayesianism.Christian Wallmann & Jon Williamson - 2019 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 10 (1):1-14.

View all 13 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references