Information on the current prevalence and types of consanguineous marriages in Malakand District, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province (KPK), Pakistan, was collected from 1192 rural couples. Some 66.4% of marriages were between couples related as second cousins or closer (F≥0.0156), equivalent to a mean coefficient of inbreeding (α) of 0.0338. The data suggest that the prevalence of consanguineous unions in Malakand has been increasing during the last decade, in response to the high levels of violence across KPK.

In the whole universe, from the lowest beings to the highest ones, love permeates through the entire world of existence. Love is one of the hallmarks and perfections of existence in animals. This survey was done to illuminate and explain Mullah Sadra’s ontological viewpoint on the entity of sentiments and the inborn and innate love in the existence of non-human animals. The analytic and descriptive method was used to conduct this study and research. An animal is one of the creatures (...) in the essence of the existence that possesses its own perfect attributes. Animals have souls, the effects of which are life, perception, free choice, and emotions. Animals have an order for their existence, and they are attributed with perfection to the extent of their intensity and weakness. That is to say, all animals are not at the same level. Their perfection is also the same as their existence is. There is life, perception, and love in animals, but it depends on their proportion of existence. All animals are in love, but every animal having the highest share of its rank enjoys more love. Mullah Sadra’s ontological principles in proving the existence and flow of love in animals are that the existence is ‘original,’ ‘non-composite,’ ‘equivocal,’ and ‘coextensive’ with life, conception and love, and ‘God, the Almighty, is the true Beloved of all beings including animals’ souls.’ Evolutionarily, animals can only move to the point where humanity of human beings begins. (shrink)

Generation of swing phase limb trajectory over obstacles during locomotion should be a reasonable test for the λ model proposed by Feldman and Levin. The observed features such as lack of simple amplitude scaling of endpoint (toe) trajectories for different obstacle heights, complex shaped toe velocity profiles, and exploitation of passive intersegmental dynamics to control limb elevation cannot be adequately explained by the λ model.

The ongoing coronavirus 2019 pandemic caused by the severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 has resulted in a severe ramification on the global healthcare system, principally because of its easy transmission and the extended period of the virus survival on contaminated surfaces. With the advances in computer-aided diagnosis and artificial intelligence, this paper presents the application of deep learning and adversarial network for the automatic identification of COVID-19 pneumonia in computed tomography scans of the lungs. The complexity and time limitation (...) of the reverse transcription-polymerase chain reaction swab test makes it disadvantageous to depend solely on as COVID-19’s central diagnostic mechanism. Since CT imaging systems are of low cost and widely available, we demonstrate that the drawback of the RT-PCR can be alleviated with a faster, automated, and reduced contact diagnostic process via the use of a neural network model for the classification of infected and noninfected CT scans. In our proposed model, we explore the benefit of transfer learning as a means of resolving the problem of inadequate dataset and the importance of semisupervised generative adversarial network for the extraction of well-mapped features and generation of image data. Our experimental evaluation indicates that the proposed semisupervised model achieves reliable classification, taking advantage of the reflective loss distance between the real data sample space and the generated data. (shrink)

Introduction Substitute decision making on behalf of incapable patients is based on the ethical principle of ‘respect for autonomy’. This study was conducted to assess patients' wishes and preferences in terms of a substitute decision maker and determinants of such preferences. Methods The authors conducted a cross-sectional study and selected samples randomly from patients presenting at Farabi Eye Hospital clinics who were 18 years of age or older. Questionnaires were completed through interviews. Results 200 patients between the ages of 18 (...) and 83 years were interviewed. About 52% (N=105) were men and 73% (N=77) were married. Among married patients, the spouse was chosen as the substitute decision maker in only 51% of cases. Single men preferred their father first in 36% (N=9) of cases, while single girls chose their father in 5.6% (N=1) of cases and their most prevalent choice was other unmentioned people (33.3%, N=6). Most patients (93.5%) wished to be asked about their substitute decision maker when hospitalised. Conclusion The results of this study show that the people we usually consult for decisions concerning patient treatment are significantly different from the patients' preferred substitute decision makers. The authors suggest patients be allowed to choose their substitute decision maker while conscious. (shrink)

In the form of a case study and based upon novel material about the reception of Spinoza’s Theological–Political Treatise in Iran, this paper studies issues with the interactions among political, theological and philosophical ideas in the reception of Spinoza’s TTP. The paper starts with the first Iranian encounters with Spinoza’s philosophy in the Qajar era in the nineteenth century and then focuses on the reception of the TTP in the period after the 1979 Islamic Revolution. The first translation of the (...) TTP was prepared in the 1990s by Muḥsin Jahāngīrī, but he withheld the manuscript from being published. I discuss the arguments that led him to withhold the publication of his translation; in this context, it will be important to consider the tumultuous religious and political debates, and broader questions as to the legitimacy of political power will also prove relevant. The first doctoral dissertation in Persian about the TTP will be described, followed by a description of a digital translation of the twentieth chapter of the TTP, which was published after the 2009 election protests. The article ends with discussing translator Ali Ferdowsi’s motivation to produce the first complete Persian translation of the TTP, published in Tehran in 2017. In conclusion, it will be discussed to which extent the theocratic political context in the country caused interest in the TTP. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:On the Importance of Conceptual ContrastsMadness, Reason, and Mad PrideAwais Aftab, MD (bio)Garson (2023) offers an engaging historical and philosophical discussion around the importance Late Modern thinkers assigned to the task of differentiating madness from idiocy (or more specifically, to the tripartite distinction of sanity, madness, and idiocy). Based on this analysis, Garson’s identifies the need to offer a positive account of mental illness—one that does not define (...) the essence of mental illness exclusively as the absence, lack, or failure of the power of reasoning. Following the Late Modern thinkers (Locke, Kant, Wigan, and Heinroth), Garson concludes that madness is infused with reason, and what characterizes madness is the presence of reason in an altered and mutated form. This is all worth taking seriously. My own assessment of this historical and philosophical material nonetheless differs from that of Garson. To recognize madness as possessing reason within it in an altered form may be of less profound significance than he thinks it is. Garson’s discussion commendably highlights the importance of making conceptual contrasts explicit in definitional debates, and this should indeed lead us to search for contrasts that are more philosophically illuminating (what is better will depend on the context of inquiry). However, in my view, the recognition of madness as altered reason neither reframes the project of defining “mental disorder” nor does it provide an intellectual scaffolding for mad activism.The significance of “madness contains reason within in but in an altered or perverse form” is difficult to translate into contemporary scientific terms, and the fuzziness and historical baggage around the terms “madness,” “reason,” and “perversion” does not make it easy. “Mental disorder” or “psychopathology” means to us something quite different than what madness meant to Late Modern thinkers, and while “madness” remains a popular term in philosophical literature, there is no clarity on the nature of overlap between the domain of madness and the domain of conditions currently classified by the diagnostic manuals. Mental disorders, as currently conceptualized, include a motley of conditions that were previously characterized using terms such as idiocy, madness, neuroses, and psychopathic personalities. [End Page 297]From our contemporary vantage point, to compare idiocy and madness is to make a distinction within the domain of psychopathology. We are comparing two groups of psychiatric conditions. The lessons we derive from this comparison do not necessarily extrapolate well to a comparison of mental disorders with something outside the domain of psychopathology. To the extent that psychopathology is inclusive of both idiocy and madness, psychiatric disorders both contain and do not contain “reason” within them. The domain is heterogenous in this regard, and broad generalizations about the nature of reason in the mental disorders would be simplistic at best and inaccurate at worst. Other distinctions that we have made within the domain of psychopathology have included organic versus functional, neurosis versus psychosis, categories versus continua, and distinctions used within nosology have included operationalized criteria versus phenomenology, idiographic versus nomothetic, medical versus non-medical, description versus explanation, and so on (Aftab & Ryznar, 2021; Zachar, Banicki, & Aftab, 2023), all of which have the potential to offer a positive account of some aspect of psychopathology.It is worth nothing that the distinction between “absence of reason” versus “perversion of reason” is analogous to the common distinction between absence of function and altered function in patho-physiology. Such a distinction exists for almost every function that exists. Consider vision: absence of vision (blindness) and altered vision (illusions, distortions, hallucinations). Consider hypoesthesia (reduced sense of touch) and paraesthesia (altered sense of touch—tingling, pricking, burning, etc.). Garson alludes to diminished sexual capacity versus paraphilia as an analogy, but he does not seem to appreciate that the analogy applies much more broadly. Is the distinction between absence of reason versus perversion of reason of any greater significance than the distinction between blindness and hallucination? If we were to say, “What distinguishes hallucination from blindness is not the failure, absence, or lack of sight, but its presence—albeit in a perverse and mutated form,” how profound would it really be for our notions of disorder? Or imagine some Late Modern physician saying that a disturbance of speech and... (shrink)

In this commentary on Anneli Jefferson’s book “Are Mental Disorders Brain Disorders?,” I offer an overview of her central thesis, and then propose my own modified account of when we are justified in calling mental disorders as “brain disorders.” In doing so, I draw on recent work in neuroscience that understands the relationship between brain and behavior in complex, dynamic, and computational terms. In particular, I disagree with Jefferson’s criterion of sufficiency, that a particular brain process should always realize a (...) psychological dysfunction. I propose that a psychiatric disorder can be said to be a brain disorder if there are empirically identifiable systematic brain differences associated with it and if these associations are contextualized within a scientifically robust theoretical understanding of the relationship between brain and behavior. I conclude by preliminary reflections on whether the issue of “mental disorder” versus “brain disorder” comes down to “the language of psychology” versus “the language of neuroscience,” and the degree to which the former can be expressed in the latter. (shrink)

This article is an up-dated version of Gordon Brown's ontological approach to education. It tests the hypothesis that Roy Bhaskar's critical realism can successfully underpin education by applying...

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Future Is Political and TransdisciplinaryAwais Aftab (bio)Philosophy, psychiatry, & psychology (PPP) is a transdisciplinary oasis, one of the few journals in mental health care that facilitate a meaningful dialogue between philosophers, psychiatrists, psychologists, and scholars from related disciplines. The fact that PPP successfully provides such a space is of no small importance, especially from my perspective as a psychiatrist. The multidisciplinary nature of the undertaking has been (...) a central aspect of the identity of the journal from the very beginning. PPP has maintained this transdisciplinary inclusive spirit over the years, and its editorial and advisory boards remain richly representative, but the challenge of ensuring continued participation of clinicians is not insubstantial. After all, the point is not token participation, but a robust and transformative interdisciplinary engagement. Clinicians have much to contribute to philosophical debates, however, such capacity for dialogue requires sustained cultivation (Aftab & Waterman, 2021), and forces in medical education have led to a situation where comparatively fewer psychiatrists have the interest or the ability to engage in such rigorous dialogue with philosophers. Philosophy of mental health has grown and specialized exponentially since the mid-90s. Keeping up with this literature is difficult even for philosophers, it is no small feat for full-time clinicians.This means that PPP and its affiliate organizations have a responsibility to take a more active role in supporting educational initiatives to ensure that future generations of psychiatric clinicians are able to contribute to philosophical debates, and that philosophy of psychiatry does not become divorced from clinical and practical concerns. My advice to clinicians based on my experience would be two-fold: first, it is essential to acquire a basic familiarity with the philosophy of psychiatry literature. Aftab and Waterman (2021) offer a sample list of reading recommendations. At the time of this writing, the International Network for Philosophy and Psychiatry is also undertaking efforts to develop curricula aimed at clinicians. Second, it is important to find ways to interact with others in the philosophy of psychiatry community. Formal avenues to do so include the annual meetings of the Association for the Advancement of Philosophy and Psychiatry and the Philosophy Special Interest Group of the Royal College of Psychiatrists, among others. There are also various online communities active on social media that many find helpful.In recent years, we have seen an unprecedented enthusiasm and support for inclusion of lived experience in mental health care. This is a welcome and much needed development, but we are only just beginning to scratch the surface of [End Page 5] how to philosophically navigate this inclusion. Frameworks such as standpoint epistemology and epistemic justice offer us starting points (Knox, 2022), but much remains to be worked out (Aftab, 2022). There are notable philosophical challenges, such as ascertaining the limits of lived experience, and the biases and errors to which it is vulnerable; the application of scientific method and philosophical criticism to lived experience; methods to resolve disagreements when different forms of lived experience contradict each other; handling discrepancies between knowledge from lived experience and knowledge from other sources be handled; and analyzing the intersection of politics of lived experience with other differentials of power. I anticipate that these topics will be of central importance to the field and to the journal in the coming years.It is also vital that philosophy of psychiatry engage with the sociopolitical dimensions of madness (Kalathil & Jones, 2016). The failure of philosophy to do so in a meaningful way has already been articulated powerfully by commentators such as Nev Jones (2022). An important aspect of acknowledging philosophy's failures in this regard comes from the notion of "elite capture," recently popularized by Olúfẹ́mi O. Táíwò (2022). It refers to how progressive philosophical ideas such as standpoint epistemology are co-opted by the "elite" to serve their own ends. Discussions on social media have already begun to point out that concepts in philosophy of psychiatry such as "epistemic injustice" show signs of elite capture by the psychiatric establishment, resulting in token participation but no systemic changes. Philosophy of psychiatry needs to tackle its own vulnerability to co-option. This will require creative forms of philosophizing and engagement with... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Can The Psychopathologized Speak?Notes on Social Objectivity and Psychiatric ScienceAwais Aftab*, MD (bio)In "Exclusion of Psychopathologized Standpoints Due to Hermeneutical Ignorance Undermines Psychiatric Objectivity" (2022), Bennett Knox offers a compelling argument that failure of psychiatric community to engage with the "psychopathologized" in processes such as the revision of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) constitutes a form of epistemic injustice and threatens the social objectivity (...) of psychiatric science. I find myself in agreement with the central thesis and I am glad to see it articulated so well by Knox. While it is clear that the exclusion of psychopathologized standpoints in psychiatric science cannot be justified, there are issues that arise that require further clarification, and may generate disagreements, when we consider the complexities of how this inclusion is to take place, what requirements can be imposed on this process of inclusion, and the relationship between the DSM and psychiatric science broadly when it comes to social objectivity.The Methodological Objectivity of the DSM Does Not Exhaust the Methodological Objectivity of Psychiatric ScienceThe DSM is a nosological project within a particular historical context, operating with a certain set of assumptions (Aftab & Ryznar, 2021). The DSM has limitations in terms of what sorts of perspectives it can meaningfully incorporate, but the limitations of the DSM are not the limitations of psychiatric science. This is because psychiatric science is a pluralistic domain and includes many different methodologies and perspectives (Jerotic & Aftab, 2021). As one example, the DSM is poorly equipped to capture the phenomenology of psychiatric conditions. It is not something that it sets out to do. This, however, only becomes a serious problem if we adopt the attitude "if it's not in the DSM then it doesn't really count." Unfortunately, many in the psychiatric community have [End Page 267] adopted this sort of attitude, at least implicitly, resulting in a serious neglect of phenomenology (and various other perspectives, including those of the psychopathologized), leading Nancy Andreasen to bemoan the "death of phenomenology." (Andreasen, 2007) The DSM is methodologically limited by design; there are things that it will fail to do. The appropriate response is to acknowledge these inherent limitations. Other perspectives such as neurodiversity or Hearing Voices Movement also bring their own sets of assumptions and limitations. The DSM is simply one element, one perspective, one methodology in a scientific field that is capable of and ought to adopt a plurality of perspectives and methodologies. This is worth pointing out because Knox appears to assume that if it proves difficult or impossible for the DSM to include radically diverse perspectives, then "all the worse for psychiatry's objectivity." If it is impossible for the DSM, that does not mean that it is also impossible for psychiatric science.1In Determining What Counts as Inappropriate Exclusion, What Is the Role of Scientific Expertise?Longino herself brings up this question: "in determining what counts as inappropriate exclusion of dissenting perspectives, does it matter what kind of issue is involved? Are the duties of inclusion different when the question is, Should we be trying to learn about such and such, for example, atomic fission? than when it is, Is atomic fission a controllable or uncontrollable process?" (Longino, 2002, p. 133) The danger that needs to be averted here is that of trivializing expertise and placing experts on an equal footing with non-experts, a danger that is strikingly illustrated by our social response to the coronavirus disease 2019 pandemic.Take an example from medicine. Individuals with lung cancer have a lot to offer when it comes to the treatment of lung cancer, including their experiences of care, and choice of, say, aggressive chemotherapy vs palliative comfort care, etc. but how much do they have to contribute on the matter of the histopathological classification of lung cancer? Consider the Hierarchical Taxonomy of Psychopathology (HiTOP) (Kotov et al., 2021). This quantitative nosological project has a very specific aim: to determine the patterns of covariation among psychiatric symptoms using statistical techniques such as factor analysis. This... (shrink)

This study aimed to identify the antibiotic-relevant lessons from the controlled drug regimen for narcotics. Whereas several elements of the United Nations Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs could be advantageous for antibiotics, we doubt that an international legally binding agreement for controlling antibiotic consumption would be any more effective than implementing stewardship measures through national AMR plans.

Business Ethics, the Environment & Responsibility, Volume 31, Issue 2, Page 419-437, April 2022.

This article comments on the following previously published article: Moncrieff, J., “ It Was the Brain Tumor That Done It!” Szasz and Wittgenstein on the Importance of Distinguishing Disease from Behavior and Implications for the Nature of Mental Disorder. Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology, 27, 169–181.Joanna Moncrieff’s philosophical views on the nature of mental illness represent in many ways the enduring legacy of Thomas Szasz in philosophy of psychiatry. She articulates a defense of Szaszian thinking about disease, with connections to Wittgenstein’s (...) philosophy, that is probably as compelling a defense as a contemporary student of philosophy is likely to find. However, Moncrieff’s... (shrink)

The paper proposes a research model explaining the sequential mediation effect of job embeddedness and work engagement between ethical leadership and career satisfaction. The model also examines whether JE heightens WENG, a factor indirectly influenced by ethical practices ending in employee satisfaction. The study used a time-lagged data collection procedure and survey responses of 247 hotel workers in China. Data were analyzed through structural equation modeling. The results showed that EL directly and indirectly contributes to employee CS. The present empirical (...) framework extends the hospitality industry literature by explaining the precise mechanism through which EL generates CS among hospitality workers in China. The paper offers theoretical and practical implications and future research directions. (shrink)

Based on the social exchange theory, the aim of this study is to identify the association between job stress state anger, emotional exhaustion and job turnover intention. This study postulates that job related stress and state anger among nurses during COVID-19 subsequently leads to their job turnover intentions. In addition, the study also aims to see the mediating role of emotional exhaustion between COVID-19-related job stress, state anger, and turnover intentions. The sample of this study is gathered from 335 registered (...) nurses working in Pakistani hospitals dealing with COVID-19-related patients. The interrelationships between variables are checked by using structural equation modeling through AMOS. Key findings confirm that COVID-19-related job stress and state anger had a significant effect on nurses’ turnover intentions. Furthermore, emotional exhaustion mediated the relationship between COVID-19-related job stress, state anger, and turnover intentions. There is a lack of research which has assessed the impact of Novel COVID-19-related job stress and state anger on nurses’ turnover intentions in hospitals, providing empirical evidence from a developing country-Pakistan. This study offers managerial implications for hospital management and health policymakers. Moreover, nursing managers need to pay attention to nurses’ turnover intentions who are facing the issue at the front line as patients receive their initial treatment from nurses in the COVID-19 outbreak. (shrink)

This study aimed to describe the effect of nursing profession work-related values on job satisfaction among a sample of Iranian nurses. We used in-depth interviews with 30 nurses who worked in university-affiliated and public hospitals in Tehran, Iran. The results of thematic analysis of interviews are reported in four themes to present the participants’ articulations in linking their work-related values to job satisfaction. The themes consist of values that “encourage tolerance,” “enhance inner harmony,” “reflect traditional commitment,” “enhance unity,” and are (...) “centered around altruism and spiritual values.” The most satisfied participants considered nursing a divine profession and a tool by which they could gain spiritual pleasure and satisfaction. Our findings highlight the potential role of nursing work-related values in reducing dissatisfaction with one’s job. For the nursing profession, this may have implications in reducing job instability and turnover. (shrink)

Innovation ecosystems are formed by interconnected firms that coalesce in interdependent networks to jointly create value. Such ecosystems rely on the norm of reciprocity—the give-and-take ethos of sharing knowledge-based resources. It is well established that an ecosystem firm can increase its competitive advantage by increasing interconnectedness with partners. However, much research has focused heavily on the positive role of inbound openness or ‘taking’ resources from ecosystem partners. The positive role of outbound openness or ‘giving’ resources to ecosystem partners remained less (...) explored and often misunderstood as eroding competitive advantage. We address this gap by first developing a conceptual model about the mediating role of inbound openness and outbound openness in the relationship between a firm’s ecosystem interconnectedness and competitive advantage. We then test this model on a large sample (_n_ = 794 managers) from Silicon Valley (USA) and Macquarie Business Park (Australia). Results indicate that outbound openness is a more important mediator than inbound openness for ecosystem firms seeking competitive advantage. Our findings suggest that the effect of outbound openness goes beyond merely generating tit-for-tat reciprocity to generating strategic benefits in their own right. The study adds to knowledge about the ethics of innovation ecosystems by showing that outbound openness to partners improves competitive advantage. Ecosystem firms, thus, do well by doing good when they increase their outbound openness. (shrink)

In the nation of Belize, and in particular the south side of Belize City, the main metropolitan area of the nation, significant economic disparities have led to child and adolescent exposure to high rates of violent crime, gang activity, unsafe neighborhoods, sexual, and physical violence. Problems associated with poor Social-Emotional Character Development are especially prevalent among boys. Consequently, valid culture-relevant measures are required that identify problematic behavior for policy-based intervention and evaluation of educational programs designed to ameliorate this problem. The (...) present study demonstrates the application of Exploratory Structural Equation Modeling to existing measures through the investigation of structural validity and generalizability of the Social-Emotional and Character Development Scale with a large sample of children from schools in Belize. Exploratory structural equation modeling results demonstrate the original factor correlations were reduced, providing less biased estimates than confirmatory factor analysis. Moreover, a multi-group Exploratory Structural Equation Modeling analysis illuminates significant differences between latent factor scores of males and females for most factors. Using this newer factor analytic procedure, original factors are reconceptualized to better situate the Social Emotional Character Development Scales into the larger body of Social-Emotional Learning competencies literature. (shrink)

COVID-19 has affected millions of people around the globe. People's mental health, especially those of nurses, has been primarily affected by the fear of this virus. More focus has been paid to vaccination and treatment of the virus, but less attestation has been given to addressing the mental health of people affected by the virus. Empirical studies show that different external factors are not easily manageable and controllable by the individual. This study preliminarily explores the connection between fear of COVID-19 (...) and secondary traumatic stress in nurses. Further, it examines the moderating effects of occupational self-efficacy on the relationship between fear of COVID-19 and secondary traumatic stress. Data for the study was collected from the nurses of six large hospitals in Karachi, Pakistan. The final analysis was performed on 243 samples. Studies on COVID-19 suggest that increased occupational self-efficacy decreases fear and its impact. This study offers insights for managers to develop stress management programs and provide proper training and counseling sessions to the nurses to motivate them emotionally. Theoretically, this study broadens the understanding of the theory of emotions by using the pandemic as a stressor. Future studies may explore different roles of occupational self-efficacy and study its influential role in managing different kinds of emotions explained by the theory of emotions. Managers at the workplace could design different self-efficacy training for nurses to increase their self-motivation to fight different types of stress they face at the workplace. (shrink)

The purpose of this research is to provide an overview of state governance for corporate social responsibility (CSR) in the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). A systemic literature review method is employed to collect 88 relevant publications, and a qualitative coding method is used to identify 98 governance instruments from those publications. These are grouped into 13 themes and then examined within three conceptual models. The findings reveal that most of the instruments are geared towards ethical expectations, internal (...) and external social responsibility, raising awareness, and socio‐economic development. The findings are then explored within four theories. The results suggest that CSR governance in the GCC is at a moderate to high level of bureaucratization; reflects Islamic identity, national development targets, and business accountability; is between the stages of habitualization and objectification; and relies mostly on normative pressures. Recommendations for policymakers and company managers are then presented based on these findings. (shrink)

Conversational implicatures (CIMs) are implied by the speaker in context rather than being linguistically encoded, and learners’ inability to infer the intended meaning, if not remedied through instruction (or mediation), leads to communication breakdowns. Given this premise, the current study aimed to examine effects of classroom praxis-based instruction adjusted to EFL learners’ Zone of Proximal Development (ZPD) on their comprehension of CIMs. Participants were 36 Iranian high school students in 2 classrooms, assigned to experimental and comparison groups. A 20-item CIM (...) test was administered at pretest and posttest times to collect the data. Microgenetic trajectories were also traced through audio-recorded role-plays and social interactions within the ZPD setting. ZPD-adjusted mediational instruction on CIMs was given based on a multi-level regulatory scale and a view of microgenetic development along an other-to self-regulated functioning continuum. In the non-ZPD setting, mainstream teacher-fronted instruction was employed. ANCOVA results revealed differential instructional effects in favor of the praxis-based mediational setting. Microgenetic learning episodes also portrayed how collectively-mediated, ZPD-activated learning led to L2 learners’ progressively improved comprehension of CIMs. The findings suggest that comprehension (and perhaps production) of L2 CIMs can be improved through praxis-oriented co-construction of pragmatic knowledge through collaborative engagement with communicative activity. (shrink)

Awais Aftab’s response to my article is informative because it expresses what I suspect is a widespread but confused inclination among psychiatrists to “have their cake and eat it.” On the one hand they do not want to be branded as reductionists, so they deny they are equating mental disorder with brain disease or brain mechanisms. Yet, they want to maintain a role for physical causation in mental disorder, because without it the link between psychiatry and medicine starts to (...) look tenuous.Reductionism is the implication of what Aftab is saying, however. By denying any important distinction between behavior produced by a brain disease and other, non-disease driven behavior (which I refer to here as “ordinary... (shrink)

I respond to the 4 commentaries by Awais Aftab & Kristopher Nielsen, Hane Htut Maung, Diane O’Leary and Kathryn Tabb under 3 main headings: “What is the BPSM really?” & Why update it?; “Is our approach foundationally compromised?”, and finally, “Antagonists or fellow travellers?”.

Readers, please welcome the new Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology editorial team of Senior Editors and our Managing Editor. We are grateful to keep our veteran Senior Editors Tim Thornton, Nancy Potter, Mona Gupta, and Werdie van Staden. However, we are equally grateful to have our new cohort of Senior editors, Awais Aftab, Anna Bergqvist, Derek Strijbos, and Michael Wong, revitalize our efforts. Many of you already know our efficient and capable Managing Editor, Sébastien Arviset, who has been with us (...) for several years now. This new influx of talent and energy we hope will invigorate the Journal and keep our editorial operations smooth and efficient. In alphabetical order, our editors can tell you a little... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Standards and Assumptions, the Limits of Inclusion, and Pluralism in PsychiatryBennett Knox*, MA (bio)Let me begin by expressing my gratitude to AAPP, PPP, and the Jaspers Award Committee—I am deeply honored to receive this award. So too let me thank Anke Bueter (2022) and Awais Aftab (2022) for their thought-provoking commentaries. Many of the concerns they bring up are ones that I share, so I am delighted to (...) have a chance to discuss them in my response. I will bring up three central issues in turn: 1) the role of shared standards versus background assumptions, 2) the limits of inclusion, and 3) pluralism in psychiatry.Shared Standards or Background Assumptions?Both Bueter and Aftab reference Longino's "shared public standards" criterion for social objectivity (1990, p. 77; 2002, p. 130), which I did not explicitly discuss in the original paper (Knox, 2022). This was a choice I made partly because in the case of psychiatry determining what constitutes an appropriate "shared public standard" is often not at all straightforward, which points to a potential problem for Longino's view. Namely, in some cases it is a matter of dispute whether some assumption shared within a scientific field should be counted as a "shared public standard" (which Longino requires that there be) or a "background assumption" (which she requires be subjected to critical scrutiny). And it is sometimes unclear how we could effectively adjudicate this type of disagreement.Take the example Bueter uses of "psychiatrists aiming for biomedical explanations of a particular mental disorder, whereas the critics value research that does not assume the existence of mental disorders" (2022, p. 273). A conflict along these lines often does arise between advocates of the pathology paradigm and the neurodiversity paradigm with regard to Autism, for example.1 A psychiatrist working within the pathology paradigm may argue that something like "psychiatry must deal only with mental disorders, understood as pathologies" constitutes a shared standard, and so psychiatric research on Autism must understand it as a pathology. An advocate of the neurodiversity paradigm, however, might argue that this same proposition [End Page 275] is merely a normative background assumption shared among many psychiatrists, which ought to be questioned and ultimately rejected. How might we adjudicate this meta-disagreement about the status of this standard/assumption?Bueter gives some helpful guidance on this issue by pointing to Carrier's requirement that participants exhibit the "epistemic attitude" (2013). I agree that if all participants commit themselves to this attitude, then "…differences in conceptual resources and standards of assessment need not make shared deliberation impossible, and the standards can be a subject of discussion themselves" (Bueter 2022, p. 273). For instance, since this attitude requires some commitment to empirical adequacy, we might search for some empirical evidence that favors one paradigm over the other. But advocates of both paradigms might actually agree on all the empirical facts, and yet still have a deep disagreement about which paradigm's understanding should be accepted as a shared standard. If participants are committed to some common standards and goals, we may often be able to resolve this sort of problem. But there is still a danger that we may arrive at an impasse, with no clear idea how to proceed.Though in many cases scientific experts must be allowed some power to set the standards in their domain (lest we dilute that expertise in ways that Aftab rightly points out would be problematic), I would also caution against accepting that something is a legitimate shared public standard just because the members of a scientific community say so. In keeping with the spirit of Longino's reliance on Quine, none of our shared standards are in principle immune from revision—save perhaps a minimal commitment to empirical evidence and rational argument.The Limits of InclusionMy impression is that Longino's response to the "Nazi problem" presented by Hicks (2011) might be to bite the bullet: her account does require allowing Nazi scientists to participate, and perhaps even cultivating their participation. But if (as seems likely) the Nazi shows themself to be unable to adhere to the shared standards... (shrink)