Processing the various features from different feature maps and modalities in coherent ways requires a dedicated integration mechanism . Many authors have related feature binding to conscious awareness but little is known about how tight this relationship really is. We presented subjects with asynchronous audiovisual stimuli and tested whether the two features were integrated. The results show that binding took place up to 350 ms feature-onset asynchronies, suggesting that integration covers a relatively wide temporal window. (...) We also asked subjects to explicitly judge whether the two features would belong to the same or to the different events. Unsurprisingly, synchrony judgments decreased with increasing asynchrony. Most importantly, feature binding was entirely unaffected by conscious experience: features were bound whether they were experienced as occurring together or as belonging to a separate events, suggesting that the conscious experience of unity is not a prerequisite for, or a direct consequence of binding. (shrink)

I argue that Van der Velde and I agree on two fundamental issues surrounding the vision-related binding problem and recent solutions that have been offered: (1) that tagging theories fail to account for object feature binding in visual consciousness and (2) that feedforward-feedback processes in the visual cortical hierarchy play a role in generating a feature-unified object of visual consciousness. Van der Velde develops and discusses an important objection to tagging theories that could help to strengthen (...) my critique of neuronal synchrony (and other tagging theories) and then argues that the cognitive subject makes no explanatory contribution to the unity of an object’s features in visual consciousness. These issues are discussed in turn. By contrast, Van Leeuwen takes a more critical approach to my target article. A two-fold response to Van Leeuwen is offered: first, the root of Van Leeuwen’s perplexity is uncovered and then some specific objections that Van Leeuwen poses to my critique of neuronal synchrony, as a purported solution of the object feature binding problem, are addressed. (shrink)

Color-motion asynchrony (CMA) refers to an apparent lag of direction of motion when a dynamic stimulus changes both color and direction at the same time. The subjective order of simultaneous events, however, is not only perceptual but also subject to illusions during voluntary actions. Self-initiated actions, for example, seem to precede their sensory outcomes following an adaptation to a delay between the action and the sensory feedback. Here, we demonstrate that the extent of the apparent asynchrony can be substantially reduced (...) when direction change is induced by a voluntary key press following a delay adaptation regime. We also show that the reduced color-motion asynchrony effect size following a motor-sensory recalibration is not a result of a change in the onset of perceived direction change relative to that of the color. This is particularly important as it implies, for the first time in the literature, that voluntary action is not only important in forming action-sensory outcome associations but may also act as a binding factor between the two perceptual features of a sensory event. (shrink)

A central issue of cognitive neuroscience is to understand how a large collection of coupled neurons combines external signals with internal memories into new coherent patterns of meaning. An external stimulus localized at some input spreads over a large assembly of coupled neurons, building up a collective state univocally corresponding to the stimulus. Thus, the synchronization of spike trains of many individual neurons is the basis of a coherent perception. Based on recent investigations of homoclinic chaotic systems and their synchronization, (...) a novel conjecture for the dynamics of single neurons and, consequently, for neuron assemblies is formulated. Homoclinic chaos is proposed as a suitable way to code information in time by trains of equal spikes occurring at apparently erratic times. In order to classify the set of different perceptions, the percept space can be given a metric structure by introducing a distance measure between distinct percepts. The distance in percept space is conjugate to the duration of the perception in the sense that an uncertainty relation in percept space is associated with time-limited perceptions. This coding of different percepts by synchronized spike trains entails fundamental quantum features which are not restricted to microscopic phenomena. It is conjectured that they are related to the details of the perceptual chain rather than depending on Planck's action. (shrink)

A central issue of cognitive neuroscience is to understand how a large collection of coupled neurons combines external signals with internal memories into new coherent patterns of meaning. An external stimulus localized at some input spreads over a large assembly of coupled neurons, building up a collective state univocally corresponding to the stimulus. Thus, the synchronization of spike trains of many individual neurons is the basis of a coherent perception. Based on recent investigations of homoclinic chaotic systems and their synchronization, (...) a novel conjecture for the dynamics of single neurons and, consequently, for neuron assemblies is formulated. Homoclinic chaos is proposed as a suitable way to code information in time by trains of equal spikes occurring at apparently erratic times. In order to classify the set of different perceptions, the percept space can be given a metric structure by introducing a distance measure between distinct percepts. The distance in percept space is conjugate to the duration of the perception in the sense that an uncertainty relation in percept space is associated with time-limited perceptions. This coding of different percepts by synchronized spike trains entails fundamental quantum features which are not restricted to microscopic phenomena. It is conjectured that they are related to the details of the perceptual chain rather than depending on Planck's action. (shrink)

The “binding problem” has been a central question in vision science for some 30 years: When encoding multiple objects or maintaining them in working memory, how are we able to represent the correspondence between a specific feature and its corresponding object correctly? In this letter we argue that the boundaries of this research program in fact extend far beyond vision, and we call for coordinated pursuit across the broader cognitive science community of this central question for cognition, which (...) we dub “Binding Problem 2.0”. (shrink)

Recent research suggests that the subjective feeling of conscious recollection is uniquely characterized by joint memory for several context features while merely familiar memories lack this property . In the present research we took the novel approach of extending the dual task paradigm to the simultaneous study of subjective retrieval experience and joint memory for two orthogonal context features. While dual task load during encoding lead to reductions in the frequency of the subjective experience of conscious recollection and reductions in (...) overall context memory, joint context memory was not affected. Furthermore, the relation of higher overall context memory for consciously recollected items than for familiar items was preserved even under dual task load. These results have import implications for theories of long-term feature binding and the processes involved in producing the experience of conscious recollection. (shrink)

The capacity for feature binding is typically explained in terms of the attribution model: a perceptual state selects an individual and attributes properties to it (Kahneman & Treisman 1984; Clark 2004; Burge 2010). Thus features are bound together in virtue of being attributed to the same individual. While the attribution model successfully explains some cases of binding in perception, not all binding need be understood as property attribution. This chapter argues that some forms of binding—those (...) involving holistic iconic representations, which bind features outside the limits of attention and object files—don’t fit the attribution model. The chapter then sketches an alternative coordination model of binding that construes icons as complex analog representations. (shrink)

After I had delivered the paper (Stechow, 2003), a colleague wrote to me that the system outlined was virtually identical with (Kratzer, 1998), and that this article had not been cited. The longer version (Stechow, 2002 (to appear)) quotes (Kratzer, 1998), and the reference has been deleted by my automatic bibliography program when I rewrote and shortened the paper. I am sorry for that.

It is tempting to hold that perceptual experience amounts to a co-conscious collection of visual, auditory, tactual, gustatory, and olfactory episodes. If so, each aspect of perceptual experience on each occasion is associated with a specific modality. This paper, however, concerns a core variety of multimodal perceptual experience. It argues that there is perceptually apparent intermodal feature binding. I present the case for this claim, explain its consequences for theorizing about perceptual experience, and defend it against objections. I (...) maintain that just as one thing may perceptually appear at once to jointly bear several features associated with the same sense modality, one thing also may perceptually appear at once to jointly bear features associated with different sense modalities. For instance, just as something may visually appear at once to be both red and round, or to have a red part and a green part, something may multimodally perceptually appear at once to be both bright and loud, or to have a red part and a rough part. The main lesson, I argue, is that perceiving is not just co-consciously seeing, hearing, feeling, tasting, and smelling at the same time. And perceptual phenomenal character is not on each occasion exhausted by that which is distinctive to or associated with a given modality, along with that which accrues thanks to simple co-consciousness. Not all ways of perceiving are modality specific. I defend this account against three main objections: that singular content theorists avoid my conclusions; that apparent infusion of perceptible features is required for perceptually apparent binding but does not occur intermodally; and that the diversity of objects across modalities makes perceptually apparent intermodal binding rare. (shrink)

Binding can be described at three different levels: In neuroscience it refers to the integration of single-cell activities to form functional neural assemblies, especially in response to global stimulus properties; in cognitive science it refers to the integration of distributed modular input processing to form unified representations for memory and action, and in consciousness studies it refers to the unity of phenomenal consciousness . To describe and explain the unity of consciousness, detailed phenomenological descriptions of binding at the (...) phenomenal level and clarification of the underlying cognitive and neural mechanisms are required. The disunity of consciousness during dreaming is a fruitful avenue to study phenomenal binding and its mechanisms. The notion of the 'bizarreness' of dreams is closely related to the concept of 'binding': bizarreness can be reconceptualized as referring to different types of unusual combinations of features in the binding of dream images coherently together. The present study concentrates on the representation of human characters and the bizarreness found in these representations. We developed a rating scale that distinguishes different types of bizarreness on the basis of the unusual combinations of elements that are manifested in dream images. The data consisted of 592 dream reports in the home-based dream diaries of 52 students. The results indicate that about half of the human characters appearing in our dreams contain bizarre elements, and that certain types of bizarreness are more frequent than others. Phenomenal features intrinsic to the representation of a person are less frequently bizarre than is the external relation between the person and the context . Thus, binding the local features of a representation coherently together appears to be less prone to errors than binding several different information streams together into a coherent phenomenal model of the world. (shrink)

Recent findings in neuroscience strongly suggest that an object’s features (e.g., its color, texture, shape, etc.) are represented in separate areas of the visual cortex. Although represented in separate neuronal areas, somehow the feature representations are brought together as a single, unified object of visual consciousness. This raises a question of binding: how do neural activities in separate areas of the visual cortex function to produce a feature-unified object of visual consciousness? Several prominent neuroscientists have adopted neural (...) synchrony and attention-based approaches to explain object feature binding. I argue that although neural synchrony and attentional mechanisms might function to disambiguate an object’s features, it is difficult to see how either of these mechanisms could fully explain the unity of an object’s features at the level of visual consciousness. After presenting a detailed critique of neural synchrony and attention-based approaches to object feature binding, I propose interactive hierarchical structuralism (IHS). This view suggests that a unified percept (i.e., a feature-unified object of visual consciousness) is not reducible to the activity of any cognitive capacity or to any localized neural area, but emerges out of the interaction of visual information organized by spatial structuring capacities correlated with lower, higher, and intermediate levels of the visual hierarchy. After clarifying different notions of emergence and elaborating evidence for IHS, I discuss how IHS can be tested through transcranial magnetic stimulation and backward masking. In the final section I present some further implications and advantages of IHS. (shrink)

.................................................................................................... ..................... 2 2 LF-Binding and Feature Deletion......................................................................................... 3..

Temporal binding is the phenomenon in which events related as cause and effect are perceived by humans to be closer in time than they actually are). Despite the fact that temporal binding experiments with humans have relied on verbal instructions, we argue that they are adaptable to nonhuman animals, and that a finding of temporal binding from such experiments would provide evidence of causal reasoning that cannot be reduced to associative learning. Our argument depends on describing and (...) theoretically motivating an intermediate level of representations between the lower levels of associations of sensory features and higher symbolic representations. This intermediate level of representations makes it possible to challenge arguments given by some comparative psychologists that animals lack higher-level abstract and explicit forms of causal reasoning because their cognitive capacities are limited to learning and reasoning at the basic level of perceptual associations. Our multi-level account connects time perception with causal reasoning and provides a philosophically defensible framework for experimental investigations that have not yet been pursued. We describe the structure of some possible experiments and consider the implications that would follow from a positive finding of temporal binding in nonhuman animals. Such a finding would provide evidence of explicit awareness of causal relationships and would warrant attribution of intermediate representations that are more abstract and sophisticated than the associations allowed by the lower level of the two-level account. (shrink)

I argue for two major claims in this paper. First, I argue that the linguistic evidence best supports a certain form of contextualism about predicates of personal taste (PPTs) like ?fun? and ?tasty?. In particular, I argue that these adjectives are both individual-level predicates (ILPs) and anaphoric implicit argument taking predicates (IATPs). As ILPs, these naturally form generics. As anaphoric IATPs, PPTs show the same dependencies on context and distributional behavior as more familiar anaphoric IATPs, for example, ?local? and ?apply?. (...) Moreover, they are subject to important binding-related phenomena, for example, various kinds of anaphora, binding arguments, and strict-sloppy ambiguities. The latter are particularly problematic for relativism, contextualism's major competitor. I argue that relativism cannot account for these binding facts in a non-ad hoc manner. Second, I argue that disagreement is a predictable feature of dialogues involving PPTs in conjunction with the contextualist semantics defended. Appealing to ?off the shelf? analyses of genericity, I show how disagreement arises in just the cases we would expect, licensing just the kinds of responses we would expect. They also suggest promising explanations, unavailable to relativists, of various otherwise puzzling features of disagreements involving PPTs. (shrink)

Cognitive scientists have long known that the modalities interact during perceptual processing. Cross-modal illusions like the ventriloquism effect show that the course of processing in one modality can alter the course of processing in another. But how do the modalities interact in the specific domain of object perception? This paper distinguishes and analyzes two kinds of multisensory interaction in object perception. First, the modalities may bind features to a single object or event. Second, the modalities may cooperate when differentiating an (...) object or event from its surroundings. I critically evaluate evidence for various forms of multisensory binding. I then consider the case for multisensory differentiation. I argue that existing evidence for multisensory differentiation is inconclusive. I highlight ways that the issue might be empirically resolved. (shrink)

Our brains process visual data in segregated, specialized cortical areas. As is commonly remarked, the brain processes the what and the where of its environment in separate, distal locations. Indeed, regarding the what information that the brain computes, it responds to edges, colors, and movements using different neuronal pathways. Moreover, so far as we can tell, there are no true association areas in our cortices. There are no convergence zones where information is pooled and united; there are no central neural (...) areas dedicated to information exchange. Still, the visual features that we extract separately have to come together in some way, since our experiences are of these features united together into a single unit. The binding problem is explaining how our brains do that, given the serial, distributed nature of our visual processing. How do our minds know to join the perception of a shape with the perception of its color to give us the single, unified experience of a colored object? (shrink)

Visual feature binding has been suggested to depend on reentrant processing. We addressed the relationship between binding, reentry, and visual awareness by asking the participants to discriminate the color and orientation of a colored bar and to report their phenomenal awareness of the target features. The success of reentry was manipulated with object substitution masking and backward masking. The results showed that late reentrant processes are necessary for successful binding but not for phenomenal awareness of the (...) bound features. Binding errors were accompanied by phenomenal awareness of the misbound feature conjunctions, demonstrating that they were experienced as real properties of the stimuli . Our results suggest that early preattentive binding and local recurrent processing enable features to reach phenomenal awareness, while later attention-related reentrant iterations modulate the way in which the features are bound and experienced in awareness. (shrink)

Since Kaplan’s "Demonstratives", it has become a common-place to distinguish between the character and content of an expression, where the content of an expression is what it contributes to "what is said" by sentences containing that expression, and the character gives a rule for determining, in a context, the content of an expression. A tacit assumption of theories of character has been that character is autonomous from content – that semantic evaluation starts with character, adds context, and then derives content. (...) One consequence of this autonomy thesis is that the rules for character can contain no variables bound by content-level operators elsewhere in the sentence. Tacit appeal to this consequence features essentially both in Jason Stanley’s recent argument that all contextual ambiguity must be linked to "elements in the actual syntactic structure of the sentence uttered" in his "Context and Logical Form" and in my arguments against character-based theories of complex demonstratives in my "Complex Demonstratives". However, I argue here that the autonomy thesis is unmotivated, and show that we can separate Kaplan’s notion of character into two independent components: an aspect of meaning which is context-sensitive, and an aspect of meaning that is exempted from scopal interactions with other operators. The resulting semantic framework allows constructions similar to Kaplan’s rejected notion of "monsters begat by elegance", but which are both more empirically adequate and more theoretically versatile. Having made the distinction between context-sensitivity and autonomy from scopal interaction, I show how it allows binding into the character of expressions and hence undermines the immediate success of both Stanley’s argument and my former argument against character-based theories of complex demonstratives, and discuss briefly the prospects for reinstating modified versions of those arguments. Finally, I show how that same distinction allows a defusing of Kripke’s modal argument against a descriptive theory of names. Once autonomy from semantic interaction is separated from context-sensitivity, the first of those two alone can be used to capture the modal rigidity of proper names.. (shrink)

The binding problem is fundamental to visual perception. It is the problem of associating an object's visual properties with itself and not with some other object. The problem is made particular difficult because different properties of an object, such as its color, shape, size, and motion, are often processed independently, sometimes in different cortical areas. The results of these separate analyses have to be combined before the object can be seen as a single coherent entity as opposed to a (...) collection of unconnected features. Visual bindings are typically initiated and updated in a serial fashion, one object at a time. Here, we show that one type of binding, location-identity bindings, can be updated in parallel. We do this by using two complementary techniques, the simultaneous-sequential paradigm and systems factorial technology. These techniques make different assumptions and rely on different behavioral measures, yet both came to the same conclusion. (shrink)

Demonstrating that a developing norm is not yet well established in international law is frequently thought to show that states are not bound by the norm as law. More precisely, showing that a purported international legal norm has only limited support from well-established international legal sources is normally seen as sufficient to rebut an obligation on the part of subjects to comply with the norm in virtue of its legal status. I contend that this view is mistaken. Nascent norms of (...) international law (e.g., crystallizing norms of customary law) can be binding in much the same way as better-established doctrine. This point becomes perspicuous, I argue, once we get a clear sense of the plausible options for grounding the moral authority of international law generally. -/- This result is interesting in its own right, but it also reveals two other features of the character of state responsibility under international law. First, the distinction between legislation and compliance is less pronounced compared to domestic law. Consequently, the virtues of good governance will frequently be pertinent to determining the content of states’ obligations under international law. Second, normally more powerful and influential agents will be more strongly bound by international law than other subjects. This is an attractive result, addressing a concern that motivates many international lawyers to view international law as absolutely binding. An absolutist view international legal authority is unnecessary for showing that the most powerful and dangerous states are strongly bound by the terms of much existing law. (shrink)

Neurophysiological studies in humans employing magneto- and electro- encephalography increasingly suggest that oscillatory rhythmic activity of the brain may be a core mechanism for binding sensory information across space, time, and object features to generate a unified perceptual representation. To distinguish whether oscillatory activity is causally related to binding processes or whether, on the contrary, it is a mere epiphenomenon, one possibility is to employ neuromodulatory techniques such as transcranial alternating current stimulation. tACS has seen a rising interest (...) due to its ability to modulate brain oscillations in a frequency-dependent manner. In the present review, we critically summarize current tACS evidence for a causal role of oscillatory activity in spatial, temporal, and feature binding in the context of visual perception. For temporal binding, the emerging picture supports a causal link with the power and the frequency of occipital alpha rhythms ; however, there is no consistent evidence on the causal role of the phase of occipital tACS. For feature binding, the only study available showed a modulation by occipital alpha tACS. The majority of studies that successfully modulated oscillatory activity and behavioral performance in spatial binding targeted parietal areas, with the main rhythms causally linked being the theta and beta frequency bands. On the other hand, spatio-temporal binding has been directly modulated by parieto-occipital gamma and alpha tACS, suggesting a potential role of cross-frequency coupling when binding across space and time. Nonetheless, negative or partial results have also been observed, suggesting methodological limitations that should be addressed in future research. Overall, the emerging picture seems to support a causal role of brain oscillations in binding processes and, consequently, a certain degree of plasticity for shaping binding mechanisms in visual perception, which, if proved to have long lasting effects, can find applications in different clinical populations. (shrink)

Much research on memory for binding depends on incidental measures. However, if encoding associations benefits from conscious attention, then incidental measures of binding memory might not yield a sufficient understanding of how binding is accomplished. Memory for letters and spatial locations was compared in three within-participants tasks, one in which binding was not afforded by stimulus presentation, one in which incidental binding was possible, and one in which binding was explicitly to be remembered. Some (...) evidence for incidental binding was observed, but unique benefits of explicit binding instructions included preserved discrimination as set size increased and drastic reduction in false alarms to lures that included a new spatial location and an old letter. This suggests that substantial cognitive benefits, including enhanced memory for features themselves, might occur through intentional binding, and that incidental measures of binding might not reflect these advantages. (shrink)

Several of the essays in this collection discuss the `binding problem', the problem of explaining in neurophysiological terms how it is that we see the various perceptual qualities of a physical object, such as its shape, colour, location and motion, as features of a single object. The perceived object seems to us a unitary thing, but its sensory properties are diverse and turn out to be processed in different areas of the brain. How then does the brain manage the (...) integration? Readers of the essays in this collection may find themselves suffering from an analogous binding problem about the study of consciousness, though this problem is conceptual rather than perceptual, and here the difficulty is to achieve the integration rather than to understand how an effortless integration is achieved. Consciousness is the ideal topic for inter-disciplinary investigation. It is a central concern of such diverse disciplines as neurophysiology, evolutionary biology, psychology, cognitive science, philosophy and theology, among others, yet none of these disciplines has come close to providing full answers to the central questions that consciousness raises. Inter-disciplinary investigation seems an obvious way forward, but it generates the conceptual binding problem that this collection displays. The standard of the essays is very high, but it is extraordinarily difficult to integrate their content into anything like a single picture. We are all apparently talking about the same phenomenon, the conscious awareness of the world that each of us enjoys first-hand, but it is quite unclear how to see the very different things we say about this phenomenon as part of a single picture, or even as parts of different but compatible pictures. Having raised the binding problem for the inter-disciplinary study of consciousness, I hasten to say that I will not attempt even a partial substantive solution here: that is left as an exercise for the readers of this book. (shrink)

This paper provides a unification-based implementation of Binding Theory (BT) for the English language in the framework of feature-based lexicalized tree-adjoining grammar (LTAG). The grammar presented here does not actually coindex any noun phrases, it merely outputs a set of constraints on co- and contraindexation that may later be processed by a separate anaphora resolution module. It improves on previous work by implementing the full BT rather than just Condition A. The main technical innovation consists in allowing lists (...) to appear as values of semantic features. (shrink)

Glyn Humphreys' research on attention and binding began from feature‐integration theory, which claims that binding together visual features, such as colour and orientation, requires spatially selective attention. Humphreys employed a more inclusive notion of binding and argued, on neuropsychological grounds, for a multi‐stage account of the overall binding process, in which binding together of form elements was followed by two stages of feature binding. Only the second stage of feature binding, (...) a re‐entrant (top‐down) process beginning in posterior parietal cortex and returning to early visual areas, required attention. In line with his commitment to converging evidence, Humphreys considered that investigating the role of attention in motion‐induced blindness could be a route to better understanding of the cognitive role of the attention‐dependent second stage of feature binding. He suggested that this role might be to resolve ambiguity and to generate a single consistent interpretation of the perceptual input. (shrink)

The theory of event coding by Hommel et al. proposes that feature binding is a central component of action planning. To evaluate the binding hypothesis, we consider findings from studies of action-perception interference and bimanual movements. We argue that although binding of action features may be a valuable concept, interference from partial feature overlap does not provide a parsimonious account for the observed phenomena.

The Health Impact Fund (HIF) is a project aimed at expanding access to life-saving drugs worldwide and incentivizing pharmaceutical companies to invest in research and development for neglected diseases. The HIF would invert the existing patent framework by rewarding ideas through their diffusion rather than protecting against this diffusion, by encouraging a collective rather than privatized wealth scheme. The basic idea behind the HIF is the creation of a new competitive market that centers on individuals who, under normal circumstances, exert (...) very little force on the tide of market demand. The HIF does not operate on standard market measures of demand, but instead measures demand as a product of needs, while in conventional market scenarios, private citizens and national welfare states pay for needs. The idea is that the HIF would create a functional, competitive market in which pharmaceutical profit is determined by the actual health impact of each new drug, a measure born from pharmacological and distributive efficacy. In this article, the basic features of and main challenges to the HIF are addressed. (shrink)

The creation and consolidation of a memory can rest on the integration of any number of disparate features and contexts. How is it that these bind together to form a coherent memory? This book offers an unrivalled overview of one of the most debated hotspots of modern memory research: binding, and will instigate innovative and pioneering ideas for future research.

Tumor suppressor protein 53 (p53) plays a central role in the control of genome stability, acting primarily through the transcriptional activation of stress‐response genes. However, many p53 binding sites are located at genomic locations with no obvious regulatory‐link to known stress‐response genes. We recently discovered p53 binding sites within retrotransposon‐derived elements in human and mouse subtelomeres. These retrotransposon‐derived p53 binding sites protected chromosome ends through transcription activation of telomere repeat RNA, as well as through the direct modification (...) of local chromatin structure in response to DNA damage. Based on these findings, I hypothesize that a class of p53 binding sites, including the retrotransposon‐derived p53‐sites found in subtlomeres, provide a primary function in genome stability by mounting a direct and local protective chromatin‐response to DNA damage. I speculate that retrotransposon‐derived p53 binding sites share features with telomere‐repeats through an evolutionary drive to monitor and maintain genome integrity. (shrink)