This monograph constitutes a response to the criticisms of Christianity outlined in Nietzsche's GENEOLOGY OF MORALS, in which Nietzsche argues that Christianity is a "slave revolt" of the weak--an attempt by the impotent to bring down the vitality of the capable nobility. Scheler's response is multi-faceted but centers on Nietzsche's failure to understand the nature of Christian love. Christianity is not a destructive enterprise trying to bring everyone down to the same low level of its impotent faithful, who must put (...) their trust in the next world because they can get nowhere in this one. Rather, it attempts constructively to bring everyone up to a new level of human flourishing. Christianity's preoccupation with the poor, weak, and marginalized stems from a recognition, through divine love, of the miracle of God's creation and infinite possibilities present even in them. (shrink)

Upon Scheler’ s death in 1928, Martin Heidegger remarked that he was the most important force in philosophy at the time. Jose Ortega y Gasset called Scheler "the first man of the philosophical paradise." The Human Place in the Cosmos, the last of his works Scheler completed, is a pivotal piece in the development of his writing as a whole, marking a peculiar shift in his approach and thought. He had been asked to provide an initial sketch of his (...) much larger works on philosophical anthropology and metaphysics--works he was not able to complete because of his early demise. Frings' new translation of this key work allows us to read and understand Scheler's thought within current philosophical debates and interests. The book addresses two main questions: What is the human being? And what is the place of the human being in the universe? Scheler responds to these questions within contexts of said two projected much larger works but not without reference to scientific research. He covers various levels of being: inorganic reality, organic reality (including plant life and psychological life), all the way up to practical intelligence and the spiritual dimension of human beings, and touching upon the holy. Negotiating two intertwined levels of being, life-energy ("impulsion") and "spirit," this work marks not only a critical moment in the development of his own philosophy but also a significant contribution to the current discussions of continental and analytic philosophers on the nature of the person. (shrink)

One of the pioneers of modern sociology, Max Scheler (1874- 1928) ranks with Max Weber, Edmund Husserl, and Ernst Troeltsch as being among the most brilliant minds of his generation. Yet Scheler is now known chiefly for his philosophy of religion, despite his groundbreaking work in the sociology of knowledge, the sociology of emotions, and phenomenological sociology. This volume comprises some of Scheler's most interesting work--including an analysis of the role of sentiments in social interaction, a sociology of knowledge (...) rooted in global social and cultural comparisons, and a cross-cultural theory of values--and identifies some of his important contributions to the discussion of issues at the forefront of the social sciences today. Editor Harold J. Bershady provides a richly detailed biographical portrait of Scheler, as well as an incisive analysis of how his work extends and integrates problems of theory and method addressed by Durkheim, Weber, and Parsons, among others. Harold J. Bershady, professor of sociology at the University of Pennsylvania, is the author of Ideology and Social Knowledge and the editor of Social Class and Democratic Leadership . Heritage of Sociology series. (shrink)

Max Scheler’s essay on virtue, first published under a pseudonym in 1913, begins with some reflection upon the decline in his era of a concern for virtue. Its central theme is a phenomenological exhibition of the Christian experience of humility, reverence, and related concepts, together with an exploration of their historical and social embodiments in Western culture. The core of humility is a spiritual readiness to serve, related to love, that produces in its possessor a liberation from the ego. The (...) core of reverence is its sense of what surpasses our vision. It has the power to reveal to us the deeper value and being in all things. The paper contains elements of a polemic directed against scientific naturalism. (shrink)

Max Scheler decisively influenced German philosophy in the period after the First World War, a time of upheaval and new beginnings. Without him, the problems of German philosophy today, and its attempts to solve them would be quite inconceivable. What was new in his philosophy was that he used phenomenology to investigate spiritual realities. The subject of On the Eternal in Manis the divine and its reality, the originality and non-derivation of religious experience. Scheler shows the characteristic (...) quality of that which is religious. It is a particular essence that cannot be reduced to anything else. It is a sphere that belongs essentially to humankind; without it we would not be human. If genuine fulfillment is denied it, substitutes come into being. This religious sphere is the most essential, decisive one. It determines man's basic attitude towards reality and in a sense the color, extent and position of all the other human domains in life. It forms the basis for various views about life and thought. Scheler was emphatically an intuitive philosopher. In Scheler's work the break between being as the almighty but blind rage and value as the knowing but powerless spirit-has become complete, and makes of each human a split being. Personal experiences may be reflected here. The development of Scheler's work as a whole was highly dependent on his personal experiences. It is this that gives Scheler's work its liveliness and its validity. (shrink)

The views of the philosophers and theologians diverge and disagree on the issues whether or not the objects of religious faith: the existence and essence of God, the immortality of the soul and similar content, as well as the extent to which the belief and assertion of the existence of those objects can be objects of philosophical knowledge. It can be stated that, in contrast to the teachings that reigned in minds from the XIII and the end of the XVIII (...) century, the 19th century gave birth to an almost immense number of "positions" to the above-mentioned issues, which did not go beyond the scope of their adoption in narrower circles of scientific schools. These "positions" to this day are mutually fighting, without the prospect of winning any of them. (shrink)

Purpose. The research is aimed at understanding the philosophical and journalistic heritage of M. Scheler during 1914-1919. "The philosophy of war" is regarded as the middle link between the phenomenological and anthropological stages of its philosophical evolution. The theoretical and methodological basis of the study is the philosophical legacy of Max Scheler, as well as the work of domestic and Western researchers devoted to this issue. Problems of Weltkriegsphilosophie become comprehensible based on the historical, logical and comparative principles of (...) historical and philosophical analysis, which allowed to theoretically reconstruct the cultural and historical context, philosophical sources and ideological intentions of the German philosopher. Originality. For the first time in domestic historical and philosophical thought, it proved that the works by Max Scheler of the First World War played an outstanding role in the formation of philosophical anthropology as a separate philosophical trend. Conclusions. The basis of the Weltkriegsphilosophie by Max Scheler is the philosophical comprehension of the war in which the thinker tries to see the high sacral meaning, where the sacrifices that the nation brings to the altar of victory are not in vain: the nation is rallying this sacrifice, its readiness for it. According to Scheler, war is the most effective means of forming the so-called "love communities", to which he refers combat brotherhood, family and nation as a "collective personality", which recognizes itself through war. The philosopher is disappointed to some part with militaristic enthusiasm in his later military journalistic works and calls for a spiritual and moral renewal of Europe, fed from Christian roots. At the heart of this renewal should be the principle of personal solidarity, based on the Christian idea of love. However, Catholic universalism is an insufficient means for the formation of a "love community" and a new man who is co-creator of God that constitutes the main core of the philosophical anthropology of Max Scheler, which emerges in the 20s of the twentieth century. Based on this, the article affirms the existence in Sheler’s works of an intermediate stage between his phenomenology and philosophical anthropology – Weltkriegsphilosophie. (shrink)

The student of Max Scheler's work encounters several difficulties. First, the range of his preoccupation is unique in our time. During his most creative years, epistemology, ethics, philosophy of religion, and the phenomenology of emotional life were at the center of his interest. Later he became more and more involved in the ontological problems of society and reality and laid the foundation of a new sociology of knowledge. Second, Scheler's thought evolved in the course of his short life--he died (...) in 1928, barely fifty-four--through various phases which were hardly compatible with one another. He started as a student of Rudolph Eucken, the philosopher of life, who imbued his disciple with an admiration for St. Augustine and Pascal; he became deeply influenced by Nietzsche, Dilthey, Bergson, and above all, Husserl. Converted to Catholicism, Scheler became a convinced Christian--both a personalist and a theist. But very soon his attitude toward religion underwent a complete change; in a last pantheistic phase, he dedicated himself to the philosophical and sociological exploration of the human condition. He then conceived the development of world history as a progression from illogical and blind vital urges to the fulfillment of the destiny of humanity in the realms of values and spiritual existence, and interpreted the whole process as the manifestation of divine force, the becoming of God in the world. A third difficulty for the student of Scheler's thought is the lack of organization of his books, originating in his disdain of any attempt to visualize life in an artificially unified perspective of the kind which the construction of a philosophic system might offer. He was, as Ortega y Gasset said, in the true sense of Plato an "enthusiastic" philosopher. Overwhelmed by the wealth of his discoveries, he lived in a continuous haste of mind. He had to proclaim so many lucid insights that he staggered, bewildered by cognition and inebriated by truth. This explains the frequent inconsistencies of his thought and the lack of structure of his writings. (shrink)

In the first chapter, titled “Modern and Postmodern Aspects of Scheler’s Later Personalism,” Michael Barber argues that Scheler’s earlier and his later personalism reflect a similar pretheoretical ethical experience. Barber finds postmodern aspects in Scheler, insofar as the later Scheler finds underneath science and metaphysics desires to control and to love. At the same time, Scheler remains tied to modern thought in that he never abandons eidetic phenomenology, which, Barber argues, is essential in order not to surrender Scheler’s understanding of (...) personhood to determinist explanations or dogmatic religion. In his conclusion, Barber compellingly suggests that the ethical origins of Scheler’s personalism could be found in moments of face-to-face communication with another, and that his later critique of spiritualization and altered vision of God have their roots in Scheler’s awareness of how false spiritualization hides its own drives and desires and how this makes possible “the subjection of the Other to its own violent totality”. (shrink)

Theory in the traditional sense of the word comprises a deductive system in which hypotheses and their logical consequences are compared with empirical observations. Such comparison is usually regarded as a verification of the theory. The ideal for this conception of theory is a universal scientific system in which the theories of the different scientific disciplines are brought together under the head of a few fundamental principles.Traditional theory and reality belong to two distinct and separate provinces. Insofar as men make (...) forecasts with the help of theory and attempt to change reality, they do not act as theoreticians. Theory remains in the realm of contemplation. Philosophers have frequently made something absolute out of this aspect of theory and, under the title of,logosf or.spirit', have deified the subject of these intellectual activities. It appears in their systems as the creator of the world. What they are really doing, however, is treating the scholar’s activity, which is based on the division of labor in modern society, as an dbjective and independent substance. The real subject of theory in its traditional aspect is not pure spirit but the scholar who performs definite and necessary functions in modem society.If such an analysis is accepted, the philosophical naiveté of the theoretician disappears. He perceives that not only thinking as such, but also its task, its direction, and the structure of the objective world are ultimately connected with human activity and work. Out of the historical process by which men wrest their living from nature, there emerges the separation of material and intellectual work, as well as the structure and the content of the latter. The dogmatic differentiation between the logical and historical premises of science cannot be maintained. The theoretician is himself part and parcel of the subject which forms the real objective world. To take an active part in the direction of the social life of humanity, therefore, becomes a function and a requirement of science.So it is as theory, in the critical sense of the word, that the author regards the type of reasoning which attempts to impart to social life in its totality a rational form and which does not limit itself to working within the framework of the given system of the division of labor. The history of different scientific theories shows theory, with its unity and clarity, in contrast and opposition to the heterogeneity and disharmony of the real world. In the attempts to achieve harmony in society, thought may play an important role.The author analyses the logical structure of critical theory in the performance of such a function. Its content is the description of present society in terms of a development towards a rational form. Critical theory, therefore, always remains intimately linked up with the reality of existence. It needs for its development in each and every instance the existence and assistance of the various scientific disciplines. Its logical structure, however, is more complicated than that of theory in the traditional sense, because it does not regard its objectives as a separate and foreign province. Science, in the traditional sense, even where it formulates developments in nature and human history, regards interests and purposes as given facts and guideposts that are foreign to its own structure. It has a utilitarian character in a directly understandable sense. Critical theory, however, is confronted with the task of justifying its own problems and their differentiation and has to adjust its internal structure accordingly. It does not set up an unchanging system but sees as its purpose the attempt to apply the knowledge that has been accumulated in the traditional theories to the social totality in the direction that critical theory itself indicates.La théorie, au sens traditionnel, est un système déductif. La confrontation des connaissances obtenues par voie déductive avec les faits constatés permet la vérification de la théorie. L'idéal est un système universel de la science dans lequel les théories des différentes disciplines, toutes ensemble, sont rattachées à un petit nombre de propositions premières.La réalité demeure extérieure à une théorie ainsi conçue. Dans la mesure où les hommes utilisent la théorie pour faire des prévisions et pour modifier la réalité, ils ne sont plus des théoriciens. En ce sens, la théorie est purement contemplative. Les philosophes qui ont analysé la connaissance ont souvent porté à l'absolu cet aspect de la théorie et ont fait du sujet des opérations intellectuelles, sous les noms de,Logos4 ou de,Esprit4, le démiurge du monde. En vérité, ils ont ainsi hypostasié l'activité, qui dans la société moderne revient au savant du fait de la division du travail. Le sujet réel de la théorie sous sa forme traditionnelle, loin d'être l'esprit pur, est le savant qui remplit dans la société bourgeoise une fonction nécessaire, bien déterminée.Après cette prise de conscience, la naïveté philosophique du théoricien doit disparaître. Il comprend que la pensée, ses tâches et son orientation, l'organisation du monde qui lui est donné, se ramènent en dernière analyse au travail humain. Le combat de l'homme avec la nature est la condition de l’évolution historique, dans laquelle le travail matériel se sépare du travail intellectuel, il détermine la structure et le contenu de ce dernier. La séparation rigide des hypothèses logiques et historiques de la science est impossible à maintenir. L'activité du théoricien exprime le sujet concret qui ne donne pas forme à la seule théorie, mais aussi au monde réel. Prendre position dans la vie sociale, l'influencer consciemment devient une tâche immanente à la science.Par théorie au sens critique, H. entend la connaissance qui ne se contente pas de construire ses systèmes en respectant les cadres de la division du travail existante, mais qui s'efforce de donner à la totalité sociale une forme raisonnable. Dans l'histoire, la cohérence logique et comme transparente qui caractérise les théories traditionnelles, était en contradiction avec les rapports réels. Dans les tentatives pour rendre la société conforme à l'harmonie de la pensée, celle-ci peut jouer un rôle important.H. étudie la structure logique que présente la pensée lorsqu'elle exerce une telle fonction. Elle a pour contenu la représentation de la société actuelle, envisagée par rapport à révolution vers la raison. La théorie critique forme par conséquent un jugement existentiel unique. Pour développer et justifier celui-ci, elle a besoin, à chaque instant, de la science spéciale. Mais comme la théorie ne conçoit pas les buts qu'elle s'assigne comme extérieurs à elle, elle est logiquement plus compliquée que la théorie traditionnelle. Même lorsque la discipline spéciale construit des évolutions comme dans l'histoire naturelle et humaine, elle est orientée par des objectifs et des intérêts. Elle est, en un sens immédiatement compréhensible, utile. La théorie critique, au contraire, doit justifier elle-même la manière dont elle pose les problèmes, qui d'ailleurs sans cesse se transforment, elle doit modifier en conséquence l'ordre de son développement. Elle ne travaille pas en vue d'un système fixe, mais se comprend elle-même comme une tentative pour appliquer le savoir accumulé par les théories traditionnelles, à la marche historique de l'ensemble social, afin d'exercer une action dans un sens bien déterminé.Aussi bien, cette fonction de la théorie est-elle la réalisation des intentions authentiques de la philosophie idéaliste classique. (shrink)

Max Picard (1888-1965) was a Swiss-German writer, who converted to Catholicism from Judaism. A doctor and psychologist, Picard worked in Berlin but retired in the 1920s to Switzerland. He is often regarded as a "wisdom thinker," and his rich and penetrating writings continue to speak to us in the twenty-first century. The Flight from God is an incisive, profound description of many of the problems facing modern culture, and its analysis resonates with us more today than when first published in (...) 1934. Picard illustrates that modern culture is essentially in Flight, and so the individual is under pressure to make a choice; in earlier generations only an individual could be in flight because the culture itself was not in flight but in Faith. The flight does not require courage or guilt; yet it is to be found in, and is often destructive of, many facets of life including human relationships, art, economics, science, entertainment, even religion. Because of this it leaves many in anguish, from which we seek alternative avenues of structure and meaning. Yet, in every person there is a residue that will not yield itself to the flight, and this is bound up with love, which reminds us of God. Picard shows how God is always somehow present in the flight--just when we think we are arriving from the flight, we find that God is already there. Picard's identification and discussion of the roots of the distresses of modern culture, and its attempts to grapple with the spiritual dimension of human experience, along with tensions created by freedom and individuality, are clearly still of the greatest relevance for us today. (shrink)

In everyday life we take it for granted that we have conscious control of some of our actions and that the part of us that exercises control is the conscious mind. Psychosomatic medicine also assumes that the conscious mind can affect body states, and this is supported by evidence that the use of imagery, hypnosis, biofeedback and other ‘mental interventions’ can be therapeutic in a variety of medical conditions. However, there is no accepted theory of mind/body interaction and this has (...) had a detrimental effect on the acceptance of mental causation in science, philosophy and in many areas of clinical practice. Biomedical accounts typically translate the effects of mind into the effects of brain functioning, for example, explaining mind/body interactions in terms of the interconnections and reciprocal control of cortical, neuroendocrine, autonomic and immune systems. While such accounts are instructive, they are implicitly reductionist, and beg the question of how conscious experiences could have bodily effects. On the other hand, non-reductionist accounts have to cope with three problems: 1) The physical world appears causally closed, which would seem to leave no room for conscious intervention. 2) One is not conscious of one’s own brain/body processing, so how could there be conscious control of such processing? 3) Conscious experiences appear to come too late to causally affect the processes to which they most obviously relate. This paper suggests a way of understanding mental causation that resolves these problems. It also suggests that “conscious mental control” needs to be partly understood in terms of the voluntary operations of the preconscious mind, and that this allows an account of biological determinism that is compatible with experienced free will. (shrink)

Developing a reading of some of Beauvoir and Sartre's most influential writings in philosophy, Max Deutscher explores contemporary philosophy in the light of the phenomenological tradition within which Being and Nothingness and The Second Sex occurred as striking events operating on the border of the modern and the 'post-modern'. Deutscher traces the shifts of genre that produce their gendered philosophies, and responds in terms of contemporary experience to the mood and the arguments of their works. Drawing upon the (...) writings of two contemporary critics in particular - Michele Le Dœuff and Luce Irigaray - Deutscher reworks this part of philosophy's history in order to advance thinking in contemporary philosophy, generate renewed philosophical reflection on consciousness, freedom and one's relation to others, and to return a look still cast in our direction from an earlier time. (shrink)

Zusammenfassung In der Philosophie Platons und der ihm folgenden Tradition bilden Theorie und Praxis stets eine Einheit, wobei die Theorie der Praxis in folgender Hinsicht übergeordnet wird: Die Theorie, verstanden als Schau (θεωρία/theôria) der „Idee des Guten“, fundiert die Praxis gelingenden Lebens und konkreter Handlungen. Bei Meister Eckhart scheint sich dieses Verhältnis zu komplizieren. Ausgangspunkt ist die Beobachtung, dass in seinen Werken eine Aufwertung der sog. vita activa, der tatkräftig-anpackenden Lebensform, beobachtet werden kann: Diese Lebenspraxis sei sogar, so lautet die (...) wirkmächtige Interpretation Dietmar Mieths, die Spitze des Menschenmöglichen und gegenüber der vita contemplativa vorzuziehen. Wie verträgt sich aber diese These mit dem oft kolportierten Vorrang der Theorie gegenüber der Praxis? In der vorliegenden Arbeit soll das Verhältnis von Kontemplation und Theorie einerseits zur vita activa andererseits geklärt werden. (shrink)

This dissertation attempts to identify the presence and role of myth in Parmenides' philosophical poem. It is argued that the myths of the poem are neither extrinsic to, nor entirely in service of, Parmenides' reasoned account. By virtue of the traditional significance which they possess, the myths of the poem determine both the form and content of Parmenides' philosophical presentation, with the result that Parmenides' philosophy should be viewed as an attempt to sustain traditional tales with philosophical argumentation. Primarily (...) two myths are identified as operative in the poem. The first is that of a mortal's chariot-journey on the path of the sun to a region of life, light and understanding. It is in the context of this archaic myth that a number of otherwise puzzling features of the poem are explained, including the detailed imagery of the prelude, the presentation of the search for knowledge as a "path," the goddess' advice on "ways of seeking," and the characterization of the poem's argumentation as "signs along the way." The second myth takes its point of departure from the first. Parmenides' conception of reality is, at its core, a mythological view of the cosmos as a whole, as associated with the vantage-point of the all-seeing sun at the apex of the sky. A dose examination of the "signs" of what is in Fr. 8 reveals that Parmenides' argumentation constitutes a defense of the notion of the cosmos as a single, animate, corporeal, possibly sentient, being. Mortal ignorance is accordingly explained as an error of perspective for Parmenides, i.e., the inability of charioteer-mind to arrive at an insight into the cosmic whole, the enduring unity from which all things come and into which they return. It is suggested that Parmenides does not deny change and plurality at the level of the phenomena; what he does deny is that change and plurality have reality from the perspective of the unity and totality of all things, in so far as that totality is conceived as a single, ever-living being. (shrink)

If Haecker's book on History and the Attitude of the Christian be considered as an index, there seems to be a strong humanistic current in present day Catholicism. Haecker develops in his book the Christian belief that history manifests the will of God, and that all wars, upheavals and revolutions really occur for the salvation of the soul of the individual. He opposes the modern trend to deify nation and race, and presents the elevation of man from his fall, and (...) his return to God, as the eternal goal of all that ever happens. Because Haecker insists upon the intrinsic value of each single man, because he refuses to accept the ruling totalitarian ideology of the day, even the non-Catholic can go a long way with him in his humanism.Horkheimer, however, demonstrates that the connection between this kind of humanism and Catholicism is a very loose one. The deep understanding of human misery that is evident in Haecker's pages fits other convictions and persuasions just as well as it does a Catholic philosophy. Haecker's contention that to reject a sense and a meaning transcending the temporal world is to drive man to despair, does not invalidate the rejection of a supernatural significance. Despair is no argument against truth. Grief over the present is well justified ; nevertheless an attitude is possible which permits of a positive cooperation in the historical tasks of the day.Le livre de Haecker sur la philosophie chrétienne de l'histoire donne à Horkheimer l'occasion de présenter quelques remarques de principe au sujet du courant humaniste dans le catholicisme contemporain. Haecker développe Vidée chrétienne que l'histoire est soumise à la volonté de Dieu, et que dans toutes les guerres, les crises et les révolutions, c'est en vérité le salut de l'âme individuelle qui est en jeu. Il s'oppose à la divinisation moderne du peuple et de la race, et montre dans le relèvement de l'homme après la chute et dans son retour à Dieu le but éternel du devenir. Dans cette affirmation de la valeur de chaque personne, dans la négation des idéologies totalitaires régnantes, s’exprime un humanisme que le philosophe non-catholique peut reconnaître et approuver.Cependant, Horkheimer indique que le lien de cet humanisme et du catholicisme est — logiquement — très lâche. La compréhension de la misère humaine, qui apparaît dans le livre de Haecker, ne peut nullement confirmer la vision catholique du monde, elle s'adapte aussi bien à d'autres convictions. Certes, on comprend l'affirmation de Haecker que le refus de la transcendance doit mener l'homme au désespoir ; mais la négation d'une signification supranaturelle n'est pas ainsi réfutée : le désespoir n'est pas un argument contre la vérité. La tristesse légitime que nous inspire le présent, appelle, bien loin de l'exclure, la décision de travailler aux tâches que l'histoire nous assigne. (shrink)

This paper evaluates Mangan’s (1993) analysis of the way feelings at the fringes of consciousness provide global evaluations of what is happening at the focus of attention in ways that allow the human mind to direct its activities in an effective, adaptive way—elaborating on a distinction between fringe consciousness and focal-attentive consciousness originally developed by William James. The paper argues that, while Mangan’s analysis is a plausible account of mental operations, viewed from a first-person perspective, it is inconsistent with a (...) detailed account of human information processing viewed from a third-person perspective, which largely operates in an unconscious fashion. It also ignores classical problems relating to consciousness-brain causal interaction in philosophy of mind, and the subtlety different ways in which information processing can be said to be “conscious”. The paper then offers an alternative interpretation of the evidence (following Velmans, 1991) in which first- and third-person accounts of mental processing are complementary and mutually irreducible. (shrink)

Freud finds it impossible to accept the existence of a Supreme Being because he thinks that there is no way to scientifically demonstrate or prove the existence of a being so defined. Consequently, Freud maintains that individuals who claim to have a religious experience of God suffer from a delusion. Such individuals remain in an infantile state of neurotic denial, fooling themselves about the reality of extramental existence.In contradistinction, Max Scheler, a student of Husserlian phenomenology, can accept the existence of (...) God because he finds that God. understood as the summum bonum, is the superlative value to which humanity can give assent in the religious act. Within the context of the religious act, an individual can come to discover or realize God. But this discovery is not made through a scientific demonstration or proof. Unlike Freud, Scheler shows that this discovery comes about via a phenomenological methodology which endorses a broader view of experience. Scheler ultimately makes the further claim that those individuals, like the scientist, who choose not to engage in the religious act are, in fact, involved in a delusional state.So, both thinkers claim that the other is in a delusional state. The task I undertake in this paper is to place these two thinkers into dialogue with one another in order to evaluate their specific methodologies. First, I explicate Freud’s view of religion. In doing so, I make explicit Freud’s empirical methodology and mechanistic materialism which is the root for his claim that God exists as an illusion or “wretched makeshift” of the neurotic unconscious mind. Next, I present the Schelerian response to Freud and positivistic science by making explicit the parameters of the religious act which recognizes God as the superlative value. Finally, I assess the views of Freud and Scheler, and in so doing, show that Scheler’s phenomenological methodology, with its emphasis upon bracketing empirical presuppositions, has merit in that it broadens experience beyond merely what is scientifically observed. We see that Freud’s claim that all experience needs to be scientifically demonstrated is too narrow a view of experience. And so, by denying other types of possible epistemologies and methodologies, he and his followers of the empirical methodology of strict positivism involve themselves in a delusional state by not accepting these approaches to extramental reality. However, I maintain that the psychoanalytic method advocated by Freud has merit in that it can be a useful aid to a person involved in or seeking to be involved in the religious act. In the end I show how it is possible to view the empirical methodology of Freud and the phenomenological methodology of Scheler as coexisting and harmonizing with one another. (shrink)

Freud finds it impossible to accept the existence of a Supreme Being because he thinks that there is no way to scientifically demonstrate or prove the existence of a being so defined. Consequently, Freud maintains that individuals who claim to have a religious experience of God suffer from a delusion. Such individuals remain in an infantile state of neurotic denial, fooling themselves about the reality of extramental existence.In contradistinction, Max Scheler, a student of Husserlian phenomenology, can accept the existence of (...) God because he finds that God. understood as the summum bonum, is the superlative value to which humanity can give assent in the religious act. Within the context of the religious act, an individual can come to discover or realize God. But this discovery is not made through a scientific demonstration or proof. Unlike Freud, Scheler shows that this discovery comes about via a phenomenological methodology which endorses a broader view of experience. Scheler ultimately makes the further claim that those individuals, like the scientist, who choose not to engage in the religious act are, in fact, involved in a delusional state.So, both thinkers claim that the other is in a delusional state. The task I undertake in this paper is to place these two thinkers into dialogue with one another in order to evaluate their specific methodologies. First, I explicate Freud’s view of religion. In doing so, I make explicit Freud’s empirical methodology and mechanistic materialism which is the root for his claim that God exists as an illusion or “wretched makeshift” of the neurotic unconscious mind. Next, I present the Schelerian response to Freud and positivistic science by making explicit the parameters of the religious act which recognizes God as the superlative value. Finally, I assess the views of Freud and Scheler, and in so doing, show that Scheler’s phenomenological methodology, with its emphasis upon bracketing empirical presuppositions, has merit in that it broadens experience beyond merely what is scientifically observed. We see that Freud’s claim that all experience needs to be scientifically demonstrated is too narrow a view of experience. And so, by denying other types of possible epistemologies and methodologies, he and his followers of the empirical methodology of strict positivism involve themselves in a delusional state by not accepting these approaches to extramental reality. However, I maintain that the psychoanalytic method advocated by Freud has merit in that it can be a useful aid to a person involved in or seeking to be involved in the religious act. In the end I show how it is possible to view the empirical methodology of Freud and the phenomenological methodology of Scheler as coexisting and harmonizing with one another. (shrink)

The historical situation in which the essays of Montaigne appeared is not unlike the situation in which the skepticism of antiquity developed. In both cases an old town civilization was declining, to be replaced by large, centrally administered states. Skepticism was developed by cultivated individuals of the town bourgeoisie who sought a base in their philosophical self-consciousness for the great transformations taking place in the external world. The essential difference between Montaigne and the skeptics of antiquity lies in his more (...) positive position with regard to the external world. Because of his social origin, he was able to identify himself with the rising French absolutism.This essay deals with the changing role of skepticism in modern history. First of all, it was confronted with the revival of religion both within Catholicism and in the Reformation. This religious temper had certain traits in common with skepticism in that it also replaced the medieval conception of the external world as a meaningful order by the notion of the world as a dark reality, and turned the individual back upon himself. The inner world of the individual, however, took different forms in Montaigne and in the Reformation. The development of a cultivated, worldly wise, and harmonious personality was appropriate to his skepticism, whereas the man of early Protestantism found in himself the conscience which compelled him to tireless labor and fulfillment of duty. Montaigne’s urbane humanism placed him above Protestantism ; the fanatic religious temper seems limited by comparison. The latter, however, includes the distinction between God and the world, and with it another principle besides mere surrender to the existing order. The Reformers had to concede to the masses that the inequitable earthly regime was not an absolute. For all its inadequacy, therefore, the new religion had an element which pointed beyond the prevailing relationships in society.In liberalism, religion became reconciled with the social reality, and skepticism lost its humanistic traits. The differences were obliterated. The predominant type was skeptical because he accepted religion without taking it seriously, and he was religious because his conscience drove him to more and more activity, not, however, in order to change the world into a better one, but merely for the well-being of himself and his family.Towards the new absolutism, particularly as it has developed in the authoritarian states, skepticism becomes universal. The high idealistic faith which is announced by the authoritarian ideology takes hold of man only superficially, and in reality he continues to pursue his individual ends. The period of transition, with its analogies to the decline of antiquity and to the Renaissance, appears to be the time once again for a more noble skepticism. But history does not consist of mere repetitions. The powers of mankind have grown in the meantime, and higher forms of social organization have become possible. The flight into oneself, therefore, takes on a retrogressive and nihilistic character, unlike earlier periods.Religion, like skepticism, can no longer be revived in its earlier form. Under the pressure of reality, it seeks to return to itself. It appears, however, that freedom of conscience cannot be maintained if it limits its demands to the sphere of religion. Separated from all other historical activity, religion has become impotent and self-contradictory. Conscience, originally set against the worldly regime as something vague, has become concrete. It can exist only insofar as it becomes part of the historical effort actually to eliminate prevailing injustice. Isolated religion is no longer religious.La situation historique dans laquelle apparurent les Essais de Montaigne n’est pas sans ressemblance avec les conditions dans lesquelles se formait le scepticisme antique. Ici et là, une vieille culture urbaine s’effondre et de grands États naissent avec un gouvernement centralisé. Le scepticisme est le fait d’individus cultivés qui sortent de la bourgeoisie urbaine, et, face aux bouleversements, cherchent dans la conscience philosophique un point fixe. La différence entre Montaigne et les sceptiques antiques se marque surtout dans l’attitude positive de Montaigne à l’égard du monde extérieur. Grâce à son origine sociale, il parvient à s’identifier avec l’absolutisme français qui commence.L’article examine les transformations du scepticisme dans l’histoire moderne. Tout d'abord, on le confronte avec le renouvellement de la religion, à l'intérieur du catholicisme ou dans la Réforme. La nouvelle religiosité a des traits communs avec le scepticisme dans la mesure où elle conçoit le monde extérieur non plus à la manière du moyen-âge comme un ordre harmonieux, mais comme une obscure réalité, et renvoie l'individu à l'intimité de sa conscience. Mais cette intériorité prend un aspect différent selon qu'il s'agit de Montaigne ou des Protestants. Au scepticisme de Montaigne correspond le développement d'une personnalité harmonieuse, riche d'expérience du monde et de la culture. L'homme du protestantisme naissant découvre en soi la conscience morale impérieuse qui le pousse à un travail sans trêve, à l'accomplissement d'un devoir indéfini. Il se révèle que Montaigne est supérieur au Protestantisme grâce à son humanisme compréhensif. Comparée à lui, la religion fanatique apparaît limitée, et cependant, dans sa brutalité, elle contient la distinction de Dieu et du Monde et partant un autre principe que la simple acceptation de ce qui est. Les réformateurs durent concéder aux masses que l'ordre terrestre injuste ne représente pas une règle absolue. Encore que sous un masque, la nouvelle religiosité contient en elle-même un élément qui va au delà des conditions existantes. Dans le libéralisme, la religion s'est réconciliée avec la conscience sociale, et le scepticisme perd son caractère humaniste. Les différences s'estompent. Le type dominant est sceptique dans la mesure où il reconnaît ja religion sans la prendre au sérieux ; et religieux dans la mesure où il déploie une activité qui, à vrai dire, n'a pas pour but d'améliorer le monde, mais uniquement d'assurer son bien et celui de sa famille.Avec l'absolutisme qui se montre particulièrement dans les États totalitaires, le scepticisme devient général. La haute croyance idéaliste qui y est prêchée ne s'empare des hommes que très superficiellement — en vérité ils ne poursuivent que leurs intérêts individuels. Dans la situation de transition, qui n'est pas sans similitude avec le déclin de la liberté dans le monde antique et avec la Renaissance, le temps semble revenu pour un scepticisme plus noble que celüi des masses. Mais l'histoire ne consiste pas en simples répétitions. Entre temps, les forces de l'humanité ont grandi, des formes plus élevées d'organisation sociale sont devenues possibles. La fuite dans le moi prend par suite — au rebours de ce qui se passait dans les époques anciennes — un caractère rétrograde, voire nihiliste.Pas plus que le scepticisme, la religion ne peut revivre dans sa forme originelle. Sous la pression des circonstances, elle tçnte, il est vrai, de revenir à elle-même. Mais il apparaît que la liberté de conscience ne peut se maintenir si elle ne limite sa prétention au domaine religieux. La religion en tant que mode de vie, séparée du reste de l'activité historique, est devenue impuissante et contradictoire. La conscience qui primitivement était opposée à l'ordre terrestre seulement de manière vague, s'est concrétisée. Elle ne peut exister qu'en se transformant en volonté historique de dépasser réellement l'injustice régnante. La religion isolée n'est plus religieuse.De même que la bonté et l'humanité, par suite de l’évolution historique, ont disparu du scepticisme, ainsi la conscience et le devoir de la religion isolée. La théorie critique de la société, dans laquelle ces deux éléments sont contenus, représente une forme plus élevée de l'activité philosophique. (shrink)

Luther, A. R. The articulated unity of being in Scheler's phenomenology : basic drive and spirit.--Funk, R. L. Thought, values, and action.--Emad, P. Person, death, and world.--Smith, F. J. Peace and pacifism.--Scheler, M. Metaphysics and art.--Scheler, M. The meaning of suffering.

The central theme is a hitherto unknown explanation of the “temporality” of the person as proposed by the late Max Scheler. The first part deals with the meaning of “absolute time” in general. The second part shows how the temporality of the person is to be seen as “absolute” time on the basis of two opposing principles in man: the “life-center” or impulsion, and “mind” which, without the former, remains powerless, but conjoined with it “become” personal in absolute time.

The original version of the Principle of Verifiabüity (PV), formulated as "The meaning of a proposition is the method of its verification" (Schlick, quoting Wittgenstein), can be criticised as ungrammatical. Schlick's claim that it was a "truism" reflecting commonsense and scientific practice is refuted by PV's paradoxical consequences. Its users faüed to distinguish between operational and situational readings, the latter of which invokes a mythology of comparison with "facts". Wittgenstein rightly described PV as a "rule of thumb" of limited usefulness.

The original version of the Principle of Verifiabüity (PV), formulated as "The meaning of a proposition is the method of its verification" (Schlick, quoting Wittgenstein), can be criticised as ungrammatical. Schlick's claim that it was a "truism" reflecting commonsense and scientific practice is refuted by PV's paradoxical consequences. Its users faüed to distinguish between operational and situational readings, the latter of which invokes a mythology of comparison with "facts". Wittgenstein rightly described PV as a "rule of thumb" of limited usefulness.

Evil is a noticeably absent concept in modern and contemporary literature. The author protrays Scheler’s approach to the question of evil as that which has existence only in or on the substrate of person. Furthermore, this “dis-value” of evil, like the person, is a phenomeon of temporality.

Evil is a noticeably absent concept in modern and contemporary literature. The author protrays Scheler’s approach to the question of evil as that which has existence only in or on the substrate of person. Furthermore, this “dis-value” of evil, like the person, is a phenomeon of temporality.

Arguing About Language presents a comprehensive selection of key readings on fundamental issues in the philosophy of language. It offers a fresh and exciting introduction to the subject, addressing both perennial problems and emerging topics. Classic readings from Frege, Russell, Kripke, Chomsky, Quine, Grice, Lewis and Davidson appear alongside more recent pieces by philosophers or linguists such as Robyn Carston, Delia Graff Fara, Frank Jackson, Ernie Lepore & Jerry Fodor, Nathan Salmon, Zoltán Szabó, Timothy Williamson and Crispin Wright. Organised (...) into clear sections, readings have been chosen that engage with one another and often take opposing views on the same question, helping students to get to grips with the key areas of debate in the philosophy of language, including: sense and reference definite descriptions linguistic conventions language and behaviour descriptivism and rigidity contextualism vagueness rule-following and normativity fictional discourse. Each article selected is clear, thought-provoking and free from unnecessary jargon. The editors provide lucid introductions to each section in which they give an overview of the debate and outline the arguments of the papers. Arguing About Language is an ideal reader for students looking for a balanced yet up-to-date introduction to the philosophy of language. Darragh Byrne is lecturer in philosophy at the University of Birmingham, UK. Max Kölbel is ICREA Research Professor at the University of Barcelona, Spain. He is the author of Truth without Objectivity (Routledge, 2002) and co-editor of Wittgenstein's Lasting Significance (Routledge, 2004) with Bernhard Weiss, as well as Relative Truth (Oxford, 2008) with Manuel García-Carpintero. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 281 g. The Problematics of History. Two types are distinguished: the more general neoidealism, especially the Italian, which will be treated in subsequent volumes; and the more technical examination of historical knowledge by Dilthey, Simmel, Spengler, Windelband, Rickert, M/insterberg, Weber, Troeltsch, Meinecke, and Huizinga. Without exaggerating it, Lamanna points to the strain of "inquietude" and restlessness which shows itself in much of the early twentieth-century philosophizing, especially (...) in its attacks on rationalism, and which serves to foreshadow the greater anxieties that will be portrayed in the second volume of the trilogy. I add only two small observations, not by way of criticism, but merely to supplement the expositions (which seem to me to be excellent) of two men whom I happen to know well. Giuseppe Prezzolini appears with Papini (as he should) as a founder and leader o[ the pragmatist periodical Leonardo. Whereas Papini's adventures in philosophical romance were quite extravagant, Prezzolini's contributions were satirically ironical His L'Arte di persuadere, which to a hasty reader might well appear as a "manuale per i bugiardi" (p. 308), really appears, in view of his subsequent career in La Voce and in his Vita di Macehiavelli as a brilliant Macchiavellian satire. Similarly there is an undercurrent of genial satire in the pragmatisms of James and Schiller. The criticism in Dewey's social philosophy of what he refers to as the bourgeois Utilitarian liberalism and individualism of early nineteenth-century Britain appears in Lamanna 's pages (as in other scholarly European works) as a criticism of "Americanism." Dewey called his political philosophy a "new individualism" which was about the same as the doctrines of European social democrats. It was very democratic in contrast to the liberalism of the early utilitarians. But this early individualistic liberalism is no more American than it is European. Certainly Dewey's democracy is at least as American as the "Americanism" which he criticized. If we must use these terms, we could say that the socalled "Americanization of Europe" coincided with the Europeanization of America. James was politically an individualist and Dewey was a socialist; both were equally American and equally concerned to be cosmopolitan. These terminological problematics are not intended as a criticism of Lamanna's exposition of Dewey's philosophy, which seems to me one of the very best of the many I have read. On p. 245 "Cominger" should be Commager. HERBERT W. SCHNEIDER Claremont, California Aus den A nfiingen der Psychoanalyse. Briefe an Wilhelm Fliess. A bhandlungen und Notizen aus den Jahren 1887-1902. By Sigmund Freud. (Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer Verlag, 1962. Copyright, Imago Publishing Co., London, 1950.) This selection of the letters, notes and treatises sent to the Berlin physician and biologist Wilhelm Fliess makes fascinating reading today, twenty-five years after Freud's death. Most of this material originates in the years 1893-1901 and therefore covers not only the period of Freud's shift from neurology to psychology but also the period of his most vigorous creativity in psychoanalysis itself, namely the publication together with his predecessor, Josef Breuer, of Studien iiber Hysterie. It is the period of his self-analysis which laid the groundwork for psychoanalytic therapy, the years during which he conceived and published his basic work Interpretation of Dreams. It is also the time when he wrote Sexuality in the Etiology of Neuroses, Ueber den Traum, and Zur Psychopathologie des Alltagslebens. 282 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY Included in this volume of papers sent to Fliess is The Draft of a Psychology written in a burst of enthusiasm during three weeks in the autumn of 1895 (pp. 305-384 of the text). This important paper deals not only with emotive life but with the origin of cognitive thought, a topic which went in part into Chapter 7 of the Interpretation of Dreams. In this paper Freud still tries to combine his ideas of the physiology of the brain with his psychological and psychopathological findings. It is therefore a watershed of his intellectual endeavors, although Freud abandoned on the whole the effort to incorporate a theory of cognitive thought into his writings. Some rudiments of the Draft reappeared, however, in Das Ich und das... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:132 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY Wittgenstein occasionally lapse into philosophical theorizing of a kind congenial to Ayer. It is certainly true that their disciples do. But one does have to appreciate the fact that the main thrust of their arguments is to deny the propriety of raising such philosophical questions at all. If it was Ayer's intention to vindicate Moore and RuSsell as proponents of a certain conception of (...) philosophy, he must meet that challenge. He has failed to do so. And this, in a sense, affects his book as a piece of history. A few years ago a disciple from the "other camp" wrote a book Philosophical Analysis covering much the same ground covered by Ayer in this book. One might think that Urmson's advocacy might adversely affect the fairness of his treatment. And in a sense, here and there it does. But as an over-all picture of the drift of English philosophy it is much the better history, since Urmson sees what happened in the course of time to the views of men like Russell and Moore. Ayer's book, in contrast, should not be read or thought of as history, but as part of the past to be examined. A. R. I.oucH Claremont Graduate School Verit~ e Interpretazione. By Luigi Pareyson. (Mllano: U. Mursia and Co., 1971. Pp. 260. Life 3800) This study by the eminent director of the Institute of philosophy at the University of Turin is not an epistemological essay on truth but basically a historical study, a sustained effort of defending traditional philosophy against the inroads of "ideology," of scientism, of fideism and "panpolificism" which in usurping the place due to philosophy proper lead to political and religious fanaticism. "Ideology" is the main target of Pareyson's assault which he considers as converting thought into a mere instrumentality of action, a sort of "praxism." There are according to Pareyson two kinds of philosophical thought: the genuine one which is revelatory and tries to penetrate truth and the expressive one which is not more than an emotional and temporary expression or reaction to an existent historical situation. This emotive and expressive thought can also be identified with what is called "ideology" of Marxist or nonMarxist kind. It is on the basis of such a distinction that Pareyson would construct a new kind of philosophical historiography. Pareyson calls any recognized relationship between man and world a sort of interpretation. He first used this concept in the aesthetic field but after a study of Heidegger, Dilthey and Jaspers generalized it to become a means of reconciling the existence of a multiplicity of philosophical systems with the basic unity of philosophical thought aiming at truth--as against ideology which has no such aim. We see in the philosophies of the past that they are all personal and rooted in their own historical time, yet they are ultra-temporal and it is necessary to consider their historical setting, but also their speculative content. Schelling was a philosopher of this import, especially in his second period. He then not only anticipated but surpassed Heidegger's merely negative ontology. Pareyson calls his philosophy ontological personalism. True philosophies always mean a personal link with true being. If Heidegger remained within the confines of negative ontology, it is because he confused the inexhaustibility of truth with its ineffability. Our culture is characterized by an integral historicism which is very different from classical historicism--such as for instance the one practiced by Hegel. According to integral historicism a philosophy has merely the meaning of being the expression BOOK REVIEWS 133 of its time and nothing beyond that, while in classical historicism every philosophy was a step in the progressive manifestation of truth not only a historical phenomenon. As a result it iustified not only a historicist treatment but also a speculative discussion of its truth-content. These genuine philosophies may be nonetheless rooted in their own time as we all are, but in philosophy as in life everybody is confronted with a decision whether he wants to be merely a part of history or whether he wants to have history, i.e. also to have the link with true being. Pareyson... (shrink)

This book is designed to fill a long-standing gap in the general literature of 20th century philosophy in that it offers a comprehensive view of the philosophy of Max Scheler (1874-1928) and opens up substantial discussions that have hitherto been largely overlooked. The book is solely based on the original texts of the German Collected Edition as well as posthumous and untranslated materials. References to English translations have been made whenever available. -- from back cover.

Heidegger, M. Andenken an Max Scheler.--Gadamer, H.-G. Max Scheler, der Verschwender.--Plessner, H. Erinnerungen an Max Scheler.--Kuhn, H. Max Scheler als Faust.--Dempf, A. Schelers System christlicher Geistphilosophie als Grundlage einer religiösen Erneuerung.--Scheler, M. Neun Briefe an Karl Muth.--Rombach, H. Die Erfahrung der Freiheit.--Landgrebe, L. Geschichtsphilosophische Perspektiven bei Scheler und Husserl.--Theunissen, M. Wettersturm und Stille.--Good, P. Anschauung und Sprache.--Welsch, W. Mit Scheler.--Avé-Lallement, E. Die phänomenologische Reduktion in der Philosophie Max Schelers.--Gehlen, A. Rückblick auf die Anthropologie Max Schelers.--Schoeps, H. J. Die Stellung des (...) Menschen im Kosmos.--Ströker, E. Der Tod im Denken Max Schelers.--Wyss, D. und Huppmann, G. Die Bedeutung Max Schelers für die Medizinische Anthropologie.--Lieber, H.-J. Bemerkungen zur Wissenssoziologie Max Schelers.--Fetscher, I. Max Schelers Auffassung von Krieg und Frieden.--Bochenski, J. M. Ist die Sprache Schelers in eine analytische übersetzbar? (shrink)

Introductory Remarks IN A MAJOR WORK planned for the near future I will attempt to develop a non-formal ethics of Values on the broadest possible basis of ...

The subject of "On the Eternal in Man" is the divine and its reality, the originality and non-derivation of religious experience.

The idols of self-knowledge.--Ordo Amoris.--Phenomenology and the theory of cognition.--The theory of the three facts.--Idealism and realism.

Max Scheler seems to present two distinct approaches to philosophy of culture. In the early period of his Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik and “Ordo Amoris,” he describes cultures as being defined by their distinct order of value preferencings. In his later period of his “Probleme einer Soziologie des Wissens,” however, Scheler explains the dynamics of culture in terms of the interaction of what he calls “real” and “ideal sociological factors,” rooted in various drives and spirit, (...) respectively. These approaches are fully compatible and complementary, the former describing culture’s vertical structure and the latter, its horizontal structure. Together these two approaches offer a comprehensive philosophy of culture, deserving greater attention. (shrink)

Max Scheler: Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos Edition Holzinger. Taschenbuch Berliner Ausgabe, 2016 Vollständiger, durchgesehener Neusatz bearbeitet und eingerichtet von Michael Holzinger Erstdruck: 1928. Herausgeber der Reihe: Michael Holzinger Reihengestaltung: Viktor Harvion Gesetzt aus der Minion Pro, 11 pt.

Max Schelers Magnum Opus aus dem Jahr 1913/16 kann als der gründlichste und umfassendste Entwurf einer am Personenbegriff orientierten und auf die Objektivität von Werten setzenden Ethik angesehen werden. Vor dem Hintergrund der Phänomenologie Husserls und in kritisch distanzierender Würdigung der Kantischen Philosophie entwickelt Scheler die Grundlagen der Praktischen Philosophie, indem er die Fülle der menschlichen Wirklichkeit in all ihren Facetten ernst nimmt, um sie zugleich vor dem Hintergrund eines materialen Wertaprioris verständlich zu machen. Die Kritik an formalen Ethikentwürfen und (...) die Zurückweisung von utilitaristischen Ansätzen entwickelt sich vor dem Hintergrund einer subtilen Diskussion des Wertbegriffs, einer höchst differenzierten Analyse der Rangordnung von Werten und einer Phänomenologie der Person, die bis heute einschlägig und wirksam ist. Neben dem Gesamtentwurf besticht die Schelersche Schrift durch feingliedrige phänomenologische Analysen zu einzelnen Fragestellungen, die auch nach einem Jahrhundert nicht an Brisanz verloren haben. Hierzu zählen u.a. die Ausführungen zur Leiblichkeit, die Diskussion der Gefühle oder die Konzeption des Liebesbegriffs. Hundert Jahre nach der Erstveröffentlichung 1913/1916 erscheint Schelers Hauptwerk in einer kritischen Fassung als Ausgabe letzter Hand. Der Text wird durch eine Einleitung und einen editorischen Bericht sowie Begriffs-, Personen- und Literaturregister erschlossen. Zudem werden nachträglich eingefügte Änderungen am Text ausgewiesen sowie unvollständige Angaben ergänzt bzw. Verweise und Anspielungen durch Herausgeberanmerkungen kommentiert. (shrink)