Abstract:While the American pragmatist C. S. Peirce and the twelfth-century Confucian thinker Zhu Xi 朱熹 lived and worked in radically different contexts, there are nevertheless striking parallels in their view of inquiry. Both appeal to the fundamental nature of reality in order to draw conclusions about the way in which inquiry can be a component of the path toward moral perfection. Yet they prominently diverge in their account not only of the fundamental nature of reality, but also of the way (...) in which we have epistemic access to it. These connections between metaphysical fundamentality or structure and epistemology, it is proposed, have the potential to illuminate current debates in metaphysics. Contemporary approaches that appeal either to grounding relations or to joint-carving ideology in characterizing metaphysical structure, it is proposed, implicitly rest on distinct sets of epistemological presuppositions that resemble the respective views of Zhu Xi or Peirce. (shrink)

What are some metaphysical fundamentals which constitute the reality? This question has occupied philosophers for a long time. The western tradition once dealt with conceptions of earth, air, water, fire, ether whereas the eastern tradition has studied notions like yin-yang(陰陽), taiji(太極), lichi(理氣). The question is now being researched under the name of physicalism or naturalism, and yet what is not yet clarified is the relationship between electromagnetic force as the fundamental of the physical and consciousness as the fundamental of (...) the mental. What is puzzling is that most philosophers insist on the overcoming of the traditional dualism while they tend to accept the distinction between electromagnetic force and consciousness. If they decide that the metaphysical paradigm of the duality is plausible then they should first present the grammar of functions of those concepts like individual, identity, causation. If they can see that the prospect of that traditional metaphysical paradigms are not hopeful, then they better start to look for an alternative metaphysical picture where the world can be understood more holistically. There have been alternative paradigms such as metaphysics of process and integration. It’s time to take a look at one of these. This paper tries to interpret the latter. -/- The notion of integration(誠) has been the subject studied for a long time as a teaching of Zhongyong, one of the key Confucian texts. Many has taken the word “誠” of Zhongyong to mean sincerity or faithfulness. Certainly there are anthropological or ethical dimension to the meaning of the word. But the whole text seems to direct a reader to see how the world is, the metaphysical dimension of the world. I will interpret the major thrust of Zhongyong to say that integration is a metaphysical fundamental. If one is to accept the evolution thesis of the body of human being then she is also to concede the evolution thesis of the mind of human being. If one is positive toward the evolutionary theory of the human mind then she is more likely open-minded toward the powers of the mind of physical things. This may allow to proceed to a thesis that integration is an information consciousness(chapter 1). Suppose that physical things of the world are integrational. Then the integration is not to be given from the outside but from within. Then when things are integrational they become integrators. Integrators are bound to possess some sort of power. I will discuss the thesis that integration is a dispositional power(chapter 2). If all things are bundles of informations then information is ubiquitous(chapter 3) and things may be passive in certain contexts but are active toward their informations, processing them in their own ways. If these three hypotheses are reasonable then my thesis of integration as a metaphysical fundamental would be plausible. (shrink)

A visão da ciência enquanto um saber puramente objetivo e, por isso, livre de suposições metafísicas, ainda persiste na contemporaneidade, seja no âmbito ordinário do senso comum, seja nos meios científicos universitários. Sob essa perspectiva, percebe-se que há certo olhar que prevalece como uma máxima: a ciência moderna suplantou a metafísica. Noutros termos, ainda hoje se acredita que, após as descobertas da Revolução Científica, com Copérnico, Galileu, Newton, entre outros, o discurso metafísico foi extinto da ciência. Embora essa visão sobre (...) a ciência não seja unânime e, ao contrário, venha cada vez mais sendo solapada no meio acadêmico, não é incomum observar que ela ainda está presente entre os cientistas e teóricos da ciência brasileiros. Assim sendo, o objetivo desse artigo é, primeiramente, mostrar que a ciência moderna não rejeita – ao menos em princípio – às teses metafísicas, mas sim uma visão metafísica específica, a saber, a oriunda dos escritos de Aristóteles e que sustentou a visão científica anterior à concepção moderna. Além disso, o artigo mostra que, apesar da pretensa objetividade e matematização da ciência, a concepção moderna lança mão de uma visão particular de ontologia/metafísica em seu fundamento. Por fim, pretende-se concluir, por meio de uma análise comparativa da história da ciência, que não só é impensável, como também improvável se imaginar qualquer saber científico sem um alicerce ontológico, i.e., filosófico. (shrink)

A visão da ciência enquanto um saber puramente objetivo e, por isso, livre de suposições metafísicas, ainda persiste na contemporaneidade, seja no âmbito ordinário do senso comum, seja nos meios científicos universitários. Sob essa perspectiva, percebe-se que há certo olhar que prevalece como uma máxima: a ciência moderna suplantou a metafísica. Noutros termos, ainda hoje se acredita que, após as descobertas da Revolução Científica, com Copérnico, Galileu, Newton, entre outros, o discurso metafísico foi extinto da ciência. Embora essa visão sobre (...) a ciência não seja unânime e, ao contrário, venha cada vez mais sendo solapada no meio acadêmico, não é incomum observar que ela ainda está presente entre os cientistas e teóricos da ciência brasileiros. Assim sendo, o objetivo desse artigo é, primeiramente, mostrar que a ciência moderna não rejeita – ao menos em princípio – às teses metafísicas, mas sim uma visão metafísica específica, a saber, a oriunda dos escritos de Aristóteles e que sustentou a visão científica anterior à concepção moderna. Além disso, o artigo mostra que, apesar da pretensa objetividade e matematização da ciência, a concepção moderna lança mão de uma visão particular de ontologia/metafísica em seu fundamento. Por fim, pretende-se concluir, por meio de uma análise comparativa da história da ciência, que não só é impensável, como também improvável se imaginar qualquer saber científico sem um alicerce ontológico, i.e., filosófico.: The vision of science as a knowledge purely objective and therefore free from metaphysical assumptions still persists in contemporary. From this perspective, it is clear that there is a certain look that reigns under a common maxim: modern science has supplanted metaphysics. In other words, today is believed that after the scientific discoveries of the Scientific Revolution Modern, with Copernicus, Galileo, Newton, among others, the metaphysical discourse of science was extinguished. Although this view of science is not unanimous and, instead, come increasingly being undermined, it is not uncommon to observe that it is still present and it is like a vision of the majority of Brazilian scientists. Therefore, the aim of this paper is, firstly, to show that modern science does not reject - at least in principle - the metaphysical thesis, but a metaphysical view specific, namely, deriving from Aristotle's writings. Furthermore, the article shows that despite the alleged objectivity and 'mathematization' of science, the modern design makes use of a particularly modern ontology/metaphysics in its foundation. Keywords: Modern Metaphysics; Modern Science; Break paradigm. (shrink)

This is the first part of a two-tier overview article on fundamentality in metaphysics and the philosophy of physics. It provides an introduction to the notion of fundamentality in metaphysics, as well as to several related concepts. The key issues in the contemporary debate on the topic are summarised, making systematic reference to the most relevant literature. In particular, various ways in which the fundamental entities and the fundamental structure of reality may be conceived are illustrated and discussed. (...) A final brief section looks at the methodological issue of naturalism, paving the way for the survey of fundamentality in the philosophy of physics, which is carried out in the second part. (shrink)

Identity and distinctness facts are ones like “The Eiffel Tower is identical to the Eiffel Tower,” and “The Eiffel Tower is distinct from the Louvre.” This paper concerns one question in the metaphysics of identity: Are identity and distinctness facts metaphysically fundamental or are they nonfundamental? I provide an overview of answers to this question.

The mathematical structure of realist quantum theories has given rise to a debate about how our ordinary 3-dimensional space is related to the 3N-dimensional configuration space on which the wave function is defined. Which of the two spaces is our (more) fundamental physical space? I review the debate between 3N-Fundamentalists and 3D-Fundamentalists and evaluate it based on three criteria. I argue that when we consider which view leads to a deeper understanding of the physical world, especially given the deeper topological (...) explanation from the unordered configurations to the Symmetrization Postulate, we have strong reasons in favor of 3D-Fundamentalism. I conclude that our evidence favors the view that our fundamental physical space in a quantum world is 3-dimensional rather than 3N-dimensional. I outline lines of future research where the evidential balance can be restored or reversed. Finally, I draw lessons from this case study to the debate about theoretical equivalence. (shrink)

Metaphysical views typically draw some distinction between reality and appearance, endorsing realism about some subject matters and antirealism about others. There are different conceptions of how best to construe antirealist theories. A simple view has it that we are antirealists about a subject matter when we believe that this subject matter fails to obtain. This paper discusses an alternative view, which I will call the fundamentality-based conception of antirealism. We are antirealists in this sense when we think that (...) the relevant matter fails to be constitutive of fundamental reality. The following discussion will not rely on any particular understanding of fundamental reality, covering conceptions based on grounding, naturalness and truthmaking, to name three salient ones. This paper argues that there are serious issues with fundamentality-based metaphysics. It will be argued that: the fundamentality-based approach shapes and restricts our realist and antirealist views in unsatisfying ways, that it is unable to handle the conflicting facts that lie across the envisaged ‘layers’ of the metaphysically structured world, and that the methodological reasons for adopting the fundamentality-based approach fail. The paper will conclude with a diagnosis of the discussed issues, identifying a common source. (shrink)

This work, the text of Martin Heidegger's lecture course of 1929/30, is crucial for an understanding of Heidegger's transition from the major work of his early years, Being and Time, to his later preoccupations with language, truth, and ...

What is morally permissible, and what is morally obligatory? These questions form the core of a vast amount of philosophical reasoning. In his Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals, Immanuel Kant developed a basis for the answers. In this landmark work, the German philosopher asks what sort of maxim might function as a guide to appropriate action under a given set of circumstances. By universalizing such a maxim, would morally permissible behavior not become clear? Suppose that everyone were to (...) behave in accordance with this maxim. If everyone followed the maxim in the same way without harm to civilized culture, then the behavior would be morally permissible. But what if no one followed the maxim? Would civilization thereby be at risk? In such a case, the behavior would be morally obligatory. Kant's test, known as the Categorical Imperative, is a logical proof of the Golden Rule and the centerpiece of this work. It constitutes his best-known contribution to ethical discussion, and a familiarity with his reasoning in this book is essential to students of philosophy, religion, and history. (shrink)

The book covers a broad range of key topics, including theories of properties and particulars, the notion of truth-makers, powers and possibilities, material composition, and a variety of issues related to time and causation.

Fundamental Causation addresses issues in the metaphysics of deterministic singular causation, the metaphysics of events, property instances, facts, preventions, and omissions, as well as the debate between causal reductionists and causal anti-reductionists. The book also pays special attention to causation and causal structure in physics. Weaver argues that causation is a multigrade obtaining relation that is transitive, irreflexive, and asymmetric. When causation is singular, deterministic and such that it relates purely contingent events, the relation is also universal, intrinsic, and well-founded. (...) He shows that proper causal relata are events understood as states of substances at ontological indices. He then proves that causation cannot be reduced to some non-causal base, and that the best account of that relation should be unashamedly primitivist about the dependence relation that underwrites its very nature. The book demonstrates a distinctive realist and anti-reductionist account of causation by detailing precisely how the account outperforms reductionist and competing anti-reductionist accounts in that it handles all of the difficult cases while overcoming all of the general objections to anti-reductionism upon which other anti-reductionist accounts falter. This book offers an original and interesting view of causation and will appeal to scholars and advanced students in the areas of metaphysics, philosophy of science, and philosophy of physics. (shrink)

The book covers a broad range of key topics, including theories of properties and particulars, the notion of truth-makers, powers and possibilities, material composition, and a variety of issues related to time and causation.

This is the second part of an overview article on fundamentality in metaphysics and the philosophy of physics. Here, the notion of fundamentality is looked at from the viewpoint of the philosophical analysis of physics and physical theories. The questions are considered (1) whether physics can be regarded as fundamental with respect to other sciences, and in what sense; (2) what the label ‘fundamental physics’ should exactly be taken to mean; (3) on what grounds a particular physical theory (...) should be considered fundamental; (4) what should be regarded as fundamental according to particular theories of physics; and (5) what indications come from contemporary physics concerning the fundamental structure of reality. (shrink)

Some philosophers of science have suggested that contemporary science should be the source of inspiration to the new analytic metaphysics (A. Chakra vartty, C. Callender, S. French, J. Ladyman, T. Maudlin, etc.). This paper explores the prospect of a string metaphysics: a research program in analytic metaphysics based on string theory. Different forms of fundamentalism and pluralism are discussed in this context. The paper focus on string metaphysics with S-dualities (a relation between models of string theory at different coupling regimes) (...) and argues that fundamentality and compositionality have to be reconceptualized. String metaphysics with dualities is better couched in terms of metaphysical pluralism. Grounding, as well as a sketch of a string modality, are briefly discussed. The paper concludes with a suggestion for future work: the metaphysician may find a productive ground for research in discussing other dualities (especially the T-dualities, or the AdS/CFT duality), the emergence of spacetime, the concept of time in string theory, the multiverse etc. (shrink)

Since last year, major initiatives have been undertaken by the chair of theoretical philosophy at the University of Tübingen in order to enhance the reception of analytic metaphysics in the European landscape. Here we review the 2013 summer workshop, intended to be the first of an annual series, on “Existence, Truth and Fundamentality”, the invited speakers being Graham Priest (Melbourne), Stephan Leuenberger (Glasgow), Dan López de Sa (Barcelona), Francesco Berto (Aberdeen), Friederike Moltmann (Paris – Pantheon Sorbonne) and Jason Turner (...) (Leeds). The workshop’s scope is fairly large, focusing on three different aspects of contemporary research in metaphysics. However, the underlying idea of organizers Thomas Sattig and Alessandro Torza consisted in exploring their interconnections and even new areas which possibly share the same problem spectrum. Also, they thought of bringing together both young and senior protagonists of the contemporary debate. In this sense, the main thread followed by the speakers consisted in enquiring the ideas of fundamentality, dependence and grounding with respect to ontology (Berto, López de Sa, Turner) and the truthmaking debate (Priest, Moltmann, Leuenberger), thus pretty much in line with some latest tendencies in metaphysics, such as, prima inter paria, the works of Kit Fine. When we say that something is more fundamental than something else, we move into a non-conventional (for the standards of 20 th century philosophy) metodological framework, hardly focusing on the question about what there is, and rather tackling the issue of how fundamentally there is what there is, or how the existence of something is required as a ground for the existence of other things. Here is how Jonathan Schaffer explains the methodological transition in his influential “On What Grounds What” (2009): -/- Among the many assumptions Quine and Carnap share is that metaphysical questions are existence questions, such as whether numbers exist. They only disagree on the further issue of whether such questions are meaningful (at least as the metaphysician might pose them). But why think that metaphysical questions are existence question of this sort? Return to Aristotle’s Metaphysics. There are virtually no existence question posed. The whole discussion is about substances (fundamental units of being). At one point Aristotle pauses to ask if numbers exist, and his answer is a brief and dismissive yes. [. . . ] For Aristotle, the question about numbers is whether they are transcendent substances or grounded in concreta. The question is not whether numbers exist, but how. (Schaffer, 2009, p. 347) -/- The conference opened with Graham Priest’s intriguing and peculiar review of Buddhist cornerstone “The Fundamental Verses of the Middle Way” (Mūlamadhyakamakārikā) by Nāgārjuna (ca. 150-ca. 250 AD), seen as a unrecognized forerunner of multi-valued semantics and dialetheism. Priest shows that Nagarjuna’s thought indeed has valuable analytic grip (contrary to the traditional mystical dismiss of his works altogether) and is even in accord to some formal schemas rejecting both the laws of excluded middle and non-contradiction. Dan López de Sa was interested in the topic of grounding, raising concerns about how to explain the kind of “reality” exemplified by what is not fundamental, but rather derivative on something else. He proposes a conceptual and non-primitive analysis of grounding as linked to fundamentality and derivation, and argues that the view can be advocated along with the acceptance that at least something is not fundamental. Subsequently, he illustrates an impressive range of applications linked to contemporary debates in meta-ontology, truthmaking and philosophy of time. Stephan Leuenberger discussed a semantics for “total logic”, a variant of first order logic which is claimed to have several applications with respect to the issue of excluding negative existentials from the scope of theories accounting for a given ’totality’ of facts. For example, materialism is the claim that everything there is can be traced back to physical facts or to truth implied by those facts. What about the claim that “There are no angels”? According to Leuenberger, ordinary logic falls prey of modal arguments (if it is possible that there are angels, by modus tollens, that it is not metaphysically necessary that everything there is is physical). So, there is space for the introduction of a new operator, the totality operator, claiming of what enters its scope that “that’s the whole truth”. Consequently, total logic’s semantics tackles David Chalmers’ well-known conceivability-based argument in favour of zombie’s (subjects producing behaviour but experiencing no qualia) possible existence. Friederike Moltmann presented a massive array of natural language-based examples on the role played by case-constructions, such as “it is the case that Caesar crossed the Rubicon”, “the case of the stolen statue”, “the case in which it might rain”, and so forth. She suggests that we should take surface phenomena of our language very seriously with regard to the determination of ontological categories and truth-makers. Cases are provided by many natural languages with their own existence predicates (“to occur” and “to present itself ”), and these do not apply to other kind of entities, such as objects and events. Trying to derive a substantive thesis on their nature, she claims that they are filtered entities, a structure taking into account some features of the corresponding objects and events and preserving their relational pattern. Jason Turner discussed meta-ontological concerns against the claim that ontological debates are defective. Analysed the structure of a metaphysical theory and identified two different forms of defectiveness that can occur in ontological questions, the defection from without and the defection from within, the author provided an original solution in order to avoid such difficulties. He argued thus in favor of a logical constancy, a translation principle thanks to it would be possible reconceive an ontological defection. Lastly, Francesco Berto’s talk closed the workshop with a sagacious discussion of meinongian quantification. He substains that Meinongians and Quineans experience no conceptual equivocation. Even if the former claims that “There are things that do not exist”, something that the latter contrasts with the interpretation of existential quantifiers as all-including, they still rely upon the same concept of “existence” and they understand each other when they are outside the ontology room, so that it cannot be that they lack competence. Subsequently, Berto deals with the objection that Meinongians commit analytic falsehood in separating the meaning of “to be” from that of “exists”. The Quinean has no independent evidence for analytic equivalence aside from her emphatic stress on the “is” in “there is”. Meinongians, however, can retort to linguistic considerations and claim that existence predicates display fairly different functions. -/- As for what regards our internal division of the “philosophical labor”, Fabio Ceravolo reviewed Moltmann and Berto’s talks; whereas Mattia Cozzi took care of Priest’s and Leuenberger’s, and Mattia Sorgon of those given by López de Sa and Turner. Conclusively, we would like to thank Thomas Sattig and Alessandro Torza for all of their organizational efforts and the kind welcome they reserved to us. We hope we will have further opportunities to collaborate with Tübingen in supporting similarly innovative and valiant european initiatives. (shrink)

The book covers a broad range of key topics, including theories of properties and particulars, the notion of truth-makers, powers and possibilities, material composition, and a variety of issues related to time and causation.

The claim that metaphysics is fundamental has frequently been voiced in the history of the discipline. However, the usual ways in which this claim is justified do not appear to be effective. This article aims to fill this gap in meta-metaphysical theory by providing a credible justification of the fundamentality of metaphysics in two steps. The first consists in establishing a set of five conditions of fundamentality for the discipline. The second consists in showing that these conditions (...) are satisfied when the object of study of metaphysics is identified with an ontologically neutral object, namely categories, and the task of the discipline is taken to be the determination of the number and identity of the most general categories and the relation of less general categories to the most general ones. (shrink)

It was 250 years ago that Immanuel Kant’s “Kritik der reinen Vernunft” was published first. Generations of philosophers regarded this work as the ne plus ultra in epistemology or metaphysics of knowledge. Since central parts of his doctrine can, to say the least, be considered to be incompatible with fundamentals in current physical theorizing, many philosophers have continued to explore his ideas. Some of them do so believing that Kant’s convictions have definitely been proved to be true and that therefore (...) physical theories contradicting them are either flatly wrong or at least inadequately formulated; others try to reformulate his ideas in a way appropriate to provide a Letztbegründung for physical theories in general. Still others, and that includes the larger part of all the Kant researchers, are not interested mainly in these questions of truth but in all kinds of philological and historical questions concerning the position of his work in the flow of philosophical thinking. (shrink)

This book introduces profound reflections of Xavier Zubiri on the history of philosophy to English-speaking audiences. The book discusses the transcendental in Western philosophy and how a firm grasp of it reveals underlying unity, but also fundamental problems that Zubiri believed require a complete rethinking of certain theories.

Explores some of the major topics in metaphysics, such as essence, existence, substance, purpose, space, time, mind, causality, God, freedom, and the possibilities of immortality. An excellent companion to metaphysical studies.

The scientific realist wants to read the metaphysical picture of reality through our best fundamental physical theories. The traditional way of doing so is in terms of objects, properties, and laws of nature. For instance, there are families of fundamental particles individuated by their properties of mass and charge, which determine how they move around. One could call this view an object-oriented metaphysics grounded on properties. In this paper, I wish to present an alternative view that one can dub (...) a thin object oriented metaphysics grounded on structure: there are fundamental entities with no fundamental properties other than the one(s) needed to specify their nature. I argue that my view has several advantages over the received one. In particular, I compare my proposal to the traditional view in the quantum domain and I argue that my view provides a better fit for both approaches to quantum metaphysics, namely the primitive ontology programme and wave-function realism. (shrink)

According to Nancey Murphy, advances in science have made substance dualism a position with very little justification. However, contra Murphy’s claims, I defend the following thesis: When the central issues in philosophy of mind are made clear, it becomes evident that cognitive neuroscience which is rooted in the empirical data offers very little help, if at all, for selecting, clarifying and arguing about the central metaphysical issues, especially questions about the existence and nature of consciousness and the soul. Thus, (...) the Autonomy Thesis seems warranted in philosophy of mind. To defend this thesis, I, first, show that the central metaphysical issues in philosophy of mind are largely autonomous with respect to neuroscientific discoveries; second, respond to claims made by Murphy that, if true, would undermine my thesis. (shrink)

What is morally permissible, and what is morally obligatory? These questions form the core of a vast amount of philosophical reasoning. In this landmark work, Kant proposes the concept of a maxim, which functions as a guide to appropriate action under a given set of circumstances. By universalizing the maxim, morally permissible and obligatory behavior becomes clear. The German philosopher's test, known as the Categorical Imperative, is a logical proof of the Golden Rule and the centerpiece of this work. It (...) constitutes Kant's best-known contribution to ethical discussion, and a familiarity with its constituents is essential to students of philosophy, religion, and history. (shrink)

The Transcendental Psychology Approach to the study of perception has been developed by A.I. Mirakyan at the Psychological Institute (Moscow, Russia) about 30 years ago. This article considers the results of theoretical and experimental investigations and provides a historical overview of the approach’s development. Started with the investigations of constancy in perception, it went beyond the traditional Product Basis Paradigm (relying on perceptual features for finding perceptual mechanisms) into Philosophical Metaphysics of “nothing” and “something” concepts for revealing the form-generating principles (...) as fundamental axiomatics of the Transcendental Psychology Approach. Several principles were developed and justified: structure-process anisotropy, spatial-temporal discreteness, the formation of anisotropic (particularly, symmetric) relations, the coexistence of alternatives, and some others. Principles are explanatory for the regulations of sensory-perceptual processes and are the direct object of further specification and experimental verification using hypothetical transcendental models of perceptual structures. The theory suggests that the internal mechanisms of these models would not naturally manifest themselves in experiments within the functional range of perception, and to see the phenomena, it is necessary to bring the perceptual system out of its natural functional range. The form-generating processes are named adiaphorous in the sense that they specifically generate new structures and forms, regardless of the characteristics of products used and produced in the processes. In general, it is possible to speak about the class of so-called structurally-generative processes that are specific to the process of transition between the system-generating structures studied by different hierarchically interrelated sciences. The proposed two-staged qualitative model of the perceptual process consists of two substantially different parts: the direct sensory perception and a process of form designation or sensory name assignment. Further investigations of structurally-generative processes seem likely to shed light on the mechanisms of brain function and to contribute strategically to new directions in philosophical psychology and neuroscience. (shrink)

This book introduces profound reflections of Xavier Zubiri on the history of philosophy to English-speaking audiences. The book discusses the transcendental in Western philosophy and how a firm grasp of it reveals underlying unity, but also fundamental problems that Zubiri believed require a complete rethinking of certain theories.

The concept of metaphysics has undergone a significant change in the last 200 years. Beginning with Kant, there is a development in which “metaphysics” is no longer understood as a philosophical discipline but as a personal disposition which rather is an object of philosophical reflexion. For Wittgenstein and Heidegger, this has been the starting point of their understanding of the task and the end of the activity called philosophizing. For both thinkers, philosophy depends on an initial presupposition which, in order (...) to reach the result to which it is devoted, must be substantially revised within the process of philosophical thinking. And the term by which they designate that prejudice is “metaphysics”. I want to point out the genuine temporal aspect of both thinkers’ explication of this essential constellation of the philosophical activity. (shrink)

Much recent literature in metaphysics attempts to answer the question, ‘What is metaphysics?’ In this paper I argue that many of the most influential contemporary answers to this question yield the result that feminist metaphysics is not metaphysics. I further argue this result is problematic.

My dissertation addresses a question relevant to metaphysics, philosophy of language, and philosophy of science: What are natural kinds? I explore a view that holds that natural kinds are complex, structural properties that involve causal structure. Causal structure describes the idea that for the many properties associated with natural kinds, these properties are nomically linked - that is causally connected - in such a way that the properties of non-natural kinds are not. After criticizing arguments in favor of a nominalist (...) theory of kinds - one that holds that a natural kind just is to be identified with its class of instances - and after defending the notion of a complex structural property from several prominent objections posed by David Lewis, I apply a causal account of natural kinds to a set of problematic cases, paying special attention to isomeric kinds from chemistry. (shrink)

This book defines, perhaps for the first time in the history of the intellectual and religious tradition of Islam, the meaning of worldview from the perspective of Islam. The definition is articulated in the gathering together of the fundamental elements in the vision of reality and truth that projects the worldview of Islam into a meaningful whole. This articulation of the definition involves also explanation and contradiction of the challenges to that vision encountered throughout the ages to the present time.

Within physics there are two ways of establishing the relative fundamentality of one theory compared to another, via two senses of reduction: "inter-level" and "intra-level" (Crowther, 2018). The former is standardly recognised as roughly correlating with the chain of ontological dependence (i.e., the phenomena described by theories of macro-physics are typically supposed to be ontologically dependent on the entities/behaviour described by theories of micro-physics), and thus has been of interest to naturalised metaphysics. The latter, though, has not been considered (...) interesting for metaphysics, because it is not thought to correlate either with ontological dependence, nor causal or dynamical dependence. I argue, however, that this is a mistake, and that actually, the intra-level relation does reflect ontological dependence (in the same sense as the inter-level relation) and thus should not be neglected by metaphysics of physics. This argument further supports the assertion that the same notion of fundamentality underlies both the inter- and intra-level claims of fundamentality in physics, and that this notion of relative fundamentality in physics correlates with that of metaphysics. (shrink)

Are the characteristics and relationships among spatio-temporal entities "real" or are they simply conventional terms that note similarities among things in the world but lack any reality of their own? Or if they are real, what sort of reality do they have? Do we live in a world of causes and effects, or is this relation a useful contrivance for our convenience? What is the nature of this "I" that we invoke when referring to ourselves? Is it body? Mind? Both? (...) Neither? And once its nature is understood, what can be said of the choices it makes? Are they really ours, freely made by an independent will? Or is each choice determined more by the internal makeup of the "I" we happen to be and the social/environmental circumstances in which this "I" finds itself, rather than by any act of will? But if each of us "could not have chosen otherwise" than we have, are we no better than the machines we construct? Then again, maybe some of our more advanced machines should be considered conscious entities? Introduction to Metaphysics: The Fundamental Questions presents these and other intriguing questions, many of which have challenged philosophers from antiquity to the present in their efforts to speculate on the nature of what is real. Often filled with twists and turns, dark corners and hidden recesses, this journey of discovery is an exciting excursion into the depths of human understanding. As guides for this intellectual journey editor Andrew Schoedinger has chosen an impressive array of creative and thought-provoking philosophers: Peter Abelard, Aristotle, Renford Bambrough, George Berkeley, Joseph Butler, Rudolf Carnap, Roderick Chisholm, R.G. Collingwood, Arthur Danto, Donald Davidson, Rene Descartes, C.J. Ducasse, Alvin I. Goldman, Keith Gunderson, David Hume, John Locke, Alasdair MacIntyre, A.I. Melden, John Stuart Mill, D.F. Pears, Hilary Putnam, Anthony Quinton, Bertrand Russell, Michael Scriven, Sydney Shoemaker, P. F. Strawson, Richard Taylor, and others. This volume is a unique invitation to join a distinguished group of theorists as they tackle tough questions concerning the existence of universals, the nature of causation, understanding personal identity, the tangled web of free will, and the challenges posed by the advent of artificial intelligence. (shrink)

I explore some ways in which one might base an account of the fundamental metaphysics of geometry on the mathematical theory of Linear Structures recently developed by Tim Maudlin (2010). Having considered some of the challenges facing this approach, Idevelop an alternative approach, according to which the fundamental ontology includes concrete entities structurally isomorphic to functions from space-time points to real numbers.

This book argues that our current best theories of fundamental physics are best interpreted as positing spacetime as non-fundamental. It is written in accessible language and largely avoids mathematical technicalities by instead focusing on the key metaphysical and foundational lessons for the fundamentality of spacetime. -/- According to orthodoxy, spacetime and spatiotemporal properties are regarded as fundamental structures of our world. Spacetime fundamentalism, however, faces challenges from speculative theories of quantum gravity – roughly speaking, the project of applying (...) the lessons of quantum mechanics to gravitation and spacetime. This book demonstrates that the non-fundamentality of spacetime does not rely on speculative physics alone. Rather, one can give an interpretation of general relativity that supports some form of spacetime non-fundamentalism. The author makes the case for spacetime non-fundamentalism in three steps. First, he confronts the standard geometrical interpretation of general relativity with Brown and Pooley’s dynamical approach to relativity theory. Second, he considers an alternative derivation of the Einstein field equations, namely the classical spin-2 approach, and argues that it paves the way for a refined dynamical approach to general relativity. Finally, he argues that particle physics can serve as a continuity condition for the metaphysics of spacetime. -/- The Non-Fundamentality of Spacetime will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working in philosophy of physics, philosophy of science, and metaphysics. (shrink)