Aristotle is oftentimes viewed through a strictly philosophical lens as heir to Plato and has having introduced logical rigor where an emphasis on the theory of Forms formerly prevailed. It must be appreciated that Aristotle was the son of a physician, and that his inculcation of the thought of other Greek philosophers addressing health and the natural elements led to an extremely broad set of biologically- and medically-related writings. As this article proposes, Aristotle deepened the fourfold theory of (...) the elements with anatomic and physiologic observations. In books like History of Animals, Parts of Animals, and the lost Anatomai, he actively dissected organisms and recorded his findings. The corpus of medically-related literature Aristotle developed had a direct influence on subsequent Greek thinkers, including Galen, and on Medieval Islamic and modern Western practitioners such as William Harvey. Aristotle's ideas continue to influence modern medical thinkers in Europe and America through both his interpretation by European philosophers gaining the attention of medical humanists, and his writings' enduring impact on medical researchers balancing scientific with more personalistic approaches to medicine. (shrink)

The estrangement between genetic scientists and theologians originating in the 1960s is reflected in novel combinations of human thought (subject) and genes (investigational object), paralleling each other through the universal process known in chaos theory as self-similarity. The clash and recombination of genes and knowledge captures what Philip Hefner refers to as irony, one of four voices he suggests transmit the knowledge and arguments of the religion-and-science debate. When viewed along a tangent connecting irony to leadership, journal dissemination, and (...) the activities of the "public intellectual" and the public at large, the sequence of voices is shown to resemble the passage of genetic information from DNA to mRNA, tRNA, and protein, and from cell nucleus to surrounding environment. In this light, Hefner's inquiry into the voices of Zygon is bound up with the very subject matter Zygon covers. (shrink)

Coherence and correspondence are classical contenders as theories of truth. In this paper we examine them instead as interacting factors in the dynamics of belief across epistemic networks. We construct an agent-based model of network contact in which agents are characterized not in terms of single beliefs but in terms of internal belief suites. Individuals update elements of their belief suites on input from other agents in order both to maximize internal belief coherence and to incorporate ‘trickled in’ elements of (...) truth as correspondence. Results, though often intuitive, prove more complex than in simpler models (Hegselmann & Krause 2002, 2006; Grim, Singer, Reade & Fisher 2015). The optimistic finding is that pressures toward internal coherence can exploit and expand on small elements of truth as correspondence is introduced into epistemic networks. Less optimistic results show that pressures for coherence can also work directly against the incorporation of truth, particularly when coherence is established first and new data is introduced later. (shrink)

Models and theories are of central importance in science, and scientists spend substantial amounts of time building, testing, comparing and revising models and theories. It is therefore not surprising that the nature of scientific models and theories has been a widely debated topic within the philosophy of science for many years. The product of two decades of research, in this book Roman Frigg provides an accessible yet critical introduction to the debates about models and theories within (...) analytical philosophy of science since the 1920s. Models and Theories is the first book to address the topic from a philosophical perspective, making it essential reading for advanced undergraduates, researchers, and professional philosophers working in philosophy of science, philosophy of mathematics, and philosophy of technology. It will also be of interest to philosophically minded readers working in physics, computer sciences and STEM fields more broadly. (shrink)

Using an example of a computer simulation of the convective structure of a red giant star, this paper argues that simulation is a rich inferential process, and not simply a "number crunching" technique. The scientific practice of simulation, moreover, poses some interesting and challenging epistemological and methodological issues for the philosophy of science. I will also argue that these challenges would be best addressed by a philosophy of science that places less emphasis on the representational capacity of theories (and ascribes (...) that capacity instead to models) and more emphasis on the role of theory in guiding (rather than determining) the construction of models. (shrink)

Three metascientific concepts that have been object of philosophical analysis are the concepts oflaw, model and theory. The aim ofthis article is to present the explication of these concepts, and of their relationships, made within the framework of Sneedean or Metatheoretical Structuralism (Balzer et al. 1987), and of their application to a case from the realm of biology: Population Dynamics. The analysis carried out will make it possible to support, contrary to what some philosophers of science in general and (...) of biology in particular hold, the following claims: a) there are "laws" in biological sciences, b) many of the heterogeneous and different "models" of biology can be accommodated under some "theory", and c) this is exactly what confers great unifying power to biological theories. (shrink)

Given that scientific realism is based on the assumption that there is a connection between a model's predictive success and its truth, and given the success of multiple incompatible models in scientific practice, the realist has a problem. When the different models can be shown to arise as different approximations to a unified theory, however, one might think the realist to be able to accommodate such cases. I discuss a special class of models and argue that (...) a realist interpretation has to understand these models of a system as ‘ perspectival ’, in close analogy to different spatial perspectives onto the same object. For this sort of case, I also respond to Morrison's recent claim that in the process of unifying models into an overarching theory, explanatory and descriptive power are lost, leaving the unified theory with less of a claim to a realist interpretation than the models themselves. Introduction Perspectival models from singular perturbation problems Unification of perspectives without losses of explanatory power Perspectives as different levels of a system Perspectival models, idealizations and pluralism. (shrink)

Using an example of a computer simulation of the convective structure of a red giant star, this paper argues that simulation is a rich inferential process, and not simply a “number crunching” technique. The scientific practice of simulation, moreover, poses some interesting and challenging epistemological and methodological issues for the philosophy of science. I will also argue that these challenges would be best addressed by a philosophy of science that places less emphasis on the representational capacity of theories and more (...) emphasis on the role of theory in guiding the construction of models. (shrink)

As scientists spend a substantial part of their time building, testing, comparing and revising theories or models, it is no surprise that the nature of theories and models is a subject of central importance within the philosophy of science. This book provides a critical survey of, and introduction to, the debates surrounding theories and models within analytical philosophy of science. It combines coverage of standard topics such as the syntactic and semantic views of theories as well as (...) ones less often discussed in connection with models and theories but which nevertheless are shown to have a clear bearing on the topic, such as Munich structuralism, thought experiments, the applicability of mathematics in the empirical sciences and measurement theory. The book provides a clearly structured and systematic introduction to a field, which, due to its richness and complexity, can be difficult to master. (shrink)

This paper is the second of a two-part series on models and theories, the first of which appeared in International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 11, No. 2, 1997. It further explores some of themes of the first paper and examines applications, including: the relations between “similarity” and “isomorphism”, and between “model” and “interpretation”, and the notion of structural explanation.

The paper, as Part I of a two-part series, argues for a hybrid formulation of the semantic view of scientific theories. For stage-setting, it first reviews the elements of the model theory in mathematical logic (on whose foundation the semantic view rests), the syntactic and the semantic view, and the different notions of models used in the practice of science. The paper then argues for an integration of the notions into the semantic view, and thereby offers a hybrid (...) semantic view, which at once secures the view's logical foundations and enhances its applicability. The dilemma of either losing touch with the practice of science or yielding up the benefits of the model theory is thus avoided. (shrink)

One of the most interesting things about science and engineering at the nanoscale, from the point of view of the philosophy of science, is the frequent use they make of models constructed out of theories belonging to different levels of description. We usually take it for granted that every level of description falls under the domain of its own theory. For example, we generally presume there is some fundamental level of description. And with that presumption comes the hope (...) that we will be able to find a general theory of how things work at that level. But we also often take it for granted that at every other level of description that interests us—whether it be at the level of subatomic particles, atoms, fundamental theory molecules, fluids or mechanical solids—there will be some non-fundamental theory available to us that will be practically serviceable for explaining, predicting, and controlling the various phenomena that live at that level of description. (shrink)

The pharmaceutical sector, an industry already facing stiff challenges in the form of intensified competition and strategic consolidation, has increasingly become subject to a range of pressures. Crucially, in common with other large-scale businesses, pharmaceutical firms find themselves ‹invited’ to respond positively to the corporate ‹social’ responsibility (CSR) expectations of their stakeholders. Consequently, individual managers will almost certainly be obliged to engage in some form of stakeholder dialogue and this, in turn, means that they will have to make difficult choices (...) about which practices to adopt. This real-world management predicament runs parallel to an academic interest in CSR stakeholder dialogue theory and models. Accordingly, the approach of this paper is to focus primarily on the academic debate surrounding stakeholder dialogue, by reviewing past attempts to research and theorise the subject, by identifying gaps and weaknesses in the literature, and by proposing a new analytical model. The central aim of the proposed new model is to offer a unified, structured, systematic, and comprehensive approach to CSR decision making whilst simultaneously providing a practical framework for CSR executives who face the challenge of responding in an effective manner to stakeholders. The model outlined here is currently being employed to conduct international comparative empirical research into stakeholder dialogue practices amongst UK and German pharmaceutical firms. In the longer term the intention is to use the model to undertake international comparative research encompassing a broader range of countries and industries. (shrink)

What is a right? What, if anything, makes rights different from other features of the normative world, such as duties, standards, rules, or principles? Do all rights serve some ultimate purpose? In addition to raising these questions, philosophers and jurists have long been aware that different senses of ‘a right’ abound. To help make sense of this diversity, and to address the above questions, they developed two types of accounts of rights: models and theories. This book explicates rights modelling (...) and theorising and scrutinises their methodological underpinnings. It then challenges this framework by showing why the theories ought to be abandoned. In addition to exploring structural concerns, the book also addresses the various ways that rights can be used. It clarifies important differences between rights exercise, enforcement, remedying, and vindication, and identifies forms of legal rights-claiming and rights-invoking outside of institutional contexts. (shrink)

: This paper gives a historical overview of the ways various trends in the philosophy of science dealt with models and their relationship with the topics of heuristics and theoretical dynamics. First of all, N. Campbell’s account of analogies as components of scientific theories is presented. Next, the notion of ‘model’ in the reconstruction of the structure of scientific theories proposed by logical empiricists is examined. This overview finishes with M. Hesse’s attempts to develop Campbell’s early ideas in terms (...) of an analogical inference. The final part of the paper points to contemporary developments on these issues which adopt a cognitivist perspective. It is indicated how discussions in the cognitive sciences might help to flesh out some of the insights philosophers of science had concerning the role models and analogies play in actual scientific theorizing. Key words: models, analogical reasoning, metaphors in science, the structure of scientific theories, theoretical dynamics, heuristics, scientific discovery. (shrink)

I argue against an account of scientific representation suggested by the semantic, or structuralist, conception of scientific theories. Proponents of this conception often employ the term “model” to refer to bare “structures”, which naturally leads them to attempt to characterize the relation between models and reality as a purely structural one. I argue instead that scientific models are typically “representations”, in the pragmatist sense of the term: they are inherently intended for specific phenomena. Therefore in general scientific (...) class='Hi'>models are not (merely) structures. I then explore some consequences of this pragmatist account of representation, and argue that it sheds light upon the distinction between theories and models. I finish by briefly addressing some critical comments due to Bas Van Fraassen. (shrink)

Despite the fact that attention is a core property of all perceptual and cognitive operations, our understanding of its neurophysiological mechanisms is far from complete. There are many theoretical models that try to fill this gap in knowledge, though practically all of them concentrate only on either involuntary (bottom-up) or voluntarily (top-down) aspect of attention. At the same time, both aspects of attention are rather integrated in the living brain. In this chapter we attempt to conceptualise both aspects of (...) attentional state within the theory of Operational Architectonics of brain and mind functioning, which provides a plausible theoretical basis for neurophysiological understanding of how attention is brought to existence in the living brain. (shrink)

http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2008v12n1p73 This paper aims at discussing from the point of view of a pragmatic stance the concept of model as an abstract replica. According to this view, scientific models are abstract structures different from set-theoretic models. The view of models argued for here stems from the conceptions of some important philosophers of science who elaborated on the notion of model, such as Suppe, Cartwright, Hempel, and Nagel. Differently from all those authors, however, the conception of model argued (...) for here is typically pragmatic, not semantic, i.e. it has not to do with the interpretation of scientific theories, but with the explanation and construction of given circumstances (both abstract and concrete), from the point of view of the theory. (shrink)

This article considers claims that biology should seek general theories similar to those found in physics but argues for an alternative framework for biological theories as collections of prototypical interlevel models that can be extrapolated by analogy to different organisms. This position is exemplified in the development of the Hodgkin‐Huxley giant squid model for action potentials, which uses equations in specialized ways. This model is viewed as an “emergent unifier.” Such unifiers, which require various simplifications, involve the types of (...) heuristics discussed in Wimsatt’s writings on reduction, but with a twist. Here, the heuristics are used to generate emergent rather than reductive explanations. †To contact the author, please write to: Department of History and Philosophy of Science, University of Pittsburgh, 1017 Cathedral of Learning, Pittsburgh, PA 15260; e‐mail: [email protected]. (shrink)

Thirty years after the conference that gave rise to The Structure of Scientific Theories, there is renewed interest in the nature of theories and models. However, certain crucial issues from thirty years ago are reprised in current discussions; specifically: whether the diversity of models in the science can be captured by some unitary account; and whether the temporal dimension of scientific practice can be represented by such an account. After reviewing recent developments we suggest that these issues can (...) be accommodated within the partial structures formulation of the semantic or model-theoretic approach. (shrink)

This paper aims at discussing from the point of view of a pragmatic stance the concept of model as an abstract replica. According to this view, scientific models are abstract structures different from set-theoretic models. The view of models argued for here stems from the conceptions of some important philosophers of science who elaborated on the notion of model, such as Suppe, Cartwright, Hempel, and Nagel. Differently from all those authors, however, the conception of model argued for (...) here is typically pragmatic, not semantic, i.e. it has not to do with the interpretation of scientific theories, but with the explanation and construction of given circumstances, from the point of view of the theory. (shrink)

This article argues that common intuitions regarding (a) the specialness of ‘use-novel’ data for confirmation and (b) that this specialness implies the ‘no-double-counting rule’, which says that data used in ‘constructing’ (calibrating) a model cannot also play a role in confirming the model’s predictions, are too crude. The intuitions in question are pertinent in all the sciences, but we appeal to a climate science case study to illustrate what is at stake. Our strategy is to analyse the intuitive claims in (...) light of prominent accounts of confirmation of model predictions. We show that on the Bayesian account of confirmation, and also on the standard classical hypothesis-testing account, claims (a) and (b) are not generally true; but for some select cases, it is possible to distinguish data used for calibration from use-novel data, where only the latter confirm. The more specialized classical model-selection methods, on the other hand, uphold a nuanced version of claim (a), but this comes apart from (b), which must be rejected in favour of a more refined account of the relationship between calibration and confirmation. Thus, depending on the framework of confirmation, either the scope or the simplicity of the intuitive position must be revised. (shrink)

I argue against the conception of scientific models advocated by the proponents of the Semantic View of scientific theories. Part of the paper is devoted to clarifying the important features of the scientific modeling view that the Semantic conception entails. The liquid drop model of nuclear structure is analyzed in conjunction with the particular auxiliary hypothesis that is the guiding force behind its construction and it is argued that it does not meet the necessary features to render it a (...) model of the theory, as the Semantic View demands. Given that this model is indicative of how quantum mechanics is applied in the domain of nuclear physics, I claim that the Semantic View does not adequately account for scientific models. (shrink)

The Compactness Theorem The compactness theorem is a fundamental theorem for the model theory of classical propositional and first-order logic. As well as having importance in several areas of mathematics, such as algebra and combinatorics, it also helps to pinpoint the strength of these logics, which are the standard ones used in mathematics and arguably … Continue reading Compactness →.

We question the widespread assumption that linguistic theory should guide the formulation of mechanistic accounts of human language processing. We develop a pseudo‐linguistic theory for the domain of linguistic stress, based on observation of the learning behavior of a perceptron exposed to a variety of stress patterns. There are significant similarities between our analysis of perception stress learning and metrical phonology, the linguistic theory of human stress. Both approaches attempt to identify salient characteristics of the stress systems (...) under examination without reference to the workings of the underlying processor. Our theory and computer simulations exhibit some strikingly suggestive correspondences with metrical theory. We show, however, that our high‐level pseudo‐linguistic account bears no causal relation to processing in the perception, and provides little insight into the nature of this processing. Because of the persuasive similarities between the nature of our theory and linguistic theorizing, we suggest that linguistic theory may be in much the same position. Contrary to the usual assumption, it may not provide useful guidance in attempts to identify processing mechanisms underlying human language. (shrink)

Despite the fact that attention is a core property of all perceptual and cognitive operations, our understanding of its neurophysiological mechanisms is far from complete. There are many theoretical models that try to fill this gap in knowledge, though practically all of them concentrate only on either involuntary (bottom-up) or voluntarily (top-down) aspect of attention. At the same time, both aspects of attention are rather integrated in the living brain. In this chapter we attempt to conceptualise both aspects of (...) attentional state within the theory of Operational Architectonics of brain and mind functioning, which provides a plausible theoretical basis for neurophysiological understanding of how attention is brought to existence in the living brain. (shrink)

The target paper of Schoeller, Perlovsky, and Arseniev is an essential and timely contribution to a current shift of focus in neuroscience aiming to merge neurophysiological, psychological and physical principles in order to build the foundation for the physics of mind. Extending on previous work of Perlovsky et al. and Badre, the authors of the target paper present interesting mathematical models of several basic principles of the physics of mind, such as perception and cognition, concepts and emotions, instincts and (...) learning. Their conceptualization helps to clarify the distinction between conscious and unconscious aspects of mind that is often neglected and further provide a clear description of the mental hierarchy, which extends from physical objects in the physical world to abstract ideas in the mental/subjective realm. While we agree that identification of a few fundamental principles is a first step toward developing the physics of the mind, and we concur with the selection of those principles in the target review paper, we think that the theory of the physics of mind would much benefit from considering also the most basic principles that are common for the physics/matter/brain and the mind/subjectivity/cognition. In this respect, such basic principles as time and space, as well as criticality, self-organization, and emergence seem to be the most interesting. (shrink)