“An elegant and erudite exposé of the hypocrisies and evasions that infect the social and political thinking of our times.” ___ John Cottingham, Emeritus Professor of Philosophy, University of Reading __________________________________________________________________________________________________ -/- What’s so good about democracy? -------------------------------------------------------------------- Is any land rightfully ‘our land’? ------------------------------------------------------------------------ How private are our private lives? --------------------------------------------------------------------- Is ‘equal opportunities’ talk all nonsense? ------------------------------------------------------------ Do free markets set the people free? ----------------------------------------------------------------- Patriotism good? Nationalism bad? ---------------------------------------------------------------------- What’s so bad about discrimination? --------------------------------------------------------------------- Are the transgendered (...) right about gender? --------------------------------------------------------------- Does anyone believe in human rights? -------------------------------------------------------------------- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -------- -/- “With characteristic wit, Cave takes readers on a journey of discovery through a maze of perplexities. This is a profound book — those who survive the voyage will never think about liberal democracy and their lives as they did.” Dan Cohn-Sherbok, Professor Emeritus, Univ. of Wales -/- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -------------- -/- CONTENTS: ____________________________________________________________________________________________________ ___ -/- Prologue: On hiding what we know >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> -/- 1 What’s so good about democracy? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 2 How democracy lies >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 3 Freedom and discrimination: burqas, bikinis and Anonymous >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>> 4 Should we want what we want? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 5 Lives and luck: can Miss Fortuna be tamed? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> 6 The Land of Justice >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > 7 Plucking the goose: what’s so bad about taxation? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> 8 ‘This land is our land’ >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 9 Community identity: nationalism and cosmopolitanism >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> 10 What’s so good about equal representation? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> 11 Human duties – oops – human rights >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 12 Free speech: the Tower of Babel; the Serpent of Silence >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> 13 Regrets, apologies and past abuses >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> 14 ‘Because I’m a woman’: trans identities >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> 15 Happy Land >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Epilogue: In denial >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> Notes and References >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Acknowledgements >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>Index> ;>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -/- . (shrink)

In this witty and mischievous book, philosopher Peter Cave dissects the most controversial disputes today and uses philosophical argument to reveal that many issues are less straightforward than we'd like to believe. Leaving no sacred cow standing, Cave uses ingenious stories and examples to challenge our most strongly held assumptions. Is democracy inherently a good thing? What is the basis of so-called human rights? Is discrimination always bad? Are we morally obliged to accept refugees? In an age of (...) identity politics and so-called 'fake news', this book is an essential resource for reinvigorating genuine public debate - and an entertaining challenge to accepted wisdom. (shrink)

This is an accessible summary - online, The Well - 1st September 2023 - of concerns raised in my book 'The Myths We Live By' and my latest, 'How To Think Like a Philosopher: Scholars, Dreamers and Sages Who Can Teach Us How to Live'. -/- Herewith as PDF.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Language of the CaveA. Serge KapplerThe Language of the Cave, by Andrew Barker and Martin Warner; vi & 198 pp. Edmonton: Academic Printing & Publishing, 1993, $54.95 cloth, $21.95 paper.The scholarly essays in this collection focus on the tension between Plato’s expressed views about style, poetry, and intellectual discourse on the one hand and his own practice on the other. Why does a man fiercely hostile (...) toward [End Page 266] literature and poetry write works that are themselves mimetic? Why does he repeatedly resort to story telling to make a point? Why do some of his works fail to fit his own prescriptions of clarity and unity? Six of the eight essays in this collection propose exonerating answers to these and similarly troubling questions.In stimulating counterpoint to this massive rescue operation, John Gould (“Plato and Performance”) argues that Plato’s attack on the irrationality of Greek literature and poetry has irrational roots in Plato himself. The reality defined by literary art, Gould suggests, is one of contradiction and conflict; its “incorrigible plurality”—the “drunkenness” of things as they are—is something that “Plato, at least in the puritanical mood of the Republic and the Phaedo, would not have wished to feel” (p. 25).Gould bases his contentions largely on a negative assessment of Plato’s arguments in the Republic. For him, the poverty and fierceness of those arguments strongly suggest an existential agenda at work. Implicitly supportive of this position, Penelope Murray (“Inspiration and Mimesis in Plato”) shows that the picture Plato paints of poets in the grip of irrational frenzy, in the Republic and elsewhere, far from being the traditional truth he purports it to be, is his own creation. It is a “far cry,” she convincingly argues, from the images of the poet that we find in pre-Platonic literature” (p. 46).The most original defense of Plato is offered by Mary Margaret McCabe in “Myth, Allegory and Argument in Plato.” She proposes that logical arguments in Plato’s text stand in a dialectical relation to stories and allegories elsewhere in the text. Mere logic presents too lean a picture of reality, while myths and allegories present one that is, from an Ockhamite perspective, too rich. The responsibility for finding the right theoretical balance lies with the reader.Now were it true that Plato’s famous images have no genuine heuristic value in the contexts in which they are offered, then McCabe’s thesis might be in some trouble. Yet that is precisely the claim of Manuela Teçusan (“Speaking about the Unspeakable: Plato’s Use of Imagery”), who reassures readers that because Plato resorts to poetic devices primarily in order to illustrate conclusions that are independently supported, he is not really guilty of an inconsistency needing to be explained away.If Plato’s complaints against literature are typically understood as presupposing extravagant metaphysical theses of his own, one possibility is to show that he is not actually committed to those theses. Christopher Rowe (“Reflections of the Sun: Explanation in the Phaedo”) and Michael Stokes (“Plato and the Sightlovers of the Republic”) weigh in with carefully argued versions of that time-honored project. Rowe can discover no reference in the Phaedo to the unhypothesized Good of the Republic, while Stokes discerns no genuine Platonic commitment to a two-world theory in Republic 5.Finally, Richard Rutherford (“Unifying the Protagoras”) diagnoses that dialogue’s notorious lack of unity as reflecting the disorganized minds and unsocratically competitive impulses of its Sophist participants, and Martin [End Page 267] Warner (“Dialectical Drama: The Case of Plato’s Symposium”) proposes that, appearances to the contrary notwithstanding, all of the Symposium displays both substance and unity.Reading these well-researched, engaging essays, one may find oneself wishing that their authors would occasionally wonder aloud whether Plato had any choice but to express himself through the poetic/dramatic medium which he criticizes. Perhaps he could have invented the straightforward philosophical prose style, but perhaps he was too busy building its conceptual and cultural foundations.A. Serge KapplerSkidmore CollegeCopyright © 1996 The Johns Hopkins University Press... (shrink)

Many authors have proposed constraining the behaviour of intelligent systems with ‘machine ethics’ to ensure positive social outcomes from the development of such systems. This paper critically analyses the prospects for machine ethics, identifying several inherent limitations. While machine ethics may increase the probability of ethical behaviour in some situations, it cannot guarantee it due to the nature of ethics, the computational limitations of computational agents and the complexity of the world. In addition, machine ethics, even if it were to (...) be ‘solved’ at a technical level, would be insufficient to ensure positive social outcomes from intelligent systems. (shrink)

This paper focuses on the fact that AI is predominantly portrayed as white—in colour, ethnicity, or both. We first illustrate the prevalent Whiteness of real and imagined intelligent machines in four categories: humanoid robots, chatbots and virtual assistants, stock images of AI, and portrayals of AI in film and television. We then offer three interpretations of the Whiteness of AI, drawing on critical race theory, particularly the idea of the White racial frame. First, we examine the extent to which this (...) Whiteness might simply reflect the predominantly White milieus from which these artefacts arise. Second, we argue that to imagine machines that are intelligent, professional, or powerful is to imagine White machines because the White racial frame ascribes these attributes predominantly to White people. Third, we argue that AI racialised as White allows for a full erasure of people of colour from the White utopian imaginary. Finally, we examine potential consequences of the racialisation of AI, arguing it could exacerbate bias and misdirect concern. (shrink)

We prove a Gleason-type theorem for the quantum probability rule using frame functions defined on positive-operator-valued measures, as opposed to the restricted class of orthogonal projection-valued measures used in the original theorem. The advantage of this method is that it works for two-dimensional quantum systems and even for vector spaces over rational fields—settings where the standard theorem fails. Furthermore, unlike the method necessary for proving the original result, the present one is rather elementary. In the case of a qubit, we (...) investigate similar results for frame functions defined upon various restricted classes of POVMs. For the so-called trine measurements, the standard quantum probability rule is again recovered. (shrink)

This paper examines the UK’s response to a recent European Clinical Trials Directive, namely the Department of Health, Central Office for Research Ethics Committee guidance, Governance Arrangements for NHS Research Ethics Committees. The revisions have been long awaited by researchers and research ethics committee members alike. They substantially reform the ethical review system in the UK. We examine the new arrangements and argue that though they go a long way toward addressing the uncertainty surrounding ethics committee function, the system favours (...) the facilitation of research over the protection of the dignity and welfare of research participants. (shrink)

In the Bayesian approach to quantum mechanics, probabilities—and thus quantum states—represent an agent’s degrees of belief, rather than corresponding to objective properties of physical systems. In this paper we investigate the concept of certainty in quantum mechanics. Particularly, we show how the probability-1 predictions derived from pure quantum states highlight a fundamental difference between our Bayesian approach, on the one hand, and Copenhagen and similar interpretations on the other. We first review the main arguments for the general claim that probabilities (...) always represent degrees of belief. We then argue that a quantum state prepared by some physical device always depends on an agent’s prior beliefs, implying that the probability-1 predictions derived from that state also depend on the agent’s prior beliefs. Quantum certainty is therefore always some agent’s certainty. Conversely, if facts about an experimental setup could imply agent-independent certainty for a measurement outcome, as in many Copenhagen-like interpretations, that outcome would effectively correspond to a preexisting system property. The idea that measurement outcomes occurring with certainty correspond to preexisting system properties is, however, in conflict with locality. We emphasize this by giving a version of an argument of Stairs [(1983). Quantum logic, realism, and value-definiteness. Philosophy of Science, 50, 578], which applies the Kochen–Specker theorem to an entangled bipartite system. (shrink)

There is an international consensus that medical research involving humans should only be undertaken in accordance with ethical principles. Paradoxically though, there is no consensus over the kinds of activities that constitute research and should be subject to review. In the UK and elsewhere, research requiring review is distinguished from clinical audit. Unfortunately the two activities are not always easy to differentiate from one another. Moreover, as the volume of audit increases and becomes more formal in response to the demand (...) for evidence-based practice in medicine, the overlap between research and audit grows more acute. Arguably, similar ethical standards and systems for ensuring that those standards are met should be applied regardless of whether or not a project is classified as research or audit. At a time when the research ethics review system in the UK is undergoing significant reform it is important that the opportunity is not missed to address the longstanding research-audit problem. We discuss suggestions for further reform that addresses this issue. (shrink)

In his short life, Alan Turing (1912-1954) made foundational contributions to philosophy, mathematics, biology, artificial intelligence, and computer science. He, as much as anyone, invented and showed how to program the digital electronic computer. From September, 1939, his work on computation was war-driven and brutally practical. He developed high speed computing devices needed to decipher German Enigma Machine messages to and from U-boats, countering the most serious threat by far to Britain..

This paper exposes some examples of continuing murky thinking concerning holism. The exposure is a prelude to noting the importance of proximity in causal explanations of illnesses and wounds. The paper then draws attention to how the proximate should not hold exclusive sway regarding what constitutes best nursing treatment and care. The error of excessive preference for proximity is shown to be an error, using as an example the treatment of leg ulcers. One component of holism that can be clearly (...) expressed amounts therefore simply to the claim: resist the error of excessive proximity preference, resist the error of concentrating solely on nearness. It is left open whether there is any further sense to be gleaned from the holistic babble. (shrink)

Researchers have frequently complained that the NHS ethical review system stifles good research. At last measures are being put in place to address this criticism, but will they undermine the protection of research participants? The Declaration of Helsinki recognizes that medicine will not progress without good quality research, but also demands that the well-being of research participants takes precedence over the interests of science and society. This article examines the implications of the ongoing reform of the NHS research ethics review (...) system for researchers, ethics committees and research participants. (shrink)

The three puzzles here considered are shown to have a common structure. And in each, an agent is thrust into a cleverly contrived deliberatively unstable situation. The paper advocates a resolutely Pyrrhonian abandonment of the futile reasoning in which the agent is trapped and advocates an alternative strategy for escape.

Professional control in the selection of treatment options for patients is changing. In light of social and legal developments emphasising patient choice and autonomy, and restricting medical paternalism and judicial deference, this article examines how far patients and families can demand NHS treatment in England and Wales. It considers situations where the patient is an adult with capacity, an adult lacking capacity and a child. In all three cases, there is judicial support for professional autonomy, but there are also inconsistencies (...) that have potential to elevate the importance of patient and family preferences. In combination, they may be perceived by healthcare professionals as an obligation to follow patient preferences, even where doing so conflicts with other professional obligations. It is argued that a more nuanced approach to shared decision-making could help clarify the boundaries of decision-making responsibility. (shrink)

This paper offers a series of commentaries and reflections on certain of Christopher Johnson's lines of argument as perceived from the perspective of cognitive studies, with particular reference to...

When consent to medical treatment is described as ‘valid’, it might simply mean that it has a sound basis, or it could mean that it is legally valid. Where the two meanings are regularly interchanged, however, it can lead to aspects of the sound basis or the legal requirements being neglected. This article looks at how the term is used in a range of guidance on consent to treatment and argues for consistency.

Consider manipulation in which one agent, avoiding force, threat, or fraud mobilizes some non-concern motive of another so as to induce this other to behave or move differently than she would otherwise have behaved or moved, given her circumstances and her initial ranking of concerns. As an instance, imagine that I get us to miss the opening of a play that I have grudgingly agreed to attend by engaging your sublimated compulsive tendency to check the stove when we are halfway (...) to the theatre. Such motive manipulation is, I take it, widely regarded as morally worrisome. If it really is morally worrisome, then we should be able to explain adequately why it is so. But existing condemnations of manipulation come up short in this regard. In this paper, I develop and defend a more plausible account of the moral status of this phenomenon. (shrink)

I defend mereological nihilism, the view that there are no composite objects, against a challenge from ontological emergence, the view that some things have properties that are ‘something over and above’ the properties of their parts. As the nihilist does not believe in composite wholes, there is nothing in the nihilist's ontology to instantiate emergent properties – or so the challenge goes. However, I argue that some simples can collectively instantiate an emergent property, so the nihilist's ontology can in fact (...) accommodate emergent properties. Furthermore, I show that employing plural instantiation does not bloat the nihilist's ontology or ideology. (shrink)

Does which side of the fence we are on determine our perceptions of justice? Philosopher Eric M. Cave argues that rules of justice would benefit the members of a community little if individuals lacked an effective desire to comply with these rules. However, sometimes a sense of justice appears to do no more than to limit what individuals can do in pursuit of their own ends. Cave presents a provocative vehicle for self-examination.

Background Non-adherence to medication is associated with increased risk of relapse in patients with bipolar disorder. Objectives To validate patient-evaluated adherence to medication measured via smartphones against validated adherence questionnaire; and investigate characteristics for adherence to medication measured via smartphones. Methods Patients with BD evaluated adherence to medication daily for 6–9 months via smartphones. The Medication Adherence Rating Scale and the Rogers’ Empowerment questionnaires were filled out. The 17-item Hamilton Depression Rating Scale, the Young Mania Rating Scale and the Functional (...) Assessment Short Test were clinically rated. Data were collected multiple times per patient. The present study represents exploratory pooled reanalyses of data collected as part of two randomised controlled trials. Findings During the study 90.50% of the days were evaluated as ‘medication taken’, 6.91% as ‘medication taken with changes’ and 2.59% as ‘medication not taken’. Adherence to medication measured via smartphones was valid compared with the MARS. Younger age and longer illness duration were significant predictors for non-adherence to medication. Decreased affective symptoms measured with smartphone-based patient-reported mood and clinical ratings as well as decreased empowerment were associated with non-adherence. Conclusions Smartphone-based monitoring of adherence to medication was valid compared with validated adherence questionnaire. Younger age and longer illness duration were predictors for non-adherence. Increased empowerment was associated with adherence. Clinical implications Using smartphones for empowerment of adherence using patient-reported measures may be helpful in everyday clinical settings. Trial registration number NCT01446406 and NCT02221336. (shrink)

This paper discusses the use of the Milgram obedience experiments and the Tuskegee syphilis study in the bioethical literature. The two studies are presented and a variety of uses of them identified and discussed. It is argued that the use of these studies as paradigms of problematic research relies on a reduction of their complexity. What is discussed is thus often constructions of these studies that are closer to hypothetical examples than to the real studies.

The attachment for download here merely references my 5,500-word final and extended article, criticising those who seek to justify Israeli attacks on Gaza. The article is published online by Daily Philosophy, 5th January 2024, link shown below. -/- After a background of facts (probably well-known by readers concerned about the matters), the article examines typical arguments much used in the media as attempts to justify Israel’s determined destruction of Gaza, involving well over twenty thousand Palestinians killed, hundreds of thousands suffering (...) appalling injuries and two million having their lives and livihoods shattered. -/- I expose inconsistencies, poor reasoning and immoralities of those who support Israeli actions. There is a final touch of Kant and Nietzsche - and use of the saying attributed to Jesus: For what shall it profit a man, if he shall gain the whole world and lose his own soul? (shrink)

Peter Cave's new book, Can a Robot Be Human? 33 Perplexing Philosophy Puzzles, covers a wide range of perplexities and paradoxes. Here, Peter raises some timely puzzles.

In his study entitled “The Beginning and the Method of the Logic,” Dieter Henrich assumes an interpretive stance with regard to the beginning of Hegel’s Logic which is in staunch opposition to the scholarly tradition. That tradition, as Henrich tries to show, has almost unanimously rejected the dialectic of Becoming as untenable. This holds true not only for those critics whose ultimate aim was to discredit speculative dialectical method in general, but even for the members of Hegel’s own school, who (...) wished to salvage as much of the Logic as possible. (shrink)

A brief history of affective responses to AI.

The pace of change and, indeed, the sheer number of clinical ethics committees has accelerated during the COVID-19 pandemic. Committees were formed to support healthcare professionals and to operationalise, interpret and compensate for gaps in national and professional guidance. But as the role of clinical ethics support becomes more prominent and visible, it becomes ever more important to address gaps in the support structure and misconceptions as to role and remit. The recent case of Great Ormond Street Hospital for Children (...) NHS Foundation Trust v MX, FX and X, [21]–[23] and [58]) has highlighted the importance of patient/family representation at clinical ethics committee meetings. The court viewed these meetings as making decisions about such treatment. We argue that this misunderstands the role of ethics support, with treatment decisions remaining with the clinical team and those providing their consent. The considered review by clinical ethics committees of the moral issues surrounding complex treatment decisions is not a matter of determining a single ethical course of action. In this article, we consider current legal understandings of clinical ethics committees, explore current concepts of ethics support and suggest how they may evolve, considering the various mechanisms of the inclusion of patients and their representatives in ethics meetings which is not standard in the UK. (shrink)

Uncertainty around the role ‘super-spreaders’ play in the transmission and escalation of infectious disease is compounded by its broad and vague definition. It is a term that has been much used in relation to COVID-19, particularly in social media. On its widest definition, it refers to a propensity to infect a larger than average number of people. Given the biological, behavioural and environmental variables relevant to infectivity, this might be pertinent to almost any infected individual who is not physically isolated (...) from others. Nor is the term confined to individuals with a propensity to spread infectious disease: it can potentially be used to describe events, policies or settings. This article explores the use of the term and considers circumstances in which the wide definition can be problematic. One problem is that it can lead to undeserved apportionment of moral blame to alleged super-spreaders. Another is that it can detract from scientific investigation of the heterogeneity of COVID-19 transmission. The author calls for a clearer epidemiological definition. (shrink)

This commentary is a response to ‘More than Skin Deep’ by Shelley M. Park, and a development of our own 2020 paper ‘The Whiteness of AI’. We aim to explain how representations of AI can be varied in one sense, whilst not being diverse. We argue that Whiteness’s claim to universal humanity permits a broad range of roles to White humans and White-presenting machines, whilst assigning a much narrower range of stereotypical roles to people of colour. Because the attributes of (...) AI in the popular imagination, such as intelligence, power and passing as human, are associated by the White racial frame with Whiteness, AI is cast predominantly as White. Following Sparrow, we suggest this presents a dilemma for those creating or representing AI. We discuss three possible solutions: avoiding anthropomorphisation, explicitly critiquing racial role-typing, and representing powerful AI as non-White. (shrink)

There are entitlements, opportunities, and rights presently reserved to married couples by the basic structure of society, its major social institutions. Some claim that this is as it should be. But given the abiding effects of the basic structure on the prospects of individuals living within it, restrictions on liberty built into the basic structure require justification. One might think that we could justify reserving the benefits of marriage to married couples by appealing to harm prevention. In this paper, I (...) argue that the prospects of doing so successfully are dim. (shrink)

John Stuart Mill was born two hundred years ago, on 20 th May, 1806. He died on 7 th May 1873. Peter Cave brings to life some of the thinking of this outstanding philosopher.

This book reflects on the implications of neurobiology and the scientific worldview on aspects of religious experience, belief, and practice, focusing especially on the body and the construction of religious meaning.

Certain paradoxes set us reeling endlessly. In surprise examination paradoxes, pupils' reasonings lead them to reel between expecting an examination and expecting none. With Newcomb's puzzle, choosers reel between reasoning in favour of choosing just one box and choosing two. The paradoxes demand an answer to what it is rational to believe or do. Highlighting other reelings and puzzles, this paper shows that the paradoxes should come as no surprise. The paradoxes demand an end to our reasoning when the conditions (...) they set ensure no end. They equivocate between, so to speak, reasoning in heaven and reasoning on earth; and, on the conditions set, not even an infinite god could reach a conclusion. (shrink)

Peter Cave gets to grips with maths, God and the meaning of life.