Brain activity determines which relations between objects in the environment are perceived as differences and similarities in colour, smell, sound, etc. According to selectionism, brain activity does not create those relations; it only selects which of them are perceptually available to the subject on a given occasion. In effect, selectionism entails that perceptual experience is diaphanous, i.e. that sameness and difference in the phenomenal character of experience is exhausted by sameness and difference in the perceived items. It has been argued (...) that diaphaneity is undermined by phenomenological considerations and empirical evidence. This paper considers five prominent arguments of this sort and shows that none of them succeeds. (shrink)

One of the most pressing objections against Divine simplicity is that it entails what is commonly termed a ‘modal collapse’, wherein all contingency is eliminated and every true proposition is rendered necessarily true. In this paper, I show that a common form of this argument is in fact famously invalid and examine three ways in which the opponent of Divine simplicity might try to repair the argument. I conclude that there is no clear way of repairing the argument that does (...) not beg the question against the doctrine of Divine simplicity. (shrink)

TThis article analyzes the critique of the Piagetan theory of intellectual development made by American philosopher Gareth B. Matthews. Matthews analyzes Piaget's ideas from the perspective of the meaning and possibility of philosophizing among children. His use of Piaget is particularly relevant today because the theory of cognitive development has shaped modern education and contributes to the preservation of skepticism about children's philosophy. The article reconstructs and interprets Matthews' arguments, which consistently and systematically show that Piaget misunderstood children's philosophy. By (...) “child’s philosophizing,” Matthews refers to children's tendency to ask philosophically significant questions, their ability to problematize experience, their specific attitude toward the world, and their ability to sense the problems that great philosophers have been dealing with for centuries. Piaget interpreted all these observable features of children's thinking as intellectual deficits; Matthews argues against this interpretation. The discussion focuses on the problem of determining the criterion of intellectual maturity, the importance of creativity and fantasy in thinking, the development of concepts and language skills, and the related differences between children and adults' language use. This analysis of Matthews’ critique of the Piagetian theory of cognitive development concludes that child psychology needs to be more open to this aspect of children's thought and that psychologists and philosophers must seek to better understand the child's philosophizing. (shrink)

This book presents a new approach to semantics based on Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz’s Directival Theory of Meaning, which in effect reduces semantics of the analysed language to the combination of its syntax and pragmatics. The author argues that the DTM was forgotten because for many years philosophers didn’t have conceptual tools to appreciate its innovative nature, and that the theory was far ahead of its time. The book shows how a redesigned and modernised version of the DTM can deliver a new (...) solution to the problem of defining linguistic meaning and that the theory can be understood as a new type of functional role semantics. The defining feature of the DTM is that it presents meaning as a product of constraints on the usage of words. According to the DTM meaning is not use, but the avoidance of misuse. Readers will see how the DTM was shelved for reasons that we don’t find so dramatic anymore, and how it contains enough original ideas and solutions to warrant developing it into a full-blown contemporary account. It is shown how many of the underlying ideas of the theory have been embraced later by philosophers and treated simply as brute facts about natural languages or even as new philosophical discoveries. Philosophers of language and researchers with an interest in how languages and the mind work will find this book a fascinating read. (shrink)

The concept of humanity has taken on new meanings in the era of posthumanist debate. Engaging both prehumanist and posthumanist perspectives, Liliana Sikorska strips away layers of cognitive mappings performed over hundreds of years in Western culture to expose in her recent essay the mechanisms that have exacerbated the East–West divide. While the majority of discussed texts come from medieval and Victorian literature and culture, it becomes obvious to the reader of her book that the issues she explores are still (...) haunting the lives of people and nations worldwide today. (shrink)

In the past centuries Maṇḍana Miśra was regarded as the most prominent figure of the advaita school of philosophy, to the extent that the whole system of advaita was frequently described by his name as ‘maṇḍana-matam’ (‘the view of Maṇḍana’). Nowadays advaita is almost exclusively associated, if not identified, with the name of Maṇḍana’s contemporary Śaṅkara. Both thinkers philosophizing along advaita lines, their views on the ultimate being, the highest bliss, ignorance etc. were substantially different. The present paper is intended (...) as a bird’s eye view on the whole of Maṇḍana’s legacy, including his Sphoṭasiddhi, being his contribution to the grammatical tradi­tion of Bhartṛhari. It is also aimed at finding the reason why in the hierarchy of eminent advaita thinkers Maṇḍana was eventually supplanted by Śaṅkara and his œuvre unacknowledged. (shrink)

The first aim of this paper is to remind the reader of a very original theory of meaning which in many aspects has not been surpassed by subsequent theories. The theory in question is Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz’s Directival Theory of Meaning. In the first section I present a version of this theory which, I trust, retains the gist of the original but loses its outdated language. In the second section I analyze some problematic consequences of the directival theory and show how (...) they can be addressed. The second aim of this paper is exploiting some of the similarities between the directival theory and later theories of meaning. In the third section I argue that using the directival theory as an interpretative tool enables us to create explications of some of the notoriously vague notions which contemporary theories of meaning employ. (shrink)

Toward the end of his classic treatise An Essay on Free Will, Peter van Inwagen offers a modal argument against the Principle of Sufficient Reason which he argues shows that the principle “collapses all modal distinctions.” In this paper, a critical flaw in this argument is shown to lie in van Inwagen’s beginning assumption that there is such a thing as the conjunction of all contingently true propositions. This is shown to follow from Cantor’s theorem and a property of conjunction (...) with respect to contingent propositions. Given the failure of this assumption, van Inwagen’s argument against the Principle of Sufficient Reason cannot succeed, at least not without the addition of some remarkable and previously unacknowledged qualifications. (shrink)

According to the predictive coding theory of cognition , brains are predictive machines that use perception and action to minimize prediction error, i.e. the discrepancy between bottom–up, externally-generated sensory signals and top–down, internally-generated sensory predictions. Many consider PCT to have an explanatory scope that is unparalleled in contemporary cognitive science and see in it a framework that could potentially provide us with a unified account of cognition. It is also commonly assumed that PCT is a representational theory of sorts, in (...) the sense that it postulates that our cognitive contact with the world is mediated by internal representations. However, the exact sense in which PCT is representational remains unclear; neither is it clear that it deserves such status—that is, whether it really invokes structures that are truly and nontrivially representational in nature. In the present article, I argue that the representational pretensions of PCT are completely justified. This is because the theory postulates cognitive structures—namely action-guiding, detachable, structural models that afford representational error detection—that play genuinely representational functions within the cognitive system. (shrink)

Modern physics is founded on two mainstays: mathematical modelling and empirical verification. These two assumptions are prerequisite for the objectivity of scientific discourse. Here we show, however, that they are contradictory, leading to the ‘experiment paradox’. We reveal that any experiment performed on a physical system is—by necessity—invasive and thus establishes inevitable limits to the accuracy of any mathematical model. We track its manifestations in both classical and quantum physics and show how it is overcome ‘in practice’ via the concept (...) of environment. We argue that the unravelled paradox induces a new type of ‘ontic’ underdetermination, which has deep consequences for the methodological foundations of physics. (shrink)

Kathrin Koslicki argues that ordinary material objects like tables and motorcycles have formal proper parts that structure the material proper parts. Karen Bennett rejects a key premise in Koslicki's argument according to which the material ingredient out of which a complex material object is made is a proper part of that object. Koslicki defends this premise with a principle motivated by its power to explain three important phenomena of material composition. But these phenomena can be equally well explained by a (...) weaker principle that does not support the questioned premise in Koslicki's argument, Bennett argues. I show that Bennett's weaker principle, together with an appropriate strengthening of a different premise in Koslicki's original argument, still yields a sound argument for the existence of formal parts. (shrink)

This paper centers around the notion that internal, mental representations are grounded in structural similarity, i.e., that they are so-called S-representations. We show how S-representations may be causally relevant and argue that they are distinct from mere detectors. First, using the neomechanist theory of explanation and the interventionist account of causal relevance, we provide a precise interpretation of the claim that in S-representations, structural similarity serves as a “fuel of success”, i.e., a relation that is exploitable for the representation using (...) system. Then, we discuss crucial differences between S-representations and indicators or detectors, showing that—contrary to claims made in the literature—there is an important theoretical distinction to be drawn between the two. (shrink)

Śankara did not comment on the first s ū tra in his Brahmas ū trabh āṣ ya, which was a common practice in such cases; rather, he started by defining two terms: ‘superimposition’ and ‘ignorance’, in a special introductory chapter known to a wider audience as Adhy ā sabh āṣ ya. The question arises as to why he deemed it necessary to precede his commentary to the initial s ū tra with these additional elucidations. Bh ā mat ī, Vācaspati Miśra’s (...) commentary on Mah ā s ū trabh āṣ ya, seems to shed some light on the problem. According to the doctrine of advaita, the phrase ‘desire to know Brahman’ in the first s ū tra seems prima facie to have no meaning. Thus, the introductory commentary is an explanation of an idea of Brahman which is foreign to advaita. (shrink)

The issue of liberation is a recurrent theme in all schools of Indian classical thought. In case of advaita-vedānta it is deeply rooted in ontology. The problem of ontological status of the world was the bone of contention for two competing non‑dualist schools of vedānta — vivaraṇa and bhāmatī. Maṇḍana’s Brahmasiddhi can be regarded as an important source of inspiration for the latter. The present paper is an analysis of Maṇḍana’s statements pertaining to the issue of mukti in contrast with (...) those of Śankara, the exponent of advaita commonly considered the creator and the most prominent representative of the school. (shrink)

This is a review of a book "Dopamine Nation: Finding balance in the Age of Indulgence" written by Anna Lembke. The author, who is a psychiatrist and a specialist in the addiction field, has made a compilation of her addicted patients stories and the results of a newest research in the neuroscience. The effect of her work is a simple description of a complicated issues of human pain and pleasure system and the influence of dopamine on the addiction problem.

The article reviews the book Konstytucja wolności [The Constitution of Liberty], by Friedrich August von Hayek.

Recently, it has been objected that naïve realism is inconsistent with an empirically well-supported claim that mental states of the same fundamental kind as ordinary conscious seeing can occur unconsciously (SFK). The main aim of this paper is to establish the following conditional claim: if SFK turns out to be true, the naïve realist can and should accommodate it into her theory. Regarding the antecedent of this conditional, I suggest that empirical evidence renders SFK plausible but not obvious. For it (...) is possible that what is currently advocated as unconscious perception of the stimulus is in fact momentaneous perceptual awareness (or residual perceptual awareness) of the stimulus making the subject prone to judge in some way rather than another, or to act in some way rather than another. As to the apodosis, I show that neither the core of naïve realism nor any of its main motivations is undermined if SFK is assumed. On the contrary, certain incentives for endorsing naïve realism become more tempting on this assumption. Since the main motivations for naïve realism retain force under SFK, intentionalism is neither compulsory nor the best available explanation of unconscious perception. (shrink)

The aim of the article is to assess the situation in terms of wage inequality and identify factors influencing changes in the levels, dynamics and relations of wages in voivodeships in Poland in 2012–2021. In Poland, during the analyzed period, an economic crisis occurred in 2012 as a consequence of the crisis of 2008–2009 and since 2020. Average monthly gross wages in Poland will be used for this purpose. Based on this data, deviations, relationships, and rates of change will be (...) calculated. To carry out the analysis and evaluation, I will use statistical data published in the Statistical Yearbooks of the Central Statistical Office in Warsaw for the years 2012–2021. In this article, the region will be identified with the voivodeship, according to the administrative division. (shrink)

The title of this article refers to one of the best-known essays written by David Hume, That Politics may be reduced to a Science. Hume assumed that politics was a science because it admitted of some general truths, which could not be varied by human beings. He adopted a similar stance, albeit indirectly, in the case of economics, discovering several general truths concerning the origins of wealth, money and international trade. At times, however, he was far from being consistent and (...) this undermined these truths. Consequently, it can be argued that, from his perspective, economics was a science on a theoretical level, but it lost this character at a more practical level. Similar doubts can be raised when it comes to Hume’s role in the history of economic thought. In some respects he was an original thinker, but several of his key concepts resembled to some extent ideas that had been put forward by ‘mercantilists’, especially those ‘mercantilists’ who were active in his native Scotland in the first decade of the 18 th century. (shrink)

The idea that concepts play a significant role in some perceptions is widespread but everybody seems to differ as to where to draw the line. Some researchers say that the difference between direct and indirect, concept driven acts of perception manifests itself whenever we perceive abstract or general properties. Others point at second order properties or causal properties. I call this inability to precisely differentiate between acts of direct and indirect perception “The Division Problem”. Furthermore there is always a question (...) as to how widespread indirect perceptions are. Can we attribute them to prelingual cognitive systems? I call this second problem “The Distribution Problem”. -/- The main aim of the paper is providing a solution to both problems by proposing a naturalistic explication of the notion of “concept”. -/- I propose to identify the role concepts were supposed to play in perception with a mechanism of “soft detection”. Unlike hard detectors which react to a specific target in virtue of their constitution and placement in the system, soft detectors are understood as dynamic categorization devices enabling the cognitive system to selectively react to an undetectable property via flexible exploitation of data from hard detectors. -/- I conclude by showing how the notion of soft detection retains some of the aspects traditionally attributed to concepts and how does it differ from similar accounts known from contemporary literature. (shrink)

We investigate a simple game paradigm for intuitionistic logic, inspired by Wajsberg’s implicit inhabitation algorithm and Beth tableaux. The principal idea is that one player, ∃ros, is trying to construct a proof in normal form while his opponent, ∀phrodite, attempts to build a counter-model. The determinacy of the game implies therefore both completeness and semantic cut-elimination.

Infertility is a serious social problem. Very often the only treatment possibility are IVF methods. This study explores the possibility of outcome prediction in the early stages of treatment. The data, collected from the previous treatment cycles, were divided into four subsets, which corresponded to the selected stages of treatment. On each such subset, sophisticated data mining analysis was carried out, with appropriate imputations and classification procedures. The obtained results indicate that there is a possibility of predicting the final outcome (...) at the beginning of treatment. (shrink)

Modernity and What Has Been Lost comes out of a conference held at the Jagiellonian University in Krakw̤, Poland, on June 4-5, 2009 that sought to identify Leo Strauss's intellectual background in re: the repudiation of a modern idea of homogenous, universal state (considered as an illegitimate synthesis of Jerusalem and Athens, i.e., the claims of Reason and Revelation). The world we live in, molded by science and historical relativism, may be described as hostile to human dignity or perfection, or (...) abhorrent to those who love the search for wisdom. Straussian teaching consisted in the steady effort to reopen "the quarrel between the Ancients and the Moderns," and refers to the esoteric way of writing practiced by the most profound thinkers of the past which has been apparently forgotten in the last three centuries. Strauss binds the concept of natural right with the question of maintenance of conditions for philosophizing, and it probably seems to him that such defense of philosophy is the highest task in our times. However, one must be well aware that philosophizing always means a perilous way of life. Indeed, it may be destructive of the city (polis) itself as far as the city exists due to some crucial beliefs the philosopher might put in doubt. Reflecting on those issues, Strauss engaged in several highly important debates with his contemporaries, in an open way with, e.g., Carl Schmitt, Karl Lw̲ith and Alexandre Kojv̈e, and more tacitly with Martin Heidegger"--Provided by publisher. (shrink)

The article presents issues concerning the interpretation of the phenomenon of wealth in the context of Christian thought. From beginning, philosophical thought has been engaged in problems of tangible property and its influence on the human condition. The great philosophers indicated a way that the person should refer to the goods of this world. Plato, Aristotle, Seneca – each of them, according to his own vision of man and the world, referred in his texts to the problem of wealth. Equally (...) significant contributions has been made by the monotheistic religions, Judaism and Christianity. Along with the development of the Church, this phenomenon stood out as an essential point of teaching. Primitive and post-apostolic church, to some extent out of necessity, took polemics with the outside world. Separating faith from matters of management, with its beginning in the Enlightenment, shaken the moral underpinnings of the deeds related to wealth. Marxist philosophy gave impulse to another reflection of the Church over economic phenomena. Leon XIII and his Rerum novarum are a milestone in Catholic thought on negative phenomena within the economy. The Holy Father portrayed threats resulting from the Marxist concept, showing an anthropological concept which was appropriate from the point of view of the Christianity. Social and later encyclicals, treat issues related to wealth from the Christian anthropology standpoint. (shrink)

The author claims that the conceptual content of perception can serve as an argument in favour of epistemological realism. He argues on behalf of the main theses of conceptualism in philosophy of perception, and explores the relational aspects of perceptual objects which make up the general conditions determining their reality. The relational aspects are as follows: the unity of quantitative and qualitative contents, their concomitance and inherence property in relation to an object. These general aspects are essential for epistemological realism (...) and establish the correlates of the conceptual identification of objects of perception. (shrink)

In this paper, I identify the hard problem of access for epistemological disjunctivism (ED): given that perceptual experience E is opaque with respect to its own epistemic properties, subject S is not in a position to know epistemic proposition (i) (that E is factive with respect to empirical proposition p) just by having E and/or reflecting on E. This is the case even if (i) is true. I first motivate the hard problem of access (Section 2) and then reconstruct and (...) analyze three of the ways in which EDists have argued for the internal accessibility of the factive character of perceptual experience. These arguments explain internal access in terms of the unity of perceptual and rational capacities (Section 3), favoring support (Section 4), and the outward-looking model of self-knowledge (Section 5). My conclusion (Section 6) is that none of these responses works. I then suggest how ED might be modified to succeed as an access internalist epistemology. (shrink)

Skeptical theism is a popular response to the evidential problem of evil, but it has recently been accused of proving too much. If skeptical theism is true, its detractors claim, then we not only have no good reason for thinking that God’s reasons for action should be available to creatures like us, but we also have no good reason for thinking that the reasons which govern how we ought to act should be available to creatures like us. And given this (...) ignorance, we would be morally paralyzed, unable to decide what we ought to do in ordinary situations that call for a moral decision. In this paper, I present a simple solution to this problem of moral paralysis by drawing on Peter Geach’s now famous argument for the attributivity of “good.”. (shrink)

We study the intersection type assignment system as defined by Barendregt, Coppo and Dezani. For the four essential variants of the system (with and without a universal type and with and without subtyping) we show that the emptiness (inhabitation) problem is recursively unsolvable. That is, there is no effective algorithm to decide if there is a closed term of a given type. It follows that provability in the logic of "strong conjunction" of Mints and Lopez-Escobar is also undecidable.

In their recent paper, Brandon Rickabaugh and Derek McAllister object to Paul Moser’s rejection of natural theology on the grounds that Moser is committed to a principle, Seek, which commits Moser to another principle, Access. Access in turn can be rationally motivated for at least some nonbelievers only by the arguments of natural theology. So Moser is in fact committed to the epistemic usefulness of natural theology. In this paper, we show that Seek by itself does not commit one to (...) Access, and that even if Moser is committed to Access, he is not thereby committed to the epistemic usefulness of natural theology for all nonbelievers. While we find this argument offered by Rickabaugh and McAllister lacking, we do not deny their conclusion that natural theology is epistemically useful to all nonbelievers. (shrink)

One of the greatest challenges facing materialist theories of the human mind is the problem of intentionality. As many non-materialists of various stripes have pointed out, it is very difficult to say, if the human mind is a purely material thing, how this material thing can be about or represent another thing wholly distinct from itself. However, for their part, these same non-materialists have relied heavily or exclusively on this intuition that one material thing cannot be about another. In this (...) paper, that hole in the intentionality objection to materialist theories of mind is filled by way of providing the germ of a new theory of the metaphysics of intentionality. On this view, intentionality just is partial identity. Partial identity is a concept introduced by David Armstrong and used by Donald Baxter to give a metaphysics of instantiation. The aboutness exhibited by our mental activity is simply a partial identity relation between the mind and the object of thought. This thesis, I contend, is a faithful interpretation of Brentano’s “intentional inexistence,” which the objects of thought have in the mind and which he held to be characteristic exclusively of mental phenomena. Some interesting and fortuitous consequences, including an elucidation of precisely why one material thing can never be about something distinct from itself, are then examined, and finally a defense against some objections is given. (shrink)

According to unconscious perception hypothesis (UP), mental states of the same fundamental kind as ordinary conscious seeing can occur unconsciously. The proponents of UP often support it with empirical evidence for a more specific hypothesis, according to which colours can be seen unconsciously (UPC). However, UPC is a general claim that admits of many interpretations. The main aim of this paper is to determine which of them is the most plausible. To this end, I investigate how adopting various conceptions of (...) colour and perceptual phenomenal character affects UPC’s resilience to objections. This brings me to the conclusion that the most plausible reading of UPC is the one according to which the phenomenal character of colour perception (i) is constituted by colours qua primitive mind-independent qualities of the environment and (ii) is not essentially tied to consciousness. My conclusion not only identifies the most plausible interpretation of UPC, but also highlights and supports an unorthodox version of the relational theory of perception, which is a perfectly viable yet so far overlooked stance in the debate about unconscious perception. (shrink)