This chapter discusses the roles of ether and electrons in relativity theory. One of the most radical moves made by Albert Einstein was to dismiss the ether from electrodynamics. His fellow physicists felt challenged by Einstein’s view, and they came up with a variety of responses, ranging from enthusiastic approval, to dismissive rejection. Among the naysayers were the electron theorists, who were unanimous in their affirmation of the ether, even if they agreed with other aspects of Einstein’s (...) class='Hi'>theory of relativity. The eventual success of the latter theory (circa 1911) owed much to Hermann Minkowski’s idea of four-dimensional spacetime, which was portrayed as a conceptual substitute of sorts for the ether. (shrink)

We put forward a new view of relativity theory that makes the existence of a flow of time compatible with the four-dimensional block universe. To this end, we apply the creation-discovery view elaborated for quantum mechanics to relativity theory and in such a way that time and space become creations instead of discoveries and an underlying non temporal and non spatial reality comes into existence. We study the nature of this underlying non temporal and non spatial (...) reality and reinterpret many aspects of the theory within this new view. We show that data of relativistic measurements are sufficient to derive the three-dimensionality of physical space. The nature of light and massive entities is reconsidered, and an analogy with human cognition is worked out. (shrink)

It has been repeatedly argued, most recently by Nicholas Maxwell, that the special theory of relativity is incompatible with the view that the future is in some degree undetermined; and Maxwell contends that this is a reason to reject that theory. In the present paper, an analysis is offered of the notion of indeterminateness (or "becoming") that is uniquely appropriate to the special theory of relativity, in the light of a set of natural conditions upon (...) such a notion; and reasons are given for regarding this conception as (not just formally consistent with relativity theory, but also) philosophically reasonable. The bearings upon Maxwell's program for quantum theory are briefly considered. (shrink)

(2007). Relativity Theory between Structural and Dynamical Explanations. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science: Vol. 21, No. 1, pp. 95-102.

Two radically different views about time are possible. According to the first, the universe is three dimensional. It has a past and a future, but that does not mean it is spread out in time as it is spread out in the three dimensions of space. This view requires that there is an unambiguous, absolute, cosmic-wide "now" at each instant. According to the second view about time, the universe is four dimensional. It is spread out in both space and time (...) - in space-time in short. Special and general relativity rule out the first view. There is, according to relativity theory, no such thing as an unambiguous, absolute cosmic-wide "now" at each instant. However, we have every reason to hold that both special and general relativity are false. Not only does the historical record tell us that physics advances from one false theory to another. Furthermore, elsewhere I have shown that we must interpret physics as having established physicalism - in so far as physics can ever establish anything theoretical. Physicalism, here, is to be interpreted as the thesis that the universe is such that some unified "theory of everything" is true. Granted physicalism, it follows immediately that any physical theory that is about a restricted range of phenomena only, cannot be true, whatever its empirical success may be. It follows that both special and general relativity are false. This does not mean of course that the implication of these two theories that there is no unambiguous cosmic-wide "now" at each instant is false. It still may be the case that the first view of time, indicated at the outset, is false. Are there grounds for holding that an unambiguous cosmic-wide "now" does exist, despite special and general relativity, both of which imply that it does not exist? There are such grounds. Elsewhere I have argued that, in order to solve the quantum wave/particle problem and make sense of the quantum domain we need to interpret quantum theory as a fundamentally probabilistic theory, a theory which specifies how quantum entities - electrons, photons, atoms - interact with one another probabilistically. It is conceivable that this is correct, and the ultimate laws of the universe are probabilistic in character. If so, probabilistic transitions could define unambiguous, absolute cosmic-wide "nows" at each instant. It is entirely unsurprising that special and general relativity have nothing to say about the matter. Both theories are pre-quantum mechanical, classical theories, and general relativity in particular is deterministic. The universe may indeed be three dimensional, with a past and a future, but not spread out in four dimensional space-time, despite the fact that relativity theories appear to rule this out. These considerations, finally, have implications for views about the arrow of time and free will. (shrink)

This survey article is divided into two parts. In the first (section 2), I give a brief account of the structure of classical relativity theory. In the second (section 3), I discuss three special topics: (i) the status of the relative simultaneity relation in the context of Minkowski spacetime; (ii) the ``geometrized" version of Newtonian gravitation theory (also known as Newton-Cartan theory); and (iii) the possibility of recovering the global geometric structure of spacetime from its ``causal (...) structure". (shrink)

In a recent paper, Howard Stein makes a number of criticisms of an earlier paper of mine ('Are Probabilism and Special Relativity Incompatible?', Phil. Sci., 1985), which explored the question of whether the idea that the future is genuinely 'open' in a probabilistic universe is compatible with special relativity. I disagree with almost all of Stein's criticisms.

In his Zur Einstein’schen Relativitätstheorie, Ernst Cassirer presents relativity theory as the last manifestation of the tradition of the “physics of principles” that, starting from the nineteenth century, has progressively prevailed over that of the “physics of models.” In particular, according to Cassirer, the relativity principle plays a role similar to the energy principle in previous physics. In this article, I argue that this comparison represents the core of Cassirer’s neo-Kantian interpretation of relativity. Cassirer pointed out (...) that before and after Kant, the history of physics presents significant instances in which the search for formal conditions that the laws of nature must satisfy preceded and made possible the direct search for such laws. In his earlier years, Cassirer seems to have regarded principles like the energy principle, the relativity principle, and the principle of least action as a constitutive but provisional form of a priori, imposing specific limitations on the form of the allowable laws of nature. Only in his later years, by attributing an autonomous status to these statements of principle, did Cassirer attribute a definitive but merely regulative meaning to the a priori. This does not impose specific requirements on natural laws but only a motivation to search for them. (shrink)

In classical Newtonian physics there was a clear understanding of “what reality is.≓ Indeed in this classical view, reality at a certain time is the collection of all what is actual at this time, and this is contained in “the present.≓ Often it is stated that three-dimensional space and one-dimensional time hare been substituted by four-dimensional space-time in relativity theory, and as a consequence the classical concept of reality, as that which is “present,≓ cannot be retained. Is reality (...) then the four-dimensional manifold of relativity theory? And if so, what is then the meaning of “change in time?≓ This problem confronts a geometric view (as the Einsteinian interpretation of relativity theory) with a process view (where reality changes constantly in time). In this paper we investigate this problem, taking into account our insight into the nature of reality as it came by analyzing the problems of quantum mechanics. We show that with an Einsteinian interpretation of relativity theory, reality is indeed four-dimensional, but there is no contradiction with the process view, where this reality changes in time. (shrink)

The present paper is meant to summarise and enlighten the theoretical implications of the twin theories of text comprehension and of text compression. Compatibility and non-exclusiveness of particle-like analysis of language and wave-like analysis of intentionality are also demonstrated within the newly established quantum linguistics framework. The informative state of language is viewed as being relatively stable; once activated and subject to motion, therefore reaching a communicative state, different phenomena occur, which may be observed, analysed and visualised through CPP-TRS observational (...) devices. Relativity theory may therefore be organised in terms of quanta with continuity and no contradiction. (shrink)

I propose that the meanings of vague expressions render the truth conditions of utterances of sentences containing them sensitive to our interests. For example, 'expensive' is analyzed as meaning 'costs a lot', which in turn is analyzed as meaning 'costs significantly greater than the norm'. Whether a difference is a significant difference depends on what our interests are. Appeal to the proposal is shown to provide an attractive resolution of the sorites paradox that is compatible with classical logic and semantics.

We construct the Extended Relativity Theory in Born-Clifford-Phase spaces with an upper R and lower length λ scales (infrared/ultraviolet cutoff). The invariance symmetry leads naturally to the real Clifford algebra Cl (2, 6, R) and complexified Clifford Cl C (4) algebra related to Twistors. A unified theory of all Noncommutative branes in Clifford-spaces is developed based on the Moyal-Yang star product deformation quantization whose deformation parameter involves the lower/upper scale $$(\hbar \lambda / R)$$. Previous work led us (...) to show from first principles why the observed value of the vacuum energy density (cosmological constant) is given by a geometric mean relationship $$\rho \sim L_{\rm Planck}^{-2}R^{-2} = L_{P}^{-4} (L_{\rm Planck} / R)^{2} \sim 10^{-122}M_{\rm Planck}^4$$, and can be obtained when the infrared scale R is set to be of the order of the present value of the Hubble radius. We proceed with an extensive review of Smith’s 8D model based on the Clifford algebra Cl (1, 7) that reproduces at low energies the physics of the Standard Model and Gravity, including the derivation of all the coupling constants, particle masses, mixing angles,....with high precision. Geometric actions are presented like the Clifford-Space extension of Maxwell’s Electrodynamics, and Brandt’s action related to the 8D spacetime tangent-bundle involving coordinates and velocities (Finsler geometries). Finally we outline the reasons why a Clifford-Space Geometric Unification of all forces is a very reasonable avenue to consider and propose an Einstein-Hilbert type action in Clifford-Phase spaces (associated with the 8D Phase space) as a Unified Field theory action candidate that should reproduce the physics of the Standard Model plus Gravity in the low energy limit. (shrink)

The ArgumentDevelopments in theoretical physics, even when they are revolutionary for physics, usually donotenter public awareness. The reaction to the special relativity theory is one of the few exceptions. The conceptual changes brought by special relativity to our notions of space and time, induced a lively debate not only within intellectual circles but in many strata of the educated middle class. In this article, I focus on a particular moment of public reaction to special and general (...) class='Hi'>relativity theory and to its creator Albert Einstein. I try to paint a picture of the anti-Einstein campaign in Germany of 1920, with finer brush strokes than those applied previously by others. My aim is to embed the campaign into the cultural and political climate of the Weimar republic. Without leaving the realm of physics only a superficial understanding of what happened seems possible. My thesis is that the anti-Einstein-campaign was organized, and the physicists involved in it used, mainly in order to rally support for one of the German right-wing parties, the Deutschnationale Volkspartei. (shrink)

Saul Kripke pointed out that whether or not an utterance gives rise to a liar-like paradox cannot always be determined by checking just its form or content.1 Whether or not Jones’s utterance of ‘Everything Nixon said is true’ is paradoxical depends in part on what Nixon said. Something similar may be said about the sorites paradox. For example, whether or not the predicate ‘are enough grains of coffee for Smith’s purposes’ gives rise to a sorites paradox depends at least in (...) part on what Smith’s purposes are. If Smith’s purpose is to make some coffee to drink, so that he can wake up and start his day, then we would be inclined to accept, and would find it strange to deny the following sorites sentence. (shrink)

Michael Ende’s bestseller/The Neverending Story/is set in a magical world called “Fantastica”. In Fantastica, there are heroes and villains, just as in the world of universities and academies. There is even an entity, or better: a non-entity of shaky existence, das Nichts, the Nothingness – loved by some philosophers like Martin Heidegger. In Fantastica Nothingness is able to create trouble and destruction. The same is true in the land of academic history and philosophy of science – let us call it (...) “HOPOSia”. In HOPOSia, particularly in its Anglophone provinces, Nothingness of knowledge and information has succeeded in building up strong opinions about the topic “Mach and Relativity”, and has created confusion and disinformation. However, you may slightly relax; our story in HOPOSia is less cruel so far and more peaceful than what happens in Fantastica. Sometimes it has even entertaining aspects. There are similarities, though: If there had not been lies and manipulation of believes, our story would have ended years ago. It went on instead and will possibly do so forever. (shrink)

Classical statistical mechanics has commanded a modest but steady amount of attention from philosophers of science. By contrast, there has been an almost total neglect of relativistic statistical mechanics, or more precisely, a neglect of the prospects and problems of producing a relativistic version of classical statistical mechanics. The neglect is undeserved, for this area offers a fascinating array of case studies for those concerned with the history and sociology of science, with the structure and dynamics of scientific theories, or (...) with foundations problems in physics. This paper is dedicated to the goal of ending the neglect. Towards this end, I will survey some of the issues which arise in attempting to marry statistical-thermodynamics with relativity theory. The choice of the issues to be discussed and their treatment naturally reflect my own preferences and prejudices, and I cannot hope for the reader’s agreement on all points. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to elucidate the question of whether Newtonian mechanics can be derived from relativity theory. Physicists agree that classical mechanics constitutes a limiting case of relativity theory. By contrast, philosophers of science like Kuhn and Feyerabend affirm that classical mechanics cannot be deduced from relativity theory because of the incommensurability between both theories; thus what we obtain when we take the limit c → ∞ in relativistic mechanics cannot be (...) Newtonian mechanics sensu stricto. In this paper I focus on the alleged change of reference of the term mass in the transition from one theory to the other. Contradicting Kuhn and Feyerabend, special relativity theory supports the view that the mass of an object is a characteristic property of the object, that it has the same value in whatever frame of reference it is measured, and that it does not depend on whether the object is in motion or at rest. Thus mass preserves the reference through the change of theory, and the existence of a Newtonian limit of relativity theory provides a good example of the rationality of theory change in mathematical physics. (shrink)

Scholars who engage with texts that were written by George Herbert Mead (e.g., 1925e.g., 1926e.g., 1929e.g., 1932e.g., 1938) in the latter half of the 1920s are faced with the task of comprehending Mead’s interpretation of relativity theory and also understanding why relativity theory was considered by Mead to have such profound implications for his own philosophy. As several scholars of Mead’s work have explained (e.g., Joas 1997; Martin 2007; Rosenthal and Bourgeois 1991), Mead was a realist. (...) Mead opposed psychophysical dualism (Cook 1979) and both the behaviorist and the idealist implications that could follow from such a dualism. He wanted to explain human conduct in terms of the self-determination of human .. (shrink)

We give a “direction for use” of the scale relativity theory and apply it to an example of spontaneous multiscale integration including four embedded levels of organization (intracellular, cell, tissue and organism-like levels). We conclude by an update of our analysis of the arctic sea ice melting.

The conventionalistic aspects of physical world perception are reviewed with an emphasis on the constancy of the speed of light in relativity theory and the irreversibility of measurements in quantum mechanics. An appendix contains a complete proof of Alexandrov's theorem using mainly methods of affine geometry.

The aim of this paper is to elucidate the question of whether Newtonian mechanics can be derived from relativity theory. Physicists agree that classical mechanics constitutes a limiting case of relativity theory. By contrast, philosophers of science like Kuhn and Feyerabend affirm that classical mechanics cannot be deduced from relativity theory because of the incommensurability between both theories; thus what we obtain when we take the limit c in relativistic mechanics cannot be Newtonian mechanics (...) sensu stricto. In this paper I focus on the alleged change of reference of the term mass in the transition from one theory to the other. Contradicting Kuhn and Feyerabend, special relativity theory supports the view that the mass of an object is a characteristic property of the object, that it has the same value in whatever frame of reference it is measured, and that it does not depend on whether the object is in motion or at rest. Thus mass preserves the reference through the change of theory, and the existence of a Newtonian limit of relativity theory provides a good example of the rationality of theory change in mathematical physics. (shrink)

(2005). Heidegger and Relativity Theory. Angelaki: Vol. 10, continental philosophy and the sciences the german traditionissue editor: damian veal, pp. 163-179.

In this paper, I discuss the similarity between Wittgenstein’s use of thought experiments and Relativity Theory. I begin with introducing Wittgenstein’s idea of “thought experiments” and a tentative classification of different kinds of thought experiments in Wittgenstein’s work. Then, after presenting a short recap of some remarks on the analogy between Wittgenstein’s point of view and Einstein’s, I suggest three analogies between the status of Wittgenstein’s mental experiments and Relativity theory: the topics of time dilation, the (...) search for invariants, and the role of measuring tools in Special Relativity. This last point will help to better define Wittgenstein’s idea of description as the core of his philosophical enterprise. (shrink)

We continue to explore the consequences of Thermal Relativity Theory to the physics of black holes. The thermal analog of Lorentz transformations in the tangent space of the thermodynamic manifold are studied in connection to the Hawking evaporation of Schwarzschild black holes and one finds that there is no bound to the thermal analog of proper accelerations despite the maximal bound on the thermal analog of velocity given by the Planck temperature. The proper entropic infinitesimal interval corresponding to (...) the Kerr–Newman black hole involves a \ non-Hessian metric with diagonal and off-diagonal terms of the form \^2 = g_{ ab } d Z^a dZ^b\), where \ are the mass, charge and angular momentum, respectively. Since the computation of the scalar curvature associated to this metric is very elaborate, to simplify matters, we focused on the singularities of the metric and found that they correspond to the extremal Kerr–Newman black hole case \ with vanishing temperature. Black holes in asymptotically Anti de Sitter spacetimes are more subtle to study since the mass turns out to be related to the enthalpy rather that the internal energy. We finalize with some remarks about the thermal-relativistic analog of proper force, the need to extend our analysis of Gibbs-Boltzmann entropy to the case of Reny and Tsallis entropies, and to complexify spacetime. (shrink)

The paper (given in the section on "Recent work in the History of Philosophy of Science) discusses the method and some of the results of the doctoral dissertation on philosophical interpretations of Einstein's special and general theories of relativity, submitted to the Dept. for History of Science, Univ. of Hamburg, in 1989, also published by Birkhauser, Basel, in 1990. It is claimed that many of the gross oversimplifications, misunderstandings and misinterpretations occurring in more than 2500 texts about the theories (...) of relativity written by scientists, philosophers, and laymen contemporary to Einstein can in fact serve as a clue to a better understanding of the general process by which philosophical interpretations are formed. Another very important source for answering the question of how misinterpretations are formed are hitherto unpublished documents in the estates of physicists and philosophers of that time, including apart from Einstein himself: Bergson, Bridgman, Carnap, Cassirer, Metz, Meyerson, Petzoldt, Reichenbach, Schlick and Vaihinger. (shrink)

It will be shown that, in comparison with the pre-relativistic Galileo-invariant conceptions, special relativity tells us nothing new about the geometry of spacetime. It simply calls something else "spacetime", and this something else has different properties. All statements of special relativity about those features of reality that correspond to the original meaning of the terms "space" and "time" are identical with the corresponding traditional pre-relativistic statements. It will be also argued that special relativity and Lorentz theory (...) are completely identical in both senses, as theories about spacetime and as theories about the behavior of moving physical objects. (shrink)

I discuss the interest-relative account of vagueness and argue for a distinction between relational vague predicates and non-relational vague predicates depending on the kind of properties expressed by them. The strategy rests on three arguments arising from the existence of clear cases of a vague predicate, from contexts in which a different answer is required for questions about whether a vague predicate applies to an item, and whether such an item satisfies the interest of an agent, and from cases where (...) an object changes up to the point of becoming P, where P is a vague predicate. In the second part of the paper, I distinguish between relational properties and non-relational properties, and I argue for the view that some vague predicates can express non-relational properties, comparative relational properties and interest-relative properties. On the basis of these arguments, I conclude that vagueness cannot be reduced to interest-relativity. (shrink)

This paper is a summary of my doctoral dissertation on philosophical interpretations of Einstein’s special and general theories of relativity, submitted to the Dept. for History of Science, Univ. of Hamburg, in 1989, which was recently published in the Series Science Networks at Birkäuser.2 After a brief overview of its content I will focus on a discussion of the method employed to analyse philosophical interpretations of a physical theory.My analysis is based- firstly on about 2500 contemporary published texts (...) about the theories of relativity written both by scientists and philosophers. These texts have not been of particular interest to historians or philosophers of science up to now; this is understandable from the fact that many of diem contain gross oversimplifications, misinterpretations and incorrect statements about the theories of relativity. (shrink)