In their book Cognitive Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Hanne Andersen, Peter Barker, and Xiang Chen reconstruct Kuhn’s account of conceptual structure and change, based on the dynamic frame model. I argue against their reconstruction of anomalies and of the no-overlap principle and propose a competing model, based on the similarity relation. First, I introduce the concept of psychological distance between objects, and then I show that the conceptual structure of a theory consists of a set of natural families, separated by (...) a significant empty space. I argue that, in such a conceptual structure, the ES condition, according to which the distance between natural families should be greater than the distance between any two objects belonging to the same natural family, is satisfied. Anomalous objects lead to the violation of this condition. I argue that in a conceptual structure satisfying the ES condition, a similarity relation could be defined, so that natural families would be similarity classes, satisfying the no-overlap principle. In a structure not satisfying this principle, such similarity classes could not be delimited. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that the values supported by scientists can have a role in episodes of theory choice. In the first part, I characterize the value- and the rulebased accounts of theory choice. In the second part, I analyze how the thesis of underdetermination of theory by empirical data can be used to argue for a value-based account. I discuss two versions of the underdetermination thesis, arguing that the weaker version, underdetermination by the evidence available at a particular (...) time, is sufficient for establishing the role of values in theory selection. Many authors distinguish between cognitive and non-cognitive values, considering that only the former ones have a legitimate role in theory choice. I defend this distinction, showing that it has both a normative and a descriptive dimension. I argue that cognitive values must not be seen as indicators of truth, but they can be characterized by their relation to the goal of science. In the end, I argue that, in spite of being justified and useful, the distinction between cognitive and non-cognitive values is not clear-cut. (shrink)

Stephen J. Macekura, The Mismeasure of Progress: Economic Growth and Its Critics, Chicago and London, The University of Chicago Press, 2020.