Our self-understanding as human agents includes a commitment to three crucial claims about human agency: that agents must be active, that actions are part of the natural order of the universe, and that intentional actions can be explained by the agent's reasons for acting. While all of these claims are indispensable elements of our view of ourselves as human agents, they are in continuous conflict and tension with one another, especially once one adopts the currently predominant view of what the (...) natural order must be like. One of the central tasks of philosophy of action consists in showing how, despite appearances, these conflicts can be resolved and our self-understanding as agents be vindicated. The mainstream of contemporary philosophy of action holds that this task can only be fulfilled by an event-causal reductive view of human agency, paradigmatically embodied in the so-called 'standard model' developed by Donald Davidson. Erasmus Mayr, in contrast, develops a new agent-causal solution to these conflicts and shows why this solution is superior both to event-causalist accounts and to Von Wright's intentionalism about agency. He offers a comprehensive theory of substance-causation on the basis of a realist conception of powers, which allows one to see how the widespread rejection of agent-causation rests on an unfounded 'Humean' view of nature and of causal processes. At the same time, Mayr addresses the question of the nature of reasons for acting and complements its substance-causal account of activity with a non-causal account of acting for reasons in terms of following a standard of success. (shrink)

This volume introduces readers to a selected number of core issues in metaphysics that have been central in the history of philosophy and remain foundational to contemporary debates, that is: substances; properties; modality and essence; causality; determinism and free will. Anna Marmodoro and Erasmus Mayr take a neo-Aristotelian approach both in the selection and presentation of the topics. But Marmodoro and Mayr's discussion is not narrowly partisan-it consistently presents opposing sides of the debate and addresses issues from different philosophical traditions, (...) and encourages readers to draw their own conclusions about them. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie Jahrgang: 101 Heft: 1 Seiten: 92-134.

In “Causality and Determination”, Anscombe stressed that, in her view, physical determinism and free action were incompatible. As the relevant passage suggests, her espousal of incompatibilism was not merely due to specific features of human ‘ethical’ freedom, but due to general features of agency, intentionality, and voluntariness. For Anscombe went on to tentatively suggest that lack of physical determination was required for the intentional conduct of animals we would not classify as ‚free‘, too. In this paper, I examine three different (...) lines of argument to establish Anscombe’s latter suggestion, which are based on general considerations about the causal efficacy of psychological-agential phenomena, the nature of agency, and the specific features of intentional agency. I start with Anscombe’s own claim from “The Causation of Action” that microphysical determinism would make psychological and personal phenomena epiphenomenal, before I turn to the view of ‘Agency Incompatibilism’, that genuine agency requires the absence of antecedent necessitation, and, lastly, to concerns about some crucial features of intentional agency which we find in both human and animal agents. (shrink)

Volume 22, Issue 2, June 2019, Page 95-97.

Constitutivists about moral norms are often suspected of providing an overly “self-centered” account of morality which does not take seriously enough morality’s interpersonal nature. This worry see...

It has often been noted that many of our intuitive assessments of particular actions suggest that there is an asymmetry between blameworthy and praiseworthy actions with regard to the question of whether moral responsibility requires that the agent could have acted otherwise. It is a quite different question, though, whether such an asymmetry between good and bad cases can be supported by more systematic considerations. In this paper, I will develop a new argument for a restricted version of the asymmetry, (...) by showing that in cases of praiseworthy actions responsibility cannot generally presuppose that the agent could have acted otherwise. This argument will be based on a distinction between two different kinds of roles that moral norms can play in determining whether an action is right and in guiding our deliberation. That agents can sometimes be responsible for their praiseworthy actions even though they cannot act otherwise is best seen as a reflection of the fact that moral norms can prohibit treating certain courses of action as genuine options at all. (shrink)

Abilities, in contrast to mere dispositions, propensities, or tendencies, abilities seem to be features of agents that put the agent herself in control. But what is the distinguishing feature of abilities vis‐à‐vis other kinds of powers? Our aim in this paper is to point, in answer to this question, to a crucial feature of abilities that existing accounts have tended to neglect: their adaptivity. Adaptivity is a feature of how abilities are exercised. The main reason for its relative neglect has (...) been that most extant accounts have focused solely on whether abilities are exercised successfully in certain possible situations and have mostly understood the exercise of an ability in terms of complete successful performance. We begin by pointing out two aspects of abilities with regard to which current accounts seem (at best) incomplete: control and exercise. We then introduce adaptivity as we understand it, and end by putting it to work in developing a fuller understanding of abilities that does better than current accounts. (shrink)

This essay discusses Kant and Hegel’s philosophies of action and the place of action within the general structure of their practical philosophy. We begin by briefly noting a few things that both unite and distinguish the two philosophers. In the sections that follow, we consider these and their corollaries in more detail. In so doing, we map their differences against those suggested by more standard readings that treat their accounts of action as less central to their practical philosophy. Section 2 (...) discusses some central Kantian concepts. In Section 3, we take a closer look at the distinction between internal and external action, as found in Kant’s philosophy of morality and legality. In Section 4, we turn to Hegel and his distinctions between abstract right, morality, and ethical life, as well as the location of his account of action within his overall theory of morality. We discuss the distinction between Handlung and Tat, and non-imputable consequences. The overall aims of our essay are to shed light on some puzzles in Kant and Hegel’s conceptions and to examine where their exact disputes lie without taking a stand on which philosophy is ultimately the most satisfactory. (shrink)

On a traditional view of human agency, intentional actions are performed sub specie boni: Agents, in acting intentionally, must see some good in what they are doing. This view has come under heavy criticism, which has partly focussed on several putative counterexamples, and partly on the view’s underlying rationale. In this paper, I defend one version of the sub specie boni view and try to show that it still deserves its old standing as the “default view” about acting with an (...) intention. For, as I argue, this view helps us to make sense of some crucial features of intentions – in particular, that we are sometimes rationally permitted to abandon intentions in the light of obstacles and costs –­, for which an alternative explanation will be hard to find. (shrink)

In the last two chapters of his book ‘From Normativity to Responsibility’, Joseph Raz developed, in outline, an intriguing account of responsibility, which is based on what he called the Rational Functioning Principle and on the idea of a domain of secure competence. With these two ideas, Raz argued, we could best delimit the scope of ‘responsibility’ in the sense of something ‘being to one’s credit or discredit as a rational agent’. In the following, I will argue that, while identifying (...) some crucial aspects of our being agents ‘in the world’, Raz’s account does not fully capture the extent of the kind of responsibility he was interested in. In particular, unintentional failures that are due to the malfunctioning of capacities which are too unreliable to count as secure competences may well fall within the scope of responsibility thus understood. I will suggest Raz’s account should be supplemented by considerations drawn from ‘quality of will’ approaches, which can (inter alia) deal better with such cases. (shrink)

Wissenschaftsreflexion: eine neue interdisziplinäre Perspektive auf die Geschichte, Theorie und Ethik der Wissenschaften sowie auf die praktischen Auswirkungen von wissenschaftlicher Forschung und Erkenntnis. Die Wissenschaften sehen sich gegenwärtig mit Blick auf ihre Geltungs- und Wahrheitsansprüche, ihre Vertrauenswürdigkeit und ihre Rolle in der Gesellschaft vor grundlegende Herausforderungen gestellt. Die Diskussionen betreffen dabei so unterschiedliche Themen wie Unsicherheit, Scheitern oder "Fake News“ in den Wissenschaften, Klimawandel, Gentechnik, Impfungen und Alternativmedizin oder Evolutionstheorien. Nur eine interdisziplinär angelegte Reflexion über die Rolle der Wissenschaften, ihren (...) Erkenntnisanspruch und ihre Methoden wird diesen neuen Herausforderungen gerecht. Mit dem vorliegenden Band wird erstmals der Begriff der Wissenschaftsreflexion differenziert eingeführt und interdisziplinär diskutiert. Der Band umfasst vielfältige Beiträge zu Grundlagen- und Anwendungsfragen aus unterschiedlichen Disziplinen, die gemeinsam eine pluralistische Perspektive eröffnen und konkrete Lösungsmöglichkeiten aufzeigen. Mit Beiträgen von: Michael Jungert, Andreas Frewer, Erasmus Mayr, Miguel Ohnesorge, Nina Janich, Jon Leefmann, Rainer Bromme, Sebastian Schuol, Kärin Nickelsen, Caterina Schürch, Julia Carina Böttcher, Bernd Flessner, Christoph Merdes, Martina Schmidhuber, Katrin Götz-Votteler, Simone Hespers, Alexander Christian, Alexander Reutlinger, Martin Carrier, Martin Kusch und Carsten Könneker. (shrink)

Kantians may be unable to derive all of benevolence from reverence for rational agency, but the remaining lacuna is not as extensive as Arpaly thinks. For while we should take seriously Kantian worries about separating benevolence from reverence, a considerable part of benevolence can be explained in terms of reverence for rational agency on a plausible intepretation of the latter. Furthermore, Kantians have an irreducible role for benevolence within their ethics, which is different from the role of a self-standing virtue.

Die Frage nach der Begrundung ethischer Verbindlichkeit und der Geltung ethischer Normen steht im Zentrum der Ethik als Wissenschaft. Diese Grundfragen der Normativitat aus verschiedenen Blickwinkeln zu beleuchten, ist Ziel der Beitrage dieses Bandes. Im ersten Teil werden zunachst die Grundlagen der Normativitat behandelt. Die Beitrage des zweiten Teils setzen sich mit Normativitat unter besonderer Berucksichtigung der Stellung des Individuums auseinander. Der dritte Teil fasst schliesslich normative Fragen gesellschaftlicher Ordnung in den Blick, wobei auch spezifische Probleme aus den Bereichsethiken behandelt (...) werden. Der Band versammelt Essays fuhrender deutscher Ethiker, die ihre je unterschiedlichen inhaltlichen Positionen in den Diskurs der Normativitat einbringen. (shrink)