In this paper, we examine the causal framework within which integrated information theory of consciousness makes it claims. We argue that, in its current formulation, IIT is threatened by the causal exclusion problem. Some proponents of IIT have attempted to thwart the causal exclusion problem by arguing that IIT has the resources to demonstrate genuine causal emergence at macro scales. In contrast, we argue that their proposed solution to the problem is damagingly circular as a result of inter-defining information and (...) causation. As a solution, we propose that IIT should adopt the specific interventionist causal framework that we offer and show how IIT can harness this interventionist framework to avoid the causal exclusion problem. We demonstrate how our argument remains fully compatible with the methodology, empirical data, and conceptual aims of the theory. (shrink)

Contemporary philosophy of science has seen a growing trend towards a focus on scientific practice over the epistemic outputs that such practices produce. This practice-oriented approach has yielded a clearer understanding of how reductive research strategies play a central role in contemporary scientific inquiry. In parallel, a growing body of work has sought to explore the role of non-reductive, or systems-level, research strategies. As a result, the relationship between reductive and non-reductive scientific practices is becoming of increased importance. In this (...) paper, I provide a framework within which research strategies can be compared. I argue that no strategy is reductive or non-reductive simpliciter, rather strategies are more, or are less, reductive than one another according to a frame of reference. That frame of reference is provided by a continuum of possible ways in which the target system might be conceptualised. I illustrate the utility of the framework by deploying it to analyse a recent debate in cancer research. When set within the framework, a prominent reductive strategy—the somatic mutation theory—and a prominent non-reductive strategy—the tissue organisational field theory—do not stand opposed to one another. Rather, they serve as boundary markers to chart the territory of approaches to carcinogenesis within which most strategies in the field fall. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that non-reductive physicalism (NRP) continues to rely on the ontological aspect of the layer cake model of the world (LCM). NRP is a post-unity account of the relationship between phenomena in the world in the sense that it has been developed in response to the perceived failure of the unity of science thesis. The LCM constitutes a framework for the organisation of phenomena in the world. It articulates the idea that phenomena in the world are (...) organised into levels. Specifically, that phenomena are layered into distinct, hierarchical levels of organisation. Historically, the unity of science thesis and the LCM have been intertwined; the LCM being the framework within which a unity of science might be possible. My argument will demonstrate that, despite a move away from unity of science positions, the LCM persists in post-unity accounts. In order to argue for this thesis, I present a close analysis of Oppenheim & Putnam’s classic presentation of the LCM; picking out the principle of hierarchic compositionality which, I argue, captures the ontological aspect of the LCM. I then demonstrate how NRP continues to rely upon the principle and, as a result, continues to support the ontological aspect of the LCM. This result is significant. It shows that whilst the rejection of the reductionist aspect of the thesis has served as the basis for post-unity positions these positions do not engage directly with the framework within which reduction might be facilitated – the LCM. Furthermore, it demonstrates that pluralist or disunity accounts of the relationship between phenomena in the world will also have to engage directly with the framework of the LCM in order to avoid being merely anti-reductionist. (shrink)