Theories of Truth

Well over half a century before the development of contemporary experimental philosophy, the Norwegian philosopher Arne Næss conducted a number of empirical investigations intended to document non-philosophers’ convictions regarding a number of topics of philosophical interest. In the 1930s and 1950s, Næss collected data relevant to non-philosophers’ conceptions of truth. This research attracted the attention of Alfred Tarski at the time, and has recently been re-evaluated by Robert Barnard and Joseph Ulatowski. In this paper I return to Næss’s research on (...) truth in order to better develop an account of how such empirical data does or doesn’t bear on the philosophical study of truth. I examine Næss’s findings from his various studies on truth, and challenge the interpretation of those studies offered by Barnard and Ulatowski. (shrink)

Under review at Canadian Journal of Philosophy. This paper does five things: (1) It provides an analysis of meta-ethical Non-Realist Cognitivism. (2) It assesses two arguments in favour of the view which have been largely overlooked in analyses so far. (3) It argues that different proponents of the view offer crucially different strategies for vindicating moral objectivity without the metaphysical commitments of traditional non-naturalism. (4) Contrary to other commentators, it argues for the no-truthmaker interpretation of Parfit’s view. (5) It argues (...) that each version of Non-Realist Cognitivism is unlikely to be able to do the explanatory work that seemed to call for an ontologically committal non-naturalism. (shrink)

According to Aristotle if a universal proposition (for example: “All men are white”) is true, its contrary proposition (“All men are not white”) must be false; and, according to Aristotle, if a universal proposition (for example: “All men are white”) is true, its contradictory proposition (“Not all men are white”) must be false. I agree with what Aristotle wrote about universal propositions, but there are universal propositions which have no contrary proposition and have no contradictory proposition. The proposition X “All (...) the propositions that contradict this proposition are true” does not have the contrary proposition and does not have the contradictory proposition. In fact: FEX “All the propositions that contradict this proposition are not true” has a different subject: the subject of the proposition X is constituted by all the propositions that contradict the proposition X; by contrast, the subject of the proposition FEX is constituted by all the propositions that contradict the proposition FEX. And FOX “Not all the propositions that contradict this proposition are true” has a different subject: the subject of the proposition X is constituted by the propositions that contradict the proposition X; by contrast, the subject of the proposition FOX is constituted by the propositions that contradict the proposition FOX. According to Aristotle, a singular proposition (in his example: "Socrates is white") which is true must have its negative proposition ("Socrates is not white") which is false. I agree with Aristotle, but there are singular propositions which do not have the corresponding negative proposition. The proposition (or, rather, the pseudo-proposition) L “This same statement is not true” does not have the negative proposition because the proposition FNL “This same statement is true” has a different subject from the subject of the proposition L: the subject of the proposition L is the proposition L; by contrast, the subject of the proposition FNL is the proposition FNL. L and FNL cannot have the same subject. By contrast, the proposition M “This mount is entirely in Swiss territory” and the proposition NM “This mount is not entirely in Swiss territory” can have the same subject (for example, the Mount Eiger): in case the subject of the proposition M and the subject of the proposition NM is the same, M and NM are opposite propositions, NM is the negative proposition of M. By contrast, the proposition (or, rather, the pseudo-proposition) L "This same statement is not true" cannot have the corresponding negative proposition because FNL "This same statement is true" has a different subject: the subject of L is L ; by contrast, the subject of FNL is FNL. Then the paper continues by analyzing some variants of the liar’s paradox: L1 “The statement L1 is not true”; the so-called liar cycle; and the so-called Yablo’s paradox. (shrink)

Philosophical theories of various sorts rely on there being robust boundaries between kinds of content. One way of drawing such boundaries is to place them between subject matters, like physics and aesthetics, and the domains of sentences falling within them. Yet contemporary literature exploring the nature of discourse domains is relatively sparse. The goal of this paper is to articulate the core features of discourse domains for them to provide the sought-after explanatory utility of establishing robust boundaries between discursive contents. (...) Analyzing the role that discourse domains have under alethic theories yields valuable information about the ways in which domains subject themselves to being defined and how alethic theories can explain the variability of truth-aptness or truth across sentences from distinct domains. The concluding argument is that because of certain issues with defining domains as unambiguous classes of sentences when individuated on the grounds of topical subject matters, philosophers should consider a commitment to indeterminism about the extensions of fundamental domains. According to this view, although domains can be defined as relatively well-individuated classes of sentences based on topical distinctions, the temporal development of our conceptual frameworks and the phenomenon of mixed content compromise our ability to definitively account for the domain membership of all truth-apt sentences. Such an indeterminacy argument is relevant for all who rely on there being robust boundaries between topically individuated discursive contents. (shrink)

This article informally presents a solution to the paradoxes of truth and shows how the solution solves classical paradoxes (such as the original Liar) as well as the paradoxes that were invented as counterarguments for various proposed solutions (“the revenge of the Liar”). This solution complements the classical procedure of determining the truth values of sentences by its own failure and, when the procedure fails, through an appropriate semantic shift allows us to express the failure in a classical two-valued language. (...) Formally speaking, the solution is a language with one meaning of symbols and two valuations of the truth values of sentences. The primary valuation is a classical valuation that is partial in the presence of the truth predicate. It enables us to determine the classical truth value of a sentence or leads to the failure of that determination. The language with the primary valuation is precisely the largest intrinsic fixed point of the strong Kleene three-valued semantics (LIFPSK3). The semantic shift that allows us to express the failure of the primary valuation is precisely the classical closure of LIFPSK3: it extends LIFPSK3 to a classical language in parts where LIFPSK3 is undetermined. Thus, this article provides an argumentation, which has not been present in contemporary debates so far, for the choice of LIFPSK3 and its classical closure as the right model for the truth predicate. In the end, an erroneous critique of Kripke-Feferman axiomatic theory of truth, which is present in contemporary literature, is pointed out. (shrink)

This paper presents four key results. Firstly, it distinguishes between _partial_ and _consistent_ assertion of a sentence, and introduces the concept of an _equivocal_ sentence, which is both partially asserted and partially denied. Secondly, it proposes a novel definition of truth, stating that _a true sentence is one that is consistently asserted_. This definition is immune from the Liar paradox, does not restrict classical logic, and can be applied to declarative sentences in the language used by any particular person. Thirdly, (...) the paper introduces an epistemic model of language, known as _assertional language_, which is used to formalize the definition of truth. Finally, it provides an argument for the falsity of so-called Liar sentences. The paper also discusses Tarski's solution to the Liar paradox and argues for the abandonment of the Tarski Scheme: _'p' is true if and only if p_, in the context of everyday language. The proposed definition of truth can be viewed as a formal account of the correspondence theory. The epistemic model is a powerful concept on its own that allows for combining different languages in a meaningful way. This model is uniquely capable of reflecting on epistemic inconsistencies, such as logical paradoxes, in a consistent manner. (shrink)

An old and well-known objection to non-classical logics is that they are too weak; in particular, they cannot prove a number of important mathematical results. A promising strategy to deal with this objection consists in proving so-called recapture results. Roughly, these results show that classical logic can be used in mathematics and other unproblematic contexts. However, the strategy faces some potential problems. First, typical recapture results are formulated in a purely logical language, and do not generalize nicely to languages containing (...) the kind of vocabulary that usually motivates non-classical theories—for example, a language containing a naïve truth predicate. Second, proofs of recapture results typically employ classical principles that are not valid in the targeted non-classical system; hence, non-classical theorists do not seem entitled to those results. In this paper, we analyze these problems and provide solutions on behalf of non-classical theorists. To address the first problem, we provide a novel kind of recapture result, which generalizes nicely to a truth-theoretic language. As for the second problem, we argue that it relies on an ambiguity and that, once the ambiguity is removed, there are no reasons to think that non-classical logicians are not entitled to their recapture results. (shrink)

Il paradosso della conoscibilità è un semplice argomento che partendo da premesse piuttosto modeste giunge alla sorprendente conclusione che vi sono verità inconoscibili; verità che è impossibile sapere non già per limiti fisici o cognitivi, ma nemmeno in linea di principio. L’argomento sembra dimostrare l’esistenza di limiti necessari ed ineludibili del sapere umano. Tale conclusione è apparentemente in grado di confutare un gran numero di teorie filosofiche quali per esempio l’idealismo trascendentale Kantiano, il pragmatismo di Peirce e James, e varie (...) forme contemporanee di antirealismo e verificazionismo. Il presente lavoro intende fornire una introduzione al paradosso e al dibattito filosofico che esso ha generato. Il libro discute criticamente vari approcci al paradosso, introduce una nuova interpretazione della sua conclusione, ed esplora alcune sue applicazioni in diversi ambiti della filosofia contemporanea. (shrink)

We introduce a tool for analysing models of $\text {CT}^-$, the compositional truth theory over Peano Arithmetic. We present a new proof of Lachlan’s theorem that the arithmetical part of models of $\text {CT}^-$ are recursively saturated. We also use this tool to provide a new proof of theorem from [8] that all models of $\text {CT}^-$ carry a partial inductive truth predicate. Finally, we construct a partial truth predicate defined for a set of formulae whose syntactic depth forms a (...) nonstandard cut which cannot be extended to a full truth predicate satisfying $\text {CT}^-$. (shrink)

This article is devoted to the philosophical study of the conditions under which knowledge can become a component or tool of education. The presentation of the contribution of epistemology to human development and education is based on addressing issues such as the nature of knowledge, sources of knowledge, theories, and criteria of truth. We proceed from the idea that knowledge is a condition of education. Particular attention is paid to the issue of distinguishing between such types of knowledge as 'knowing (...) how’ and ‘knowing that'. Educational practices open a common foundation that unites the life world of people, types of sociality, and hermeneutical practices. The epistemological approach to the question of the essence of knowledge assumes that knowledge meets three requirements, namely, knowledge must be objective, subjective, and evidentiary. Epistemology includes subjectivity as the basis of human existence in the natural world and the world with others. Intersubjectivity is considered a criterion for the reliability of knowledge about the world, which allows asserting the relationship of the objective with the subjective. (shrink)

In an influential treatise, Mikhail Bakhtin asserts that the aim of Dostoevsky's distinctive poetics is to advance a revolutionary, "polyphonic" model of moral truth. In this paper, I argue that while Bakhtin correctly identifies essential features of Dostoevsky's poetics, these features are better understood as oriented toward meeting the free modern individual's need to test ultimate moral ends and concomitant virtues in order to determine their truth. An Aristotelian poetics intended to educate audiences only in how to be virtuous to (...) achieve moral ends that are given by tradition will have different essential features than will a modern poetics whose purpose is to help individuals determine what the virtues are. It is this latter purpose, I argue, that drives Dostoevsky to create the new stylistic devices that Bakhtin observes in Dostoevsky's work, rather than the purpose of realizing a philosophically problematic "polyphonic" model of moral truth. (shrink)

Totuus on nykyisellään laaja-alaisen kritiikin kohteena niin akateemisessa, poliittisessa kuin vähemmän formaalissakin kontekstissa. Puolustan filosofisesti kestävää ja selitysvoimaista totuuskäsitettä tältä laaja-alaiselta kritiikiltä argumentoimalla sen arvon ja normatiivisuuden puolesta. Totuus on välineellisesti arvokas käsite, joka mahdollistaa todellisuuden erottamisen kuvitelmasta ja toiveajattelusta. Tämän lisäksi todet uskomukset ovat välineellisesti arvokkaita moninaisten hyötyjen, kuten onnistuneiden ennustusten ja navigoinnin saavuttamisessa. Toisaalta olemme joskus kiinnostuneita totuudesta pelkästään sen itsensä takia. Totuuden normatiivisuudesta kertoo taipumuksemme pitää sitä yleisenä tiedollisten pyrkimysten päämääränä ja yhtenä uskomuksen sekä väitettävyyden oikeellisuuden standardina, (...) johon suhteessa olemme eri mieltä ja jonka puhumista edellytämme luokka- ja oikeussaleissamme sekä parlamenteissamme. Edellisen nojalla totuus ei osoittaudu pelkästään mielenkiintoiseksi teoreettisen tarkastelun kohteeksi, vaan käsitteeksi, jolla on laaja-alaista tieteellistä ja yhteiskunnallista merkittävyyttä. (shrink)

Kirkham’s book is not a plain attempt of asking the questions like ‘What is truth?’ since it would, according to him, be one more mistake followed by confusion. The components of this four-dimensional confusion (vagueness, ambiguity, several ways of describing the same project, and one answer for two distinctly different questions about truth) find its original explanation in Kirkham’s book. Having stated that all of the previous theories of truth were just irrelevant to the question of “What is truth” because (...) when asking different questions about truth, he draws his non-trivial approach of assigning each theorist to the particular question (or ‘project’) he or she was trying to answer with his or her theory of truth. So, the main merit of Kirkham’s work is the clarification of this most urgent philosophical problem of truth on the way of metaphysics. (shrink)

Incluido a modo de prólogo en el libro Epistemología crítica de la violencia del capital. Verdad y violencia epistémica, el trabajo “Verdad y violencia epistémica. Desafíos al conocimiento humanista sobre lo universal” busca analizar críticamente esa forma particular de violencia que, utilizando herramientas epistemológicas, se basa en el control monopólico de la verdad y en el secuestro de la universalidad humana por parte de aquellos que encarnan los intereses asociados a la lógica del capital y que, precisamente gracias a ese (...) control y a ese secuestro, hacen pasar por verdadera y universal su propia visión del mundo. Al mismo tiempo, se devela la complicidad que con tal posición posee en los hechos, sea o no consciente de ello, aquella postura teórica que, para supuestamente enfrentar tal usurpación de la verdad y la universalidad, asume como salida la negación en abstracto de la existencia misma de la una y la otra. En contraste crítico con esta postura, el trabajo se propone mostrar las condiciones de posibilidad real y concreta del conocimiento verdadero sobre lo universal. (shrink)

Proof-theoretic reflection principles have been discussed in proof theory ever since Gödel’s discovery of the incompleteness theorems. But these reflection principles have not received much attention in the philosophical community. The present chapter aims to survey some of the principal meta-mathematical results on the iteration of proof-theoretic reflection principles and investigate these results from a logico-philosophical perspective; we will concentrate on the epistemological significance of these technical results and on the epistemic notions involved in the proofs. In particular, we will (...) focus on the notions of commitment to and acceptance of a theory. Special attention is given to the connection between proof-theoretic reflection and axiomatic truth theories. After distinguishing between different types of proof-theoretic reflection principles, we review some proof-theoretic results concerning extensions of formal theories by (iterated) reflection principles. As basis theories, we concentrate on standard arithmetical and elementary axiomatic truth theories. We then go on to explore the epistemological significance of these results. In this investigation, we aim to show that the epistemic notion of acceptance of (or commitment to) a theory plays a crucial role in the philosophical argumentation for reflection principles and their iteration. (shrink)

Fascinated by the recent scientific progress, even some philosophers today claim that philosophy is dead and that natural sciences (quantum cosmology, cognitive sciences) can answer questions which were once considered a domain of metaphysics: is our universe finite? Do we have free will? etc. The essay tries to problematize this claims by raising a series of questions. First, it is easy to show that modern science itself relies on a series of philosophical propositions. Second, what accounts for the role of (...) science in our world is its link with capitalism. Third, we should distinguish between knowledge and truth: not only philosophy, other discourses (like Marxism or psychoanalysis) also practice a notion of truth which cannot be reduced to knowledge. -/- . (shrink)

In light of new textual evidence in a manuscript from Toledo (BCT, MS 19, 26), the present work intends to determine the scope of Nicholas de Cusa’s influence on Giovanni Pico della Mirandola around the problem of the unity of truth and the diversity of philosophies. In his Individuum und Kosmos in der Philosophie der Renaissance (1927), Ernst Cassirer held the capital role of Cusanus’ philosophy in the configuration of the philosophical turn in Florentine Humanism during the second half of (...) the Quattrocento. In the 1960s, historians of the stature of Eugenio Garin and Paul Oskar Kristeller objected Cassirer's assertions, going so far as to affirm that there was practically no influence by Cusanus on Marsilio Ficino and Giovanni Pico. In the case of the latter, more recent studies tended to balance the issue, pointing out several possible links between both authors, particularly through the physician and bibliophile Pierleone da Spoleto, who owned many works by the German cardinal. Some sections of Pico's Oratio, Conclusiones and other texts will be analyzed in comparison with those treatises by Cusanus which he most likely knew. For both authors, it is the unity of the incomprehensible truth that brings forth the different modes of philosophizing in the plurality of thought traditions. Resumen: A la luz de nuevas evidencias textuales en un manuscrito de Toledo (BCT, MS 19, 26), el presente trabajo se propone investigar los alcances de la influencia de Nicolás de Cusa sobre Giovanni Pico della Mirandola en torno del problema de la unidad de la verdad y la diversidad de las filosofías. En su obra de 1927, Individuum und Kosmos in der Philosophie der Renaissance, Ernst Cassirer sostenía el rol capital de la filosofía de Nicolás de Cusa en la configuración del humanismo filosófico florentino de la segunda mitad del Quattrocento. En la década del 60, historiadores de la talla de Eugenio Garin y Paul Oskar Kristeller matizaron las afirmaciones de Cassirer hasta afirmar una influencia prácticamente nula del Cusano sobre Marsilio Ficino y Giovanni Pico. En el caso de este último, estudios más recientes tendieron a equilibrar la cuestión, señalando varios posibles puntos de contacto entre ambos autores, particularmente por intermedio del médico y bibliófilo Pierleone da Spoleto, que poseía muchas obras del cardenal alemán. Se analizarán algunas secciones de la Oratio, de las Conclusiones y de otros textos de Pico en comparación con aquellos tratados del Cusano que muy probablemente haya conocido. Para ambos autores, es la unidad de la incomprensible verdad la que suscita los diversos modos del filosofar en la pluralidad de tradiciones de pensamiento. (shrink)

Per quanto la disprezziamo e condanniamo, la menzogna accompagna da sempre e inevitabilmente la nostra vita. Mentiamo sin da bambini e continuiamo a mentire da adulti. Mentiamo a tutti, alle persone più care come agli sconosciuti e ancor di più ai nostri nemici. Mentiamo persino a noi stessi. Mentiamo in mille modi: quando raccontiamo una bugia, quando illudiamo noi stessi e gli altri, quando truffiamo, imbrogliamo e fingiamo. Mentiamo a parole e gesti. Mentiamo per far del male ma anche a (...) fin di bene. La capacità di mentire, come la speculare capacità di riconoscere la menzogna, fanno parte integrante del nostro bagaglio cognitivo: senza di esse ci sarebbe impossibile condurre una normale vita sociale. Altrettanto utile, pervasiva, a volte invasiva e persino scomoda è la verità, necessaria controparte della menzogna. L’una non potrebbe esistere senza l’altra. Ma dove incomincia l’una e dove finisce l’altra? Come nelle loro precedenti opere, i due autori affrontano il problema dai loro singolari punti di vista, cercando di dare una risposta, che non sarà però mai definitiva. (shrink)

La vérité est le degré d’exactitude d’une représentation de la réalité. Nous postulons trois étapes cognitives : le psychon, produit par la perception ; le construit, produit par intellection; et l’acte de parole, produit par la communication. La vérité se trouve à la seconde étape; seuls les construits sont aléthiques. La vérité est une qualité qui vient en degrés. La certitude est le point d’aboutissement parfait et inaccessible de cette gradation ; il s’agit donc d’un concept idéal. Une thèse est (...) réputée vraie si son degré aléthique est acceptablement efficace, sinon la thèse est considérée comme fausse. En d’autres termes, nous jugeons vraie toute thèse n’ayant pas assez d’échecs pour qu’elle soit considérée fausse. (shrink)

This chapter draws a connection between Herzog’s falsified epigraph to Lessons of Darkness and Kellyanne Conway’s claim that there are “alternative facts”. Philosophers have a commitment to the truth, but in cases like Herzog’s quote or Trump’s inauguration it’s very easy to fact-check. Being a good citizen may require that from us, but doing so leaves little to resolve philosophically. Thus, if Herzog raises a question about finding truth in an age of “alt-facts” and “fake news”, then it must be (...) about something other than finding “just the facts” or reporting “real news”. To uncover the more interesting question Herzog raises, I situate his role in the film as an unreliable narrator against Jean Baudrillard’s work to show how all of our interactions with the media put us into relationships with narratives and agendas that go beyond a commitment to the facts. The question then becomes: How can we respond to the uncertainty inherent in the claims and narratives developed by the media? To address the question, I argue that we should not fall victim to either resignation or self-serving cynicism. Instead, by turning to Gilles Deleuze’s politics of affirmation we can see that our exposure to media is less about getting facts per se than in developing relationships with media where we can have some degree of trust. By looking at interviews with Herzog, I claim that his understanding of “ecstatic truth” vs. the “accountant’s truth” suggests that he would support an affirmation of truth beyond the facts rather than a return to a mythical time of “just the facts.” . (shrink)

Las afirmaciones verdaderas reciben su justificación de creencias que tienen al conocimiento como base, por lo que para su formulación y comprensión se necesita asumir una posición fundacionalista. En este artículo se propone un fundacionalismo confiabilista, inspirado en Goldman, aunque con cambios importantes respecto a su teoría. A diferencia de Goldman, considero que no todas las creencias tienen que ser verdaderas, ni toda justificación de las creencias requiere de la verdad. Adicionalmente, las creencias verdaderas, expresadas mediante oraciones asertóricas, estarían fundadas (...) en creencias aún más básicas, cuya justificación proviene del uso del lenguaje. (shrink)

In recent work Philip Welch has proven the existence of ‘ineffable liars’ for Hartry Field’s theory of truth. These are offered as liar-like sentences that escape classification in Field’s transfinite hierarchy of determinateness operators. In this article I present a slightly more general characterization of the ineffability phenomenon, and discuss its philosophical significance. I show the ineffable sentences to be less ‘liar-like’ than they appear in Welch’s presentation. I also point to some open technical problems whose resolution would greatly clarify (...) the philosophical issues raised by the ineffability phenomenon. (shrink)

Le réalisme scientifique occupe une place centrale dans le système philosophique de Mario Bunge. Au cœur de cette thèse, on trouve l’affirmation selon laquelle nous pouvons connaître le monde partiellement. Il s’ensuit que les théories scientifiques ne sont pas totalement vraies ou totalement fausses, mais plutôt partiellement vraies et partiellement fausses. Ces énoncés sur la connaissance scientifique, à première vue plausible pour quiconque est familier avec la pratique scientifique, demandent néanmoins à être clarifiés, précisés et, ultimement, à être inclus dans (...) un cadre théorique plus large et rigoureux. Depuis ses toutes premières publications sur ces questions et jusqu’à récemment, Mario Bunge n’a cessé d’interpeller les philosophes afin qu’ils développent une théorie, au sens propre du terme, de la vérité partielle afin de clarifier les enjeux épistémologiques liés au réalisme scientifique. Bunge a lui-même proposé plusieurs parties de cette théorie au fil des années, mais aucune de ces propositions ne l’a satisfait pleinement et la construction de cette théorie demeure un problème entier. Dans ce texte, nous passerons rapidement en revue certaines des approches proposées par Bunge dans ses publications et nous esquisserons certaines pistes qui devraient servir à tout le moins de desiderata pour la construction d’une théorie de la vérité partielle. (shrink)

[ita] L'articolo analizza la concezione di verità in Tommaso d'Aquino, di cui si sottolinea una sostanziale validità, a patto di integrarsi con la prospettiva più affettivo-esistenziale tipica della Patristica e di Blondel. [eng] The article analyzes the conception of truth in Tommaso d'Aquino, underlining a substantial validity of it, provided that it is completed with the most existential perspective typical of the Patristic and Blondel.

I present a defense of a refined Peircean conception of truth, as inspired by Wilfrid Sellars. Roughly, Sellars' view can be represented by the two following metascientific claims: An ideally adequate scientific theory is the limit towards which successive theories would converge by theoretical evolution; Reality would be what is represented by an ideally adequate scientific theory. My overall strategy involves a search for essential components of an argument showing theoretical progress in science. I assemble these components by considering several (...) objections to the Peircean conception which have been raised in the recent literature. In general I argue that these objections do not apply because they are based on a misunderstanding of the type of argument that Peircean conception embodies. Thus although I do not claim to offer an ultimate defense of this conception of truth, I nevertheless hope to clarify the structure of the argument. ;Roughly, the objections to the Peircean conception of truth fall into two categories. The first and more tenacious class of objections centers around the claim that scientific theories are incommensurable. The apparent consequence of the truth of this claim is that no argument can be constructed which shows progress in science. The second class of objections focuses on the concept of convergence. The claim is that even if theories may be compared, they are not converging in any non-metaphorical sense. ;I discuss several possible responses to these objections. In response to those in the first category, I argue that both the objections and many of the responses presuppose an inadequate theory of the meaning of scientific concepts--a theory in which a semantic concept has been forced into a causal explanatory role. I argue that one should distinguish a semantic account from a causal account, and only by doing so can one argue that scientific theories are continuous with common sense and hence are comparable. ;In response to the second category of objections, I argue that there is a nonmetaphorical sense in which theories could be converging. I diagnose the difficulty with this class of objections as a mistake involving treating the concept of an ideal limit as basic. The objectors claim that one cannot establish theoretical convergence on this basis. I urge that the concept of theoretical convergence is basic, that of ideality is derivative. In doing so, I argue that the convergence hypothesis is an empirical claim ultimately to be supported by a detailed examination of the history of science. Moreover if the concept of ideality is derivative, then this concept is a regulative ideal which defines the concepts of ultimate truth and reality. ;Finally I argue that the Peircean conception of truth as a Naturalized Epistemology does not provide a solution to traditional philosophical problems, but rather involves a reconception of the task of epistemology. I argue that the traditional search for an a priori foundation for empirical knowledge was a disguised search for a causal explanation of how beliefs are true of the world. Once again I suggest that this approach involves forcing a semantic concept into a causal explanatory role. A naturalized epistemology, on the other hand, features justification as a relation between propositions. I argue that there is an implicit distinction in the Peircean conception between justifying our claims to know and offering a causal explanation of the interaction between language users and the world. Although the causal explanation does not lay bare the foundations of knowledge in any traditional sense, it nevertheless has the consequence that empirical knowledge is not just arbitrary. (shrink)

Lewis Hahn, Editor of Library of Living Philosophers, including Quine, Gadamer, Davidson, Ricoeur, writes: "Professor Allinson’s work [A Metaphysics for the Future] is impressive. I do not remember when in recent years I have read a more exciting systematic study. With a new phenomenology, a distinctive method and unique modes of validation for philosophy, and an extraordinary command of both Eastern and Western philosophy, Professor Allinson develops his own bold, imaginative and challenging system of philosophy". This work is intended to (...) serve not only as an expression of a new idea of a philosophy, but as an apologia for philosophy as a legitimate and independent discipline in its own right. It argues that in the 20th century, truth has not been abandoned, but merely modified. The text proposes a return to truth and suggests that it is only after apprehending the truths of consciousness that the philosopher's mirror may become a kaleidoscope through which reality may be contemplated. First order truth lies in the realm of discovery, and discovery takes place only within the moment of subjective re-enactment. It is through such a phenomenological criterion of validity that this work attempts to firmly ground an epistemology capable of paving the way for further substantive truth discoveries. As part of the philosophic stance advanced herein, however, epistemology and metaphysics are not developed in isolation. After analyzing other metaphysical approaches, the author utilizes the Chinese principle of complementarity to present his own conception of modified Hegelian dialecticism, as an account of systematic coherency and a backdrop to future philosophizing. (shrink)

Tribe, David When asked, we say we always speak the truth - in courts of law, the whole truth, nothing but the truth..

A. H. Basson; V—The Way of Truth, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 61, Issue 1, 1 June 1961, Pages 73–86, https://doi.org/10.1093/aristotelian/61.

If L had a finite number of sentences ‘s1’, . . ., ‘sn’, he would have been happy to define s is true as s is ‘s1’ and s1, or ‘s2’ and s2 . . . or . . . or ‘sn’ and sn.

This is an exploration of a cluster of related logical results. Taken together these seem to have something philosophically important to teach us: something about knowledge and truth and something about the logical impossibility of totalities of knowledge and truth. The book includes explorations of new forms of the ancient and venerable paradox of the :Liar, applications and extensions of Kaplan and Montague's paradox of the Knower, generalizations of Godel's work on incompleteness, and new uses of Cantorian diagonalization. Throughout, the (...) concern is with metaphysical and epistemological implications of these results: what such results may have to teach us about knowledge, truth, and possibility. (shrink)