Gorgias certainly is a triumph in linguistic rhetoric: he portraits the ambiguous relationship between human beings and the knowledge of reality. Following his works, the Logos does not produce any objective or absolute, but obscure knowledge. The Logos is not characterized by truth, but rather by the ability to persuade and deceive others, to convince others using the art of rhetoric. This fact composes the core of the metalinguistic attitude, which characterizes Gorgias’ texts. Since the Logos in Gorgias does not (...) seek absolute truth, it creates different truths, such as illusions for platonians, skeptic material, rhetoric or similar exercises. The analysis of the three main Gorgian works on Helen, Palamede and PTMO, are read and observed prevalently through language; they are discussed not just in a rhetorical or logical sense, but are anatomized in search for continuity in a bigger project: the “Gorgian Pragmatism”. This Pragmatism is a philosophy which advises us to embrace those beliefs we find most functional for us. While knowledge cannot be an agreement between the external world and human perception, Gorgias lays out another way to conceive this problem, which lies inside language. In fact, language in itself is considered as the main subject for its power and use. We could say that the reality of language is the only reality we might talk about, as the nucleus of substance which characterizes human beings. Many philosophers have tried to approach the problem of Sophists, and rehabilitated them after a long history of discredit, maintaining the purpose of the research searching for a peculiar philosophical content and a contribution for the posterity. I believe Gorgias can reveal, at each level of his discourse, a theory of rhetorical arrangement aimed at clarification of the problem of language in human activity. (shrink)

El concepto de dificultad contramayoritaria, aplicado al control de constitucionalidad, describe el problema de justificar que un tribunal declare inválida (inconstitucional) una ley, votada por los representantes de una mayoría de los ciudadanos. ¿Es esto legítimo? En el presente trabajo, analizamos un problema similar respecto a las burocracias públicas, relativamente menos discutido hasta ahora: ¿puede la burocracia pública tomar decisiones que considera justificadas, o tiene que limitarse a implementar las directivas del poder político en todos los casos? El debate se (...) ha planteado con intensidad en México, durante los últimos años, pero afecta a la configuración institucional de otros países en América Latina. (shrink)

In this paper, we argue that there are epistemic norms on evidence-gathering and consider consequences for how to understand epistemic normativity. Though the view that there are such norms seems intuitive, it has found surprisingly little defense. Rather, many philosophers have argued that norms on evidence-gathering can only be practical or moral. On a prominent evidentialist version of this position, epistemic norms only apply to responding to the evidence one already has. Here we challenge the orthodoxy. First, we argue that (...) there is no significant normative difference between responding to evidence you have and gathering more evidence. Second, we argue that our practices of epistemically criticizing agents for their poor evidence-gathering indicate the existence of epistemic norms on evidence-gathering. Finally, we show that our thesis has important implications for recent debates about the relationship between epistemic norms and inquiry. (shrink)

Leibnizian-Newtonian calculus was a theory that dealt with geometrical objects; the figure continued to play one of the fundamental roles it had played in Greek geometry: it susbstituted a part of reasoning. During the eighteenth century a process of de-geometrization of calculus took place, which consisted in the rejection of the use of diagrams and in considering calculus as an 'intellectual' system where deduction was merely linguistic and mediated. This was achieved by interpreting variables as universal quantities and introducing the (...) notion of function, which replaced the study of curves. However, the emancipation of calculus from its basis in geometry was not comprehensive. In fact, the geometrical properties of curves were attributed de facto to functions and thus eighteenth-century calculus continued implicitly to use principles borrowed from geometry. There was therefore no transition to a purely syntactical theory based on axiomatically introduced terms, a shift which only took place subsequently in modern times. (shrink)

The article aims to discuss the relationships between work, education and politics, analyzing how everyday material relationships are projected as ways of living the present time and expectations regarding the future. Based on “selective expectations”, given the possibility of discarding in an eliminatory labor market, practices aimed at entrepreneurship and selectivity are investigated both in the context of work and in formal and non-formal education, highlighting the links between profitability and punishment, at the crossroads between privatized social policies and militarization.

Carolina Sartorio argues that only the actual causes of our behaviour matter to our freedom. The key, she claims, lies in a correct understanding of the role played by causation in a view of that kind. Causation has some important features that make it a responsibility-grounding relation, and this contributes to the success of the view. Also, when agents act freely, the actual causes are richer than they appear to be at first sight; in particular, they reflect the agents' (...) sensitivity to reasons, where this includes both the existence of actual reasons and the absence of other reasons. So acting freely requires more causes and quite complex causes, as opposed to fewer causes and simpler causes, and is compatible with those causes being deterministic. The book connects two different debates, the one on causation and the one on the problem of free will, in new and illuminating ways. (shrink)

We reconstruct essential features of Lagrange’s theory of analytical functions by exhibiting its structure and basic assumptions, as well as its main shortcomings. We explain Lagrange’s notions of function and algebraic quantity, and we concentrate on power-series expansions, on the algorithm for derivative functions, and the remainder theorem—especially on the role this theorem has in solving geometric and mechanical problems. We thus aim to provide a better understanding of Enlightenment mathematics and to show that the foundations of mathematics did not, (...) for Lagrange, concern the solidity of its ultimate bases, but rather purity of method—the generality and internal organization of the discipline. (shrink)

Beliefs can be resistant to evidence. Nonetheless, the orthodox view in epistemology analyzes beliefs as evidence-responsive attitudes. I address this tension by deploying analytical tools on capacities and masking to show that the cognitive science of evidence-resistance supports rather than undermines the orthodox view. In doing so, I argue for the claim that belief requires the capacity for evidence-responsiveness. More precisely, if a subject believes that p, then they have the capacity to rationally respond to evidence bearing on p. Because (...) capacities for evidence-responsiveness are fallible and may be masked, beliefs can be held in the face of counter-evidence. Indeed, I will argue that our best science of belief supports the claim that evidence-resistant beliefs result from masks on evidence-responsiveness capacities. This account of belief not only allows for resistance to evidence, but provides us with a framework for describing and explaining actual cases of evidence-resistance. (shrink)

Central to the legal positivism of the nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth century was the dogma of the Ideal Legislator. Legal materials were to be interpreted as the work of an omniscient, coherent, consistent legislator. We argue that this dogma persists in the different guise of the competent speaker model, on which legal materials are the work of a competent speaker, who follows all the pertinent semantic and pragmatic rules. We will first lay out the Ideal Legislator (...) dogma as applied in legal interpretation, arguing that this dogma does not limit interpretive discretion but rather amplifies it by hiding it under the veil of an inexistent, purely instrumental rationality. We will then turn to the competent speaker model, showing that, despite its apparent neutrality, it proves to be a reincarnation of the Ideal Legislator dogma, for it, too, amplifies interpretive discretion, only it hides it under the veil of an inexistent, purely linguistic rationality. Finally, we will inquire into the different types of rationality and their relations, arguing that there is always a choice and value judgment involved in ascribing rationality to legislators, and that these choices and judgments need to be carefully inspected and normatively justified. (shrink)

Starting from the notions of q-entailment and p-entailment, a two-dimensional notion of entailment is developed with respect to certain generalized q-matrices referred to as B-matrices. After showing that every purely monotonic singleconclusion consequence relation is characterized by a class of B-matrices with respect to q-entailment as well as with respect to p-entailment, it is observed that, as a result, every such consequence relation has an inferentially four-valued characterization. Next, the canonical form of B-entailment, a two-dimensional multiple-conclusion notion of entailment based (...) on B-matrices, is introduced, providing a uniform framework for studying several different notions of entailment based on designation, antidesignation, and their complements. Moreover, the two-dimensional concept of a B-consequence relation is defined, and an abstract characterization of such relations by classes of B-matrices is obtained. Finally, a contribution to the study of inferential many-valuedness is made by generalizing Suszko’s Thesis and the corresponding reduction to show that any B-consequence relation is, in general, inferentially four-valued. (shrink)

O trabalho pretende, a partir da publicação das “Confissões da Carne”, analisar o impasse que diz respeito a sua não publicação em vida por Foucault, em especial em função da entrada do sujeito como terceiro componente do triângulo arqueológico-genealógico, impondo uma reviravolta decisiva em sua pesquisa. A força aletúrgica do sujeito implica uma definitiva dessoberanização do dispositivo de poder. Por um lado, se a forma moderna prevê a sua transferência de um poder sobre si próprio aos outros, o complexo de (...) estratégias governamentais, que «orientam» a direção da consciência, não implica a abdicação da liberdade por parte da pessoa a qual foi dirigida; por outro, uma segunda operação surge da diferenciação específica entre o modelo antigo e o modelo cristão, quer dizer, se o antigo modelo de direção funciona com vistas à autonomização do sujeito, aquele exame de consciência cristão estabelece como eixo a dependência e desenvolve uma racionalidade pastoral. Assim Foucault chega a uma estética da existência que é puro exercício de liberdade e perfeita atitude, que se oferece aos outros como prova do seu próprio valor. É com isso que o volume quarto da história da sexualidade é confrontado. O que muda drasticamente na experiência cristã da carne é a relação do sujeito com a verdade. A confissão, mais do que expiação dos pecados, neste quadro intervém como atestado e como testemunho de si próprio. Em conclusão, para Foucault, conotado pela imperfeição que o domina, o sujeito cristão liga-se a uma interminável direção de consciência cujo preço é uma perda de identidade indefinida. Assim, a partir deste recorte, o problema que passa a enfrentar é como encontrar uma forma de fundamentar a hermenêutica de si, não no sacrifício, mas numa “emergência positiva”, teórica e prática, de si, expondo tanto o momento transicional das “Confissões da Carne” quanto a própria razão pela qual renuncia à sua publicação. (shrink)

Delusions are deeply evidence-resistant. Patients with delusions are unmoved by evidence that is in direct conflict with the delusion, often responding to such evidence by offering obvious, and strange, confabulations. As a consequence, the standard view is that delusions are not evidence-responsive. This claim has been used as a key argumentative wedge in debates on the nature of delusions. Some have taken delusions to be beliefs and argued that this implies that belief is not constitutively evidence-responsive. Others hold fixed the (...) evidenceresponsiveness of belief and take this to show that delusions cannot be beliefs. Against this common assumption, I appeal to a large range of empirical evidence to argue that delusions are evidence-responsive in the sense that subjects have the capacity to respond to evidence on their delusion in rationally permissible ways. The extreme evidence-resistance of delusions is a consequence of powerful masking factors on these capacities, such as strange perceptual experiences, motivational factors, and cognitive biases. This view makes room for holding both that belief is constitutively evidence-responsive and that delusions are beliefs, and it has important implications for the study and treatment of delusions. (shrink)

The orthodox view in epistemology is that belief is constitutively evidence-responsive. I offer a novel argument for a version of this view, one that appeals to capacities to rationally respond to evidence. I do so by developing the Sellarsian idea that the concept of belief functions to mark the space of reasons in a non-intellectualist and naturalistic direction. The resulting view does justice to the role of belief in social interactions, joint deliberation, and rational persuasion, while including evidence-resistant beliefs and (...) animal beliefs as genuine beliefs. It has a range of further benefits: it helps us account for epistemic normativity, paves the way for better psychological models of belief revision, distinguishes beliefs from imaginings and mere acceptances, and helps us avoid noxious simplistic takes on human irrationality. (shrink)

In this article, we will show how Derrida’s deconstruction of modern individualism, exemplified by Robinson Crusoe’s attitude toward nature, addresses the contemporary debate on the Anthropocene. Through Hadot’s genealogy of modern “prometheanism,” we will discuss how a different gaze by human beings on themselves and nature can lead us out of the modern self-conception of the human person, that is resulting in the Anthropocene era, its catastrophic results endangering the very survival of humankind. Through Morton’s conception of hospitality and Haraway’s (...) notion of Chthulucene, we argue that a new individual and collective conversion to nature may result in an era in which human beings can conceive of themselves as ethical parts of nature. Hence, a new view on the reciprocal interdependence between human beings and nature can be affirmed, creating a feeling of hospitality without hostility. We conclude by considering Agamben’s recovery of Franciscanism, as a form-of-life, preceding modernity, in which this ethical, natural civilization was firstly foreseen. (shrink)

El presente artículo es una elaboración teórica descriptiva que desarrolla una aproximación filosófica antropológica del símbolo-religioso. El objetivo de este artículo apunta a identificar que la simbología-religiosa es requerida por el ser humano de modo perenne, en relación a la búsqueda de significados suficientes para dotar de interpretación y valor a la realidad, con la finalidad de construir una cultura estable para el existir. En función de dicho propósito se establece que el símbolo adviene desde la dimensión imaginal (Chillón, 2010) (...) de la inteligencia, extendiéndose hacia sectores que los conceptos y la productividad racional no logran abordar. Al respecto, el manuscrito establece que, comprender la función de la simbología desde su procedencia original en la experiencia religiosa, significa contribuir a la comprensión del resurgir religioso manifestado en la posmodernidad, aún a las condiciones de cambio continuo y la ausencia de direcciones sólidamente definidas (Bauman, 1996). Se establece que las mediaciones simbólicas-religiosas, conservan intacta su tarea de transitar el vínculo entre el ser humano y el misterio trascendente (Chillón, 2010; Diez de Velasco, Méndez, & Maffesoli; 2007; Mardones, 1996), a objeto de orientar la vida humana integralmente. (shrink)

Does a person's liability to attack during a war depend on the nature of their individual causal contribution to the (unjust) threat posed? If so, how? The recent literature on the ethics of war has become increasingly focused on questions of this kind. According to some views on these matters, your liability hinges on the extent of your causal contribution: the larger your contribution to an unjust threat, the larger the amount of harm that we can impose on you in (...) order to avert the threat. Some philosophers have suggested that we can ground a quite general principle of civilian immunity on this basis. But, do causal contributions really come in degrees? Can we make sense of a graded notion of causal contribution that can be relevant to debates about liability in war? I argue there is good reason to be sceptical. The appearance that causal contributions come in degrees is just an illusion that can be explained away. (shrink)

O presente texto constitui-se como resenha do livro Dispositivi della Normatività, de Antonio Tucci, professor da Università degli Studi di Salerno, Itália. Ao longo da obra, Tucci joga luzes sobre a questão da norma, da normalização e dos dispositivos de segurança, inserindo temas como o da soberania — referente às questões fronteiriças —, da identidade e da cidadania —, ao abordar questões relacionadas aos processos de subjetivação e à necessária reespacialização do espaço político, em um panorama da governamentalidade biopolítica.

“Nudging” is commonly seen as an appealing form of “Smart legislation” based on the findings of Behavioural sciences and alternative to traditional forms of regulation. However, notwithstanding the ever increasing references and a growing body of literature on its acceptability, a proper definition of the concept seems still lacking, since all the attempts to date have only provided over- or under-inclusive definitions. This chapter purports to offer a more plausible definition. Firstly, the received view and especially Thaler’s and Sunstein’s descriptions (...) of nudging will be examined and subjected to a first critical assessment. Secondly, a few examples will be made of policies enacted all around the world which are usually referred to as cases of nudging. Thirdly, some of the elements which have often been associated to nudging as its definitional features will be tested against the set of examples: such test will show that most of those elements must be done away with. Lastly, a “minimal” definition will be offered. While allowing us to distinguish nudging from other forms of conduct-influencing interventions, the minimal definition will exclude many features as its necessary conditions: among others, those related to specific ends and political ideologies. (shrink)

Little has been studied on the relationship between affect and school problems related with attendance. This study aims to identify different affective profiles and to determine whether these profiles differ from each other based on the four functional conditions of school refusal behavior. Participants comprised 1,816 Spanish adolescents aged 15–18 years. The Positive and Negative Affect Schedule for Children-Short Form and the School Refusal Assessment Scale-Revised for Children were administered. Latent profile analysis revealed five affective profiles: low affective profile, self-fulfilling (...) profile, low positive affect profile, self-destructive profile, and high affective profile. The self-destructive profile revealed the highest average scores in the first three factors of the SRAS-R-C, whereas the high affective profile reached the highest average score in the fourth factor. On the contrary, the self-fulfilling profile obtained the lowest average scores in the first two factors of the SRAS-R-C, whereas the low affective profile revealed the lowest average scores in the last two factors. Findings suggest the relevance of developing more adaptative affective profiles, such as the self-fulfilling profile, which would contribute to diminishing school attendance problems. (shrink)

Epistemic agents interact with evidence in different ways. This can cause trouble for mutual understanding and for our ability to rationally engage with others. Indeed, it can compromise democratic practices of deliberation. This paper explains these differences by appeal to a new notion: epistemic styles. Epistemic styles are ways of interacting with evidence that express unified sets of epistemic values, preferences, goals, and interests. The paper introduces the notion of epistemic styles and develops a systematic account of their nature. It (...) then discusses the implications of epistemic styles for central questions in epistemology, in particular, for issues surrounding rational engagement and for the debate between virtue epistemologists and epistemic situationists. (shrink)

This work proposes research on a still unexplored psychical world: thoughts, emotions, and real events experienced by racket victims of the three largest criminal organizations of the South of Italy: Mafia, Camorra, and ‘Ndrangheta. The purpose is to understand the multifaceted psycho-anthropological and social issues criminal organizations have settled on, and particularly which psycho-relational dynamics and sociocultural codes come into play in the complex and controversial relationship between victim and criminal system, between victim and support systems. With entrepreneurs and tradesmen (...) victims of organized crime, we have analyzed lived experiences—in particular fear—and psychological problems they had to cope with; events and motivations that allowed them “breaking” the silence and asking for help; the representation of a support network before and after their possible pressing charges; the kind of help offered by support systems. Dignity and self-respect, the fight for one's own freedom and honor,.. (shrink)

Delusions are standardly defined as attitudes that are not amenable to change in light of conflicting evidence. But what evidence do people with delusion have for and against it? Do delusions really go against their total evidence? How are the answers affected by different conceptions of evidence? -/- This chapter focuses on how delusions relate to evidence. I consider what delusions-relevant evidence people with delusions have. I give some reasons to think that people typically have evidence for their delusions, and (...) that the evidence they have against them is often overstated. I draw on this discussion to consider whether delusions are evidentially supported and epistemically rational. Finally, I discuss implications for the nature of delusion, responsibility, and treatment and suggest directions for future research. Throughout, the discussion is sensitive to different conceptions of evidence and rationality in epistemology. -/- A central upshot is that what we should say about the epistemic standing of delusions depends substantively on our positions in epistemology, in particular, on the debate between internalists and externalists about evidence. If we want clarity on the epistemic standing of delusions, we need to incorporate more sophisticated tools from epistemology. (shrink)

Commentary on Pablo Hubacher Haerle’s paper “Is OCD Epistemically Irrational?”. I argue for expanding our assessment of rationality in OCD by considering a wider range of epistemic parameters and how they fit together.

The standard notion of formal theory, in logic, is in general biased exclusively towards assertion: it commonly refers only to collections of assertions that any agent who accepts the generating axioms of the theory should also be committed to accept. In reviewing the main abstract approaches to the study of logical consequence, we point out why this notion of theory is unsatisfactory at multiple levels, and introduce a novel notion of theory that attacks the shortcomings of the received notion by (...) allowing one to take both assertions and denials on a par. This novel notion of theory is based on a bilateralist approach to consequence operators, which we hereby introduce, and whose main properties we investigate in the present paper. (shrink)

This theoretical paper proposes a new perspective to understand the moral distress of nurses more fully, using virtue ethics. Moral distress is a widely studied subject, especially with respect to the determination of its causes and manifestations. Increasing the theoretical depth of previous work using ethical theory, however, can create new possibilities for moral distress to be explored and analyzed. Drawing on more recent work in this field, we explicate the conceptual framework of the process of moral distress in nurses, (...) proposed by Ramos et al., using MacIntyrean virtue ethics. Our analysis considers the experience of moral distress in the context of a practice, enabling the adaptation of this framework using virtue ethics. The adoption of virtue ethics as an ethical perspective broadens the understanding of the complexity of nurses’ experiences of moral distress, since it is impossible to create a ready model that can cover all possibilities. Specifically, we describe how identity, social context, beliefs, and tradition shape moral discomfort, uncertainty, and sensitivity and how virtues inform moral judgments. Individuals, such as nurses, who are involved in a practice have a narrative history and a purpose ( telos) that guide them in every step of the process, especially in moral judgment. It is worth emphasizing that the process described is supported by the formation of moral competence that, if blocked, can lead to moral distress and deprofessionalization. It is expected that nurses seek to achieve the internal good of their practice, which legitimizes their professional practice and supports them in moral decision-making, preventing moral distress. (shrink)

This article aims at providing a critical review of the main studies about Mafia in a theoretical psychological and socio-anthropological framework, and investigating the perception of the phenomenon in relation to moral disengagement and values orientation in two groups of Sicilian teenagers, living in contexts with different Mafia density. Today Mafia is represented as a socio-psychological phenomenon, which has managed to make culture, community, family, and individuals coincide; it is founded on an individualistic social conception according to which violence is (...) the strongest form of self-achievement. (shrink)

Some philosophers have claimed that causally determined agents are not morally responsible because they cannot make a difference in the world. A recent response by philosophers who defend the compatibility of determinism and responsibility has been to concede that causally determined agents are incapable of making a difference, but to argue that responsibility is not grounded in difference making. These compatibilists have rested such a claim on Frankfurt cases—cases where agents are intuitively responsible for acts that they couldn’t have failed (...) to perform. This essay argues, first, that the intuitive plausibility of the idea that responsibility is grounded in difference making is not completely put to rest by Frankfurt cases, even if those cases successfully show that responsibility is not grounded in difference making in the sense of access to alternative possibilities of action. It then goes on to develop a different compatibilist strategy, one according to which responsibility is grounded in difference making, but the type of difference making it is grounded in does not require access to alternative possibilities. Indeed, it is a form of difference making that is clearly compatible with determinism. (shrink)

Opinion leaders within the community may lead debate on animal welfare issues and provide a path for information to their social networks. However, little is known about OLs’ attitudes, activities conducted to express their views about animal welfare and whether they are well informed, or not, about husbandry practices in the red meat industry. This study aimed to identify OLs in the general public and among producers and compare OLs and non-OLs’ attitudes, knowledge and actions to express their views about (...) the red meat industry. Two questionnaires, one for the Australian general public and one for Australian red meat producers, were developed to identify general attitudes. From these questionnaires, OLs were identified using a two-step cluster analysis. Subsequently, a sub-sample of 19 OLs participated in a follow-up phone interview. Results disclosed some clear OLs’ characteristics. Public OLs held more negative perceptions of the red meat industry and perceived they had more knowledge about husbandry procedures. However, their actual knowledge about animal husbandry was not different from non-OLs. Public OLs also used and trusted social and internet media more than did non-OLs. In the producer group, a large percentage of OLs were identified. Producer OLs had more actual knowledge about animal husbandry and engaged in more behaviours to express dissatisfaction with the industry than non-OLs. Unlike the public respondents, this group used conventional media more than social and internet media, and their levels of trust in all kinds of media were low. While there were clear differences, both groups believed that is important to increase communication and educate about farm practices. This may present an opportunity to develop an opinion leader intervention strategy where informed OLs could later disseminate accurate information to their social networks. Further studies should test if sustained and facilitated educational sessions between public and producer OLs can assist in increasing communication, knowledge and perhaps, may assist in achieving convergence of concerns and expectations between both groups. (shrink)

What is the relationship between moral responsibility and causation? Plainly, we are not morally responsible for everything that we cause. For we cause a multitude of things, including things that we couldn't possibly foresee we would cause and with respect to which we cannot be assessed morally. Thus, it is clear that causing something does not entail being morally responsible for it. But, does the converse entailment hold? Does moral responsibility require causation? Intuitively, it does: intuitively, we can only be (...) morally responsible for things that we cause. (shrink)

Some classical studies in social psychology suggest that we are more sensitive to situational factors, and less responsive to reasons, than we normally recognize we are. In recent years, moral responsibility theorists have examined the question whether those studies represent a serious threat to our moral responsibility. A common response to the “situationist threat” has been to defend the reasons-responsiveness of ordinary human agents by appeal to a theory of reasons-responsiveness that appeals to patterns of counterfactual scenarios or possible worlds. (...) In this paper I identify a problem with that response and I offer a better solution. (shrink)

In this article I examine the relation between causation and moral responsibility. I distinguish four possible views about that relation. One is the standard view: the view that an agent's moral responsibility for an outcome requires, and is grounded in, the agent's causal responsibility for it. I discuss several challenges to the standard view, which motivate the three remaining views. The final view – the view I argue for – is that causation is the vehicle of transmission of moral responsibility. (...) According to this view, although moral responsibility does not require causation, causation still grounds moral responsibility. (shrink)

Midwest Studies In Philosophy, EarlyView.

How is the tension between conflict and deliberation resolved in shareholder engagement? We address this question by studying shareholder engagement as a deliberative process with three stages: establishing dialogue, solution development, and solution implementation. We theorize that two interactionist mechanisms, deliberative interaction and the voicing of disagreement, play different roles at different stages of the process. We test our hypotheses with a proprietary database of 169 environmental, social, and governance engagements with US public companies over 2007–12. We find that while (...) deliberative interaction does not help advance the engagement process, it positively moderates the effect of disagreement in the solution development stage. By contrast, in the solution implementation stage, deliberative interaction amplifies the negative effect of disagreement, thus hindering progress in the engagement. Our article contributes to shareholder engagement, deliberation theory, and interactionist organization theory by establishing that engagement effectiveness is an interactional achievement shaped by both deliberation and disagreement. (shrink)