The principle that each person is his own property occupies an almost axiomatic status in right-wing liberal thought as well as in some egalitarian theories. I reject any, full or partial, notion of property with respect to oneself by showing that any appeal and any justifiability which may be associated with self-ownership can at most serve to ground rights which are demonstrably non-property rights. As a contrast to self ownership, I introduce the non-proprietarian notion of Original Freedom. I compare the (...) two with respect to the control, income, and transfer aspects of ownership and suggest that Original Freedom is the more intuitively acceptable. (shrink)

In this paper I present a moral account of the legal notion of deceptive advertising. I argue that no harmful consequences to the consumer need follow from a deceptive advertisement as such, and I suggest instead that one should focus on the consequences of permitting the practise of deceptive advertising on society as a whole. After a brief account of deceptive advertising, I move to discuss the role of the reasonable person standard in its definition. One interpretation of this standard (...) is empirical, aiming to objectify the quality of misleadingness in the advertisement. I offer an alternative normative interpretation which aims to draw the line between the advertiser's responsibility and that of the consumer, between misleading and miscomprehension. I then examine and reject several possible moral grounds for condemning and prohibiting deceptive advertising. These include: harm, in the sense of welfare, to the misled consumer; harm to competitors; and a violation or a reduction of the consumer's autonomy. Finally, I explain how the effect of the practise of deceptive advertising on society as a whole should inform our normative line-drawing between misleading and miscomprehension, and how it provides the basis for the moral evaluation of deceptive advertising. (shrink)

This paper explores the possibility of extending Locke’s theory with respect to tangible property so that it might offer a feasible theoretical basis for intellectual property too. The main conclusion is that such an attempt must fail. Locke’s theory comes in three parts: a general justification of property which serves to explain why assets ought to be under the exclusive control of individuals; a positive method of private appropriation whereby an individual acquires a prima facie exclusive claim to previously commonly (...) held natural resources; and third, a negative requirement that other individuals’ crucial interests are not harmed by such an appropriation. For each of these, the difficulties involved in applying that part of the theory to the sphere of ideas are discussed, and a central aspect of intellectual property that raises the problems of application is highlighted. (shrink)

Can Rawls’s theory provide a framework for assessing obligations to future generations? Extending the veil of ignorance so that participants in the original position do not know to which generation they belong appears to fail in this endeavour. Earlier generations cannot improve their situation by “cooperating” with later generations. Such circumstances, lacking mutuality, leave no room for an agreement or contract. Nevertheless, the original position can be reconstructed so as to model relations of mutuality between generations even if these are (...) absent from the real world. This chapter assesses earlier attempts to do this and provides a rationale for viewing the just savings principle as a clause in the full formulation of the difference principle. (shrink)

The orthodoxy on the concept of ownership is given by Honoré's list of incidents. The idea this portrays is as ownership as a very flexible concept. The main purpose of this paper is to argue that the concept of property has much more integrity than the notion of a bundle of incidents may suggest. The Libertarian Challenge claims that redistributive theories of Justice, in so far as they impose involuntary taxes, are inconsistent with property rights, and are therefore unjustifiable. One (...) response to the libertarian challenge is to present alternative conceptions of ownership that are based on less than the complete list of incidents. These conceptions, we are told, avoid the inconsistency inherent in redistributive taxation by rejecting the incidents that are the source of the inconsistency, while retaining the moral appeal by leaving in place the core incidents and thus remaining faithful to what is primarily justifiable in property rights. Such an approach has been taken by several writers (notably, Waldron, Christman, and Fried). These different attempts to present a "truncated", "bifurcated", or "purist" concept of property invariably fail. Taxation must be an infringement of property. The upshot of this is that a justification of redistributive taxation requires a restriction of property or abandoning it altogether rather than redefining it. (shrink)

Working from a "capitalist" theory of exploitation, based on a neo-classical account of economic value, I argue that guest workers are exploited. It may be objected, however, that since they are not citizens, any inequality that stems from their status as non-citizens is morally unobjectionable. Although host countries are under no moral obligation to admit guest workers as citizens, there are independent reasons that call for the extension of economic rights – the freedom of occupation in particular – to guestworkers. (...) Since the cause of unequal exchange rests in the fact that guest workers are deprived of these rights, rather than in their exclusion from citizenship per se, I conclude that they are exploited even if their exclusion from citizenship may be justified. (shrink)

According to the negative principle of appropriation a person can acquire an unowned resource if doing so respects a certain condition (the Lockean proviso). Contrary to some views, a proviso of this sort is not incompatible with libertarianism. Moreover, no unilateral powers of acquisition can fail to consider the impact on the interests of others. Hence, a doctrine of appropriation must incorporate such a proviso. However, the several interpretations such a proviso can take on various dimensions will be either implausible (...) as a way of taking into consideration the interests of others, or unable to generate the kind and extent of property rights libertarians typically endorse. (shrink)

When viewed as a question of distributive justice the evaluation of workfare typically reflects exclusively on the distribution of income: do the physically capable have a justified claim for state support, or is it fair to demand from those who do work to subsidise this support? Rarely is workfare appraised in terms of how it affects other parties such as employers or other workers, and on the structural effects the pattern of incentives it generates brings about, or as an issue (...) of distributive justice related to a more extensive range of objects of distribution such as access to pleasing jobs. -/- We propose to evaluate workfare by looking at its effects more broadly: (1) we discuss and dismiss on empirical grounds the two most common arguments in favour of workfare, namely that workfare develops self-reliance among participants and it is more economical in the use of altruism among taxpayers. (2) We suggest that workfare focuses on work as a burden and as a means to income, ignoring other beneficial aspects that are conducive to the worker’s self expression. These other benefits are distributed unevenly between two main groups: the privileged well off and the disadvantaged. (3) we argue that workfare functions as a mechanism to preserve these privileges to one class of workers at the expense of another. Or, to put it the other way, the payment of unconditional welfare to the long term unemployed might be justified as one method of mitigating unjustified privileges. (shrink)

Rawls's difference principle contains a certain normative ambiguity, so that opposing views, including strong inegalitarian ones, might find a home under it. The element that introduces this indeterminacy is the absence of an explicit reference to time . Thus, a society that agrees on the difference principle as the proper justification of basic political-economic institutions, might nevertheless disagree on whether their specific institutions are justified by that principle. Such disagreement would most often centre on issues of fact: will a more (...) egalitarian policy in fact prioritize the least well off or will a more libertarian policy do so? But facts are not the only possible points of contention. According to the fundamental indeterminacy, considering merely the sum of advantages to the least well off, the difference principle is indifferent among different flows of equal income over time. It cannot adjudicate among more or less unequal distributions across social groups when the sum income of the least advantaged group is constant. The fundamental indeterminacy lies at the bottom of three derivative indeterminacies: an adequate future discount rate, an acceptable absolute minimum, and a reasonable time interval. These might form the basis of political disagreement among self-proclaimed endorsers of the difference principle of left and right over the way the principal social-economic institutions ought to be structured and the distributions that ensue. Key Words: Rawls • equality • incentives • future discount rate • primary goods • well-being. (shrink)

Human rights are a construct of international law. Their legitimacy depends on them being informed by the deep-seated fact of global cultural pluralism and the concern of establishing a system that recognizes this pluralism, transcends a narrow parochial perspective and thus avoids the accusation of cultural or moral colonialism. There are two broad strategies to do this: by invoking an individualist-moral conception of HR designed to promote well-being and by invoking a social-political conception of HR aimed at preserving world peace (...) and stability. Economic rights are rights to commodify—to sell one’s labor, to buy goods and services and so on—under fair terms. That is to say, to take part in economic activities such as production and consumption within a distinctive social form by which they are mediated through exchange. I argue that endorsing rights of commodification is incompatible with a genuine concern with parochialism. Economic rights are neither necessary to protect some natural interest shared by all humans, nor the stability of a peaceful world order. Hence, economic rights should not be considered human rights. (shrink)

Libertarianism attempts to establish a set of property rights as a complete political morality, its argument proceeding from liberty tout court, as the unique foundational aspect of well being that grounds rights. In this book, Attas presents a sympathetic reconstruction of the libertarian argument and then brings to bear a critical evaluation leading to an ultimate rejection of libertarianism. Exposing the limitations of libertarianism and disclosing its errors, Attas argues that the rights which libertarians adopt with respect to persons, natural (...) resources and products are indefensible given what liberty must be. (shrink)

David Miller argues that the proper principle to govern distribution in the economy is a principle of desert and that markets (at their best) distribute to the participating agents rewards that are proportional to their respective contributions. This is explained by appeal to the notion of marginal productivity, and by the theory that perfect competition results in a distribution according to marginal contribution. Marginal product in this sense is taken to be a measure of the producer's contribution to the consumer's (...) well-being, and so a proportionate reward is something he can be said to deserve. I discuss the relation between desert and justice and question the premise that desert is appropriate in the economic sphere. With respect to Miller's argument I claim, first, that there are several substantial and prevalent factors that cast serious doubt on the contention that the market distributes and rewards according to marginal contribution to any significant extent. Second, that marginal contribution is not a measure of contribution to well being and, therefore, it is not a morally relevant desert-basis. (shrink)

Situations of fundamentally opposing interests are such that, without some degree of trust, they will fail to advance. In this paper I consider war and the achievement of peace through a series of reciprocal steps as the primary setting in which to examine trust, its terms, and its limits. A surprising point that transpires is that, in the attempt to resolve situations that are fundamentally conflictive, there is often a tendency to take steps to promote something else, superficially resembling trust, (...) sometimes counterproductively at the expense trust. An analysis of trust consisting of three elements is offered: (1) Vulnerability: the truster expresses an inclination to put himself in a vulnerable position with respect to the trusted. (2) Benefit: for the purpose of some gain that will befall the truster if the trusted does not exploit this vulnerability. (3) Reciprocity: with the expectation that the trusted will be sufficiently motivated to reciprocate at least partly due to the fact that truster’s behaviour is informed by such an expectation. The problem of trust is then presented as the idea of overcoming the “trust gap”. It is this: given the trust gap, and the rational-prudential basis to distrust – what could after all enable trust? Overcoming the gap may be achieved in one of two ways. Metaphorically speaking, we can narrow the gap, making the risks involved less worrisome, even if not eliminating them all together. Thus, encouraging cooperation on the basis of self-regarding prudential reasons. Or we can bridge the gap, leaving the risks as they are while procuring non-prudential resources to encourage cooperation. Only the latter can be truly classified as trust. Three ways in which the gap may be bridged are specified: Non-prudential reasons to reciprocate trust (Empathy, Fairness, and Reciprocity) correspond to the three components of trust (Vulnerability, Benefit, Reciprocity). The three reasons are introduced with the help of a minor thought experiments the results of which get further support from psychological experimental literature. It is then shown how these features of the situation provide a moral reason and, therefore, an expectation to act trustworthily, and as such facilitate trust. The possibility of trust is thus explained on the basis of an idea of reasonableness, rather than instrumental rationality, sentiment, or faith. Finally, it is argued that narrowing the gap might detrimentally affect bridging the gap. Confidence building measures (guarantees, incentives, and sanctions), designed to narrow the trust gap and facilitate cooperation, may unwittingly demolish the foundations for bridging the gap. Some policy implications are tentatively proposed: (1) Don’t focus exclusively on narrowing the gap. (2) Manufacture “common knowledge”. (3)Take care when narrowing the gap not to thwart bridging the gap. (shrink)

If persons fully own themselves and can acquire, by unilateral acts, unconditional full property rights to previously unowned natural resources, then by these same principles of property they also own the products of their property and of their labour. But (a) the principles of property are silent on the question of the division of joint products; (b) the market is a form of co-operation in production which makes the total social product a joint product. In the circumstances of an unrestrained (...) fully developed market, therefore, it is not fully determinate what one's product is. Thus the holdings that each person ends up with cannot be justified merely in terms of ownership of products. I offer an explanation of why some may resist this view of the market. (shrink)

If persons fully own themselves and can acquire, by unilateral acts, unconditional full property rights to previously unowned natural resources, then by these same principles of property they also own the products of their property and of their labour. But the principles of property are silent on the question of the division of joint products; the market is a form of co-operation in production which makes the total social product a joint product. In the circumstances of an unrestrained fully developed (...) market, therefore, it is not fully determinate what one's product is. Thus the holdings that each person ends up with cannot be justified merely in terms of ownership of products. I offer an explanation of why some may resist this view of the market. (shrink)