We worry about becoming non-existent, but not about coming into being. But both events are similarly bad according to Deprivationism; hence, it seems that we should display symmetric attitudes towards both. This entails the implausible conclusion that we should display negative attitudes towards the time of our birth. In a series of articles Brueckner and Fischer offered one of the most prominent attempts to block this conclusion by appealing to a temporal bias towards future pleasures. Inspired by Yi’s criticism of (...) their view, we argue that there is an appropriate sense of deprivation in which late birth can deprive of future pleasures. Hence, Brueckner and Fischer’s Temporal Bias does not explain the attitudinal asymmetry. In addition, to make sure that one picks out the appropriate sense of deprivation, we offer a restriction, the Historical Condition, that prevents us from considering that every value one would otherwise have is value that one was deprived of due to one’s actual birth/death. Finally, we present a novel account for the attitudinal asymmetry that relies on what we call ‘Interests Proximity Bias’. (shrink)

We argue that Anthropocentrism – the kind of speciesism that privilegies the human species – is morally unacceptable. We distinguish and criticize three varieties of Anthropocentrism: unqualified, qualified empirical and qualified non-empirical. Firstly, unqualified Anthropocentrism is dismissed because it is grounded on a moral principle which implies that discriminations like racism and sexism are justified. Secondly, qualified empirical Anthropocentrism falls victim to the marginal cases argument, an argument that shows that properties which allegedly attribute moral status to every human and (...) to no animal, ultimately, if they exclude every animal, they also exclude some humans. Lastly, qualified non-empirical Anthropocentrism is rejected due to implausible consequences about which individuals have moral status. After rejecting Anthropocentrism, we consider a generalization of the marginal cases argument against all forms of speciesism. We show that only a species entirely comprised of essentially moral individuals would be unaffected by this argument. However, the possibility of such a species has limited practical import. Contrarily, Anthropocentrism’s moral unacceptability requires profound changes in the way humans relate with animals. (shrink)

Crescimento econômico, combate à pobreza, a eficiência produtiva e a livre concorrência são afetados pela corrução. A globalização estreitou relações entre países e possibilitou um salto no fluxo de negócios em todo o mundo. Este movimento trouxe para empresas que operam em mercados globais, a necessidade de produzir com mais eficiência e agilidade. Por outro lado, criou ambiente mais favorável à corrupção. Governos e empresas se engajam no compromisso de tentar diminuí-la. Convenções internacionais promovem ações práticas para atingir este propósito. (...) A criação e aplicação de leis anticorrupção e o fomento às práticas de Compliance tem sido uma alternativa viável. (shrink)

MacFarlane (2014) advocates a radical form of semantic relativism. He argues that his proposal complies with the norms governing our assertion practices in various areas of discourse. These practices also include norms regarding the conditions in which it is inappropriate not to retract an assertion. Ferrari & Zeman (2014) identify an asymmetry concerning retractions in two relevant areas of discourse and argue that assessment-sensitivity needs to be supplemented with further theoretical tools to explain it. I dispel the asymmetry and conclude (...) that assessment-sensitivity needs no supplementation to account for it. (shrink)