In this essay, I argue that in Mengzi 2A2 Mengzi 孟子 proposes his method for cultivating righteousness by showing that on the way of achieving yi, such topics as the unperturbed hearts, cultivating courage, Gaozi’s 告子 maxim, and the flood-like qi 氣 ultimately converge. Toward this aim, first, I argue that Mengzi’s short remark “bi you shi yan er wu zheng, xin wu wang, wu zhu zhang 必有事焉而勿正, 心勿忘, 勿助長” can be read as his maxim for achieving yi that structurally (...) parallels with the preceding maxim of Gaozi that Mengzi quoted. It tells us that neither our blind obedience to the words nor our impetuous boost of qi is helpful for achieving yi; instead we should concentrate on the heart’s moral sentiments and perform righteous actions. Second, I argue that Mengzi believes that qi is crucial in one’s proper self-cultivation. The centrality of moral sentiment in his teaching redirects our attention to qi’s positive aspects—exemplified by the flood-like qi—though qi’s impulsivity often makes it appear negative. If the four sprouts are to accompany the spontaneous movement of qi, it can be said that properly expressed qi signals the moral health of one’s heart. Moreover, I show that strong positive qi not only constitutes moral sentiment that serves as a fair standard for self-examination but also leads the will to perform moral actions without delay. (shrink)

This essay investigates the structure and meaning of the Mengzi’s 孟子 analogical inferences in Mengzi 6A7. In this chapter, he argues that just as the perceptual masters allowed the discovery of our senses’ uniform preferences, the sages enabled us to recognize our hearts’ universal preferences for “order and righteousness.” Regarding an unresolved question of how the sages help us understand our hearts’ preferred objects as such, I propose a spectator-based moral artisanship reading as an alternative to an evaluator-focused moral connoisseurship (...) view: the sages are moral artisans who refine their moral achievements, and people’s uniform approval of their achievements—firmly associated with “order and righteousness”—demonstrates our hearts’ same natural preferences for them. Furthermore, I argue that this chapter’s conclusion—we and the sages are of the same kind with natural moral preferences—implies the necessity of our transition from passive spectators to active moral performers for moral self-cultivation. (shrink)

In this paper, I examine the notion of the ‘psychological dynamics’ that Professor Shun uses for explicating Confucian moral anger, based on David Hume’s (1711–76) psychological account of mind, to reconsider the role that object-based distinctions of emotions play in the Confucian moral tradition. First, by appealing to Hume’s investigation of the mental processes involved in feeling moral sentiments, I suggest that imagination, as a component in the ‘psychological dynamics’, explains how ‘dust’ settles on the mind to yield inappropriate emotional (...) responses. Second, by re-examining Confucius’s approval of Yan Hui’s moral anger, that he ‘never misdirects his anger’, I argue that though Confucians would not characterize the difference in emotional responses by distinguishing the first- and third-person perspectives, their goal of moral self-cultivation would encourage them to recognize the practical significance of distinguishing objects in situations, along with perceiving situations as a whole. While our minds as mental mirrors can reflect the whole situation, they are unique mirrors that resonate more vigorously with specific objects such as others’ minds. (shrink)

In this essay, I discuss Korean artists’ multi-layered, internal motives for engaging in artistic practices: their artistic devotion derives from their desires for moral self-cultivation, self-enjoyment, and self-forgetting. I speculate that these tendencies were intensified in Korean cultural traditions by distinctive sociopolitical circumstances of the Joseon period under the dominance of Neo-Confucianism, such as a fixed social hierarchy and Sino-centrist perspectives. This interpretation provides a useful lens for better understanding contemporary Korean artistic practices in both the fine and popular arts.

This essay examines the structural position of Mengzi’s 孟子 heart of compassion within his theoretical goal of teaching moral self-cultivation. I first investigate Kim Myeong-seok’s account that views ceyin zhi xin as a higher cognitive emotion with a concern-based construal. I argue that Kim’s conclusion is not sufficiently supported by the text of the Mengzi, but is also tarnished by the possibility of constructing a noncognitivist counter-theory of ceyin zhi xin. Instead, I suggest that David Hume’s causation-based approach to sentiment (...) provides an alternative route to reach the theoretical core of Mengzi’s ceyin zhi xin. People’s uniform moral sentiment as the effect of mental causation implies that there is a natural cause universally engraved in the human heart. As Mengzi’s practical teaching of moral self-cultivation begins with recognizing this heart of compassion, his focus is placed not upon the characteristics of the expressed emotion, but upon the universal presence of its natural cause in the human heart which demonstrates our moral potential to care for others. (shrink)

This essay investigates Dasan Jeong Yak‐yong's (1762–1836) account of human‐nature‐as‐taste, by comparing his commentaries on significant chapters in the Mengzi to Zhu Xi's commentaries. Dasan argues that human nature is understood through giho, taste sentiments and desires, and not as Principle (li). I first introduce Dasan's account of human‐nature‐as‐taste in his commentaries to 3A1 and 7A4. Next, I argue that giho is most appropriately translated as “taste,” because this term captures the dispositional characteristics of giho as a mental faculty as (...) well as its mental effects, such as desires, sentiments, and preferences. I then examine Dasan's and Zhu Xi's commentaries on 6A7 and 6A6, to illustrate how Dasan's view of human‐nature‐as‐taste interprets the chapters differently from Zhu Xi's metaphysical account of human‐nature‐as‐Principle, which Dasan considers as unsupported by the philological and contextual grounds. This exploration of Dasan's empirical account of human‐nature‐as‐taste, serving as a preliminary for a philosophical study of his reinterpretation of the Confucian Classics and his performative account of moral self‐cultivation, will provide us with an alternative perspective to the Neo‐Confucian metaphysic‐epistemic account of human nature. (shrink)

This chapter expores the similarities and differences between the virtue theories of Mencius (372–289 BCE) and David Hume (1711–1776 CE). Their individual explications of virtue, the main topics of their moral philosophies, focus on the sentiments. Mencius, concerned with teaching moral self-cultivation, believes that the sentiments are the grounds for achieving virtue. Hume, who aims at an empirical theory of moral evaluation, maintains that we determine a character trait as virtue through the moral sentiments. Given their moral foundation of sentiments, (...) two frameworks of comparison are available:epistemic and structural comparisons. The former examines the philosophers’ views of the epistemic characteristics of sentiment as they relate to virtue and morality. The latter investigates how their virtue theories have a parallel structure based on the general characteristics of sentiment. I argue that a structural comparison deepens our understanding of Mencius’s views about the virtues and their cultivation. Next, I suggest that Hume’s scientific inquiry into moral evaluation informs us of another aspect of Mencius’s sentiment-based virtue. Considering the causal process involved in the arousal of sentiments, Mencius’s heart of compassion should be regarded as a mental cause that renders human nature inherently good and not as a mental effect of an aroused sentiment. Moreover, I argue that, because virtue-related sentiments take two sorts of intentional objects—one’s self and others—we can classify Mencius’s and Hume’s virtues into other-regarding and self-regarding virtues. Mencius’s cardinal virtues of Ren and Yi correspond to Hume’s humanity and dignity. (shrink)

These two volumes of the Analects of Dasan indicate that Hongkyung Kim's translation project has passed the halfway mark to the completion of a six-volume set of Noneo Gogeum Ju ) written by Dasan Jeong Yak-yong. This series basically delivers Dasan's commentaries on the Analects, but his meticulous and critical investigations about all the resources accessible to him, from the ancient Chinese commentaries of He Yan to the views of Japanese scholars such as Dazai Zun, allow us to engage comprehensive (...) references to each chapter in detail. Since the release of its first volume in the Fall of 2016, this series has proved itself an invaluable... (shrink)

Dasan Jeong Yak-yong has been revered as one of the national intellectual heroes in Korea. Dasan's dramatic life career—acclaimed as a young elite government official, beloved by the King, but exiled for 18 years due to his family's association with Catholicism —is common knowledge to contemporary Koreans, as he is a frequent character on various television dramas, and his birth and death sites are places of pilgrimage. Dasan's cultural fame is underpinned by two intellectual pillars: one is his practical theories (...) for sociopolitical reformation that follow the scholarly tradition of "Practical Learning (silhak... (shrink)