Revision of the author's thesis--Frankfurt am Main, 2009.

Contrasting two standard models of corporate responsibility—the so-called “collectivist” and “individualist” model—this essay proposes a third option, namely, a discursive conception of responsibility and examines whether and how this conception can be applied to the corporate level. It does so by taking a careful look at one of the preconditions of individual discursive responsibility, i.e. discursive practical reason, and discussing how corporate agents can meet this precondition. Building on this new concept, the essay also offers a novel approach to justifying (...) corporate responsibility by referring to an argument advanced by Rainer Forst stating that a fundamental human right to justification is the normative core of any kind of responsibility and combining it, in a second step, with an argument recently proposed by Philip Pettit and Christian List showing the impossibility of forming consistent group attitudes and beliefs as a function of the attitudes and beliefs of individual group members. Finally, this essay outlines certain preliminary conclusions about the incorporation of responsibility in a corporate context. (shrink)

This article examines Kant’s understanding of moral progress, especially in his Religion where he argues that religion and, more importantly, the foundation of an ethical community are necessary to promote moral progress. However, it is less the identification of any factual moral progress but rather the idea of moral progress as an action guiding principle that Kant identifies as central. The conclusion shows how Kant’s insights are in accordance with the argument that we should not look for comprehensive moral progress (...) in history but adhere to the idea of possible future moral progress. (shrink)

Post- and decolonial theory have contested the idea of historical progress as a Eurocentric, hegemonic, or neocolonialist misconception. Does this imply that we should give up any idea of moral progress? This paper critically examines Allen Buchanan’s and Russell Powell’s book The Evolution of Moral Progress and their claim that there is still a need for a theory of moral progress. For Buchanan and Powell, such theory should allow and guide a better understanding of what moral progress consists of. Even (...) though they do not claim to already provide us with such a comprehensive theory of moral progress they aim to work out whether and how certain types of moral progress are possible and assess their limits. In doing so they mainly focus on improvements in terms of social participation as an uncontroversial type of moral progress. In the following, I will first discuss the characteristics of the authors’ notion of progress and then raise some critical concerns about the example they have chosen of the history of human rights as a history of progress and, particularly, about the history of the rights of people with disabilities. (shrink)

This paper seeks to defend the thesis that a justification of morality has to underline the role of the second person in addition to a perpetual and on-going change of perspective that likewise includes the third and first person. To support this argument, the paper conceptualises responsibility as a moral relationship whose core constitutes the encounter with the other whom we recognise as a second-person authority. It then sketches how this pre-cognitive dimension must be supplemented by a cognitive insight which (...) implies a dissociation from the second person and a consideration of third persons. on this basis, it finally provides an outline of how a possible tension between these different but all-together necessary perspectives could best be resolved. (shrink)

In this paper I investigate the limits of toleration using the example of the German debate on dealing with opponents of the covid vaccination. First, I present central elements of Rainer Forst’s conception of tolerance. I then refer to an important historical context of the emergence of tolerance and, using Pierre Bayle’s conception, show that the demand for tolerance of his time was limited to a specific context, but allows for some generalizations. Finally, I argue that we have to tolerate (...) those who see themselves as “Querdenker” (“lateral thinkers”) as long as their opposition does not violate applicable laws and thus endanger the framework of our democratic and constitutional order. Keywords: Toleration, limits of toleration, societal cohesion, covid vaccination, Pierre Bayle, Rainer Forst, Wendy Brown. (shrink)

Introduction to the Special Issue "Responsibility - a Contested Concept".

This paper outlines Lévinas’ conception of responsibility as non-intentional relatedness to the Other, a conception he regards as constitutive of human subjectivity. In doing so, it uncovers parallels between Lévinas’ interpretation of Judaism and his philosophical works. In the latter, he develops his account of ethics as a critique of the philosophical tradition which risks, according to Lévinas, missing the fundamental ethical dimension of the human’s being. Finally, the paper explores the question of whether it is possible to draw on (...) Lévinas in order to develop an alternative approach to political philosophy. (shrink)

In der moralphilosophischen Literatur existieren verschiedene Auffassungen darüber, worauf die Autorität moralischer Normen basiert. Einige Moralphilosophen führen das moralische Sollen auf die Vernunft, das Wohlwollen oder auch auf die Wahrnehmung moralischer Tatsachen zurück; andere dagegen meinen, dass das moralische Sollen auf äußeren Sanktionen wie sozialem Ausschluss oder inneren Sanktionen wie Schuldgefühlen beruht. Die sowohl in der Geschichte der Philosophie als auch in der gegenwärtigen Auseinandersetzung häufig vertretene Meinung, dass moralische Verpflichtung notwendig an Sanktionierung geknüpft ist, wird aus verschiedenen Perspektiven kritisch (...) untersucht. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie Jahrgang: 64 Heft: 2 Seiten: 232-245.

Der Schwerpunkt versammelt vier Aufsätze, die sich mit dem Verhältnis der philosophischen Begriffe „Verantwortung“ und „Pflicht“ beschäftigen. Obwohl diese beiden Begriffe einander sehr ähnlich sind und beide in der praktischen Philosophie eine wichtige Rolle spielen, gibt es kaum Untersuchungen zu der Frage, in welcher Beziehung beide Begriffe zueinander stehen. Drei Weisen, das Verhältnis zwischen Verantwortung und Pflicht zu bestimmen, scheinen naheliegend: 1. Die Begriffe sind synonym zu verstehen; 2. Verantwortung ist der zentrale Begriff; 3. Pflicht ist der zentrale Begriff. In (...) dieser Einleitung werden diese drei möglichen Positionen skizziert und die vier Texte des Schwerpunktes vorgestellt. (shrink)