Niniejszy esej stanowi piąty rozdział tomu The Realm of Spirit kończącego cykl The Realms of Being. Podstawą przekładu jest pierwsze wydanie dzieła: George Santayana, The Realms of Being (London: Constable and Co., Ltd., Toronto: The Macmillan Company, 1940), 67–89. -/- This essay is the fifth chapter of The Realm of Spirit volume concluding The Realms of Being series. The translation is based on the first edition of the work: George Santayana, The Realms of Being (London: Constable and Co., Ltd., Toronto: (...) The Macmillan Company, 1940), 67-89. (shrink)

Most of Polish translations of David Hume’s essays have been collected in two well-known volumes edited by T. Tatarkiewiczowa and Ł. Pawłowski, but some of them were also published in various scientific journals. Moreover, some are also available in two, or even three Polish versions, whereas some were not available in Polish until they were translated and published in several issues of this journal. The dissipation of translations and functioning of various versions of their titles cause problems for Hume scholarship (...) in Poland. In answer to this problem the article collates all existing Polish translations of Hume’s essays. (shrink)

_Three Stoic Exercises _is the first Polish translation, done by Adam Grzeliński, of three excerpts from Shaftesbury’s notebooks: _Character and Conduct_, _Attention and Relaxation_, and _Improvement _being part included in the collection entitled _Askêmata_. These texts prove that these notebooks not only complement the contents of _Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, and Times_, the three-volume set which made Shaftesbury a famous and influential philosopher, but they are to be seen mainly as a kind of moral exercises and soliloquies (...) in which Shaftesbury comments the works of the stoics: Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius. (shrink)

The Self is the first Polish translation of an excerpt from Shaftesbury’s notebooks entitled Askêmata. The text proves that these notebooks not only complement the contents of his Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times, the three-volume set which made Shaftesbury a famous and influential philosopher but is to be seen mainly as a kind of moral exercises and soliloquies in which Shaftesbury comments the works of the stoics: Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius. In one of the previous issues of „Folia Philosophica” (...) three other excerpts from the same set were published: Character and Conduct, Attention and Relaxation, and Improvement; the present one is a continuation of the series. (shrink)

John Locke’s medical interests resulted in several short texts in which he criticizes two theoretical conceptions of his days, paracelsianism and galenism. Two of the texts – ‘ Morbus’ and ‘ Anatomia’ – show the influence of Thomas Sydenham on Locke’s understanding of medicine which can be summarized as a turn towards clinical medicine and empirical investigations. The article reconstructs this early stage of the development of Locke’s standpoint leading to ‘ An Essay Concerning Human Understanding’.

Artykuł rekonstruuje najważniejsze elementy filozofii polityki Dawida Hume’a dotyczące możliwość ukonstytuowania się państwa. Zdaniem szkockiego filozofa warunkiem wyjścia ze stanu natury jest określenie praw własności, które w dalszej konsekwencji prowadzi do stworzenia prawa pozytywnego oraz wskazania reguł sprawowania władzy. Hume wskazuje na psychologiczne przesłanki powstania państwa, odnajdując je w naturalnej dla wszystkich ludzi motywacji egoistycznej i ograniczonej życzliwości. Wizja powstania państwa, wynikająca ze sposobu, w jaki Hume rozumiał udział rozumu i namiętności w ludzkim doświadczeniu, stanowi jednocześnie kontynuację krytycznego namysłu nad (...) filozofią praktyczną wywodzącą się w brytyjskiej filozofii od Locke’a i Hobbesa. (shrink)

Kartezjanizm i antykartezjanizm locke’owskiej koncepcji tożsamości osobowej Niniejszy artykuł koncentruje się na zależnościach pomiędzy Locke’owskim i kartezjańskim pojmowaniem tożsamości osobowej. Wbrew częstym odczytaniom, różnica pomiędzy nimi nie daje się sprowadzić do prostego przeciwstawienia substancjalizmu i empiryzmu. Locke nie rezygnuje ze stanowiska substancjalistycznego, jednakże rozgranicza dwie sfery — naturalnego, bazującego na doświadczeniu poznania oraz filozoficznych spekulacji, w których stara się przedstawić racjonalną i zgodną ze swym programem epistemologicznym interpretację dogmatów religijnych. Krytyka Locke’a dotyczy możliwości istnienia rzeczy myślącej jako substancji istniejącej niezależnie (...) od ciała, natomiast rozbudowaniu w stosunku do filozofii kartezjańskiej ulega opis różnicowania się doświadczenia i ludzkiej subiektywności, zaś pojęcie tożsamości osobowej zyskuje eksplikację na czterech uzupełniających się poziomach: psychologicznym, biologicznym, społeczno-prawnym i religijnym. (shrink)

Brytyjska estetyka została w XVIII wieku zapoczątkowana pracami A.A.C. Shaftesbury’ego i Josepha Addisona. Shaftesbury jako pierwszy wskazał na specyfikę doświadczenia estetycznego, odmiennego od bezpośredniego doznania zmysłowego, odwołując się do pojęć zmysłu wewnętrznego ( inward sense ) oraz bezinteresowności jako warunku tego doświadczenia. Do wyobraźni czytelników przemawiał pochodzący z Moralistów przykład pasterza podziwiającego piękno oceanu: „Doża, jako pan młody, który w majestatycznym bucentaurze płynie na łonie swej Tetydy – mówi jeden z rozmówców tego dialogu – posiada mniej niż biedny pasterz, który, (...) swobodnie wyciągnięty na zwisającej skale lub szczycie wysokiego cypla, zapomina o swych stadach i podziwia piękno oceanu” [Shaftesbury 1790, 328]. Ocena piękna wiąże się z przyjemnością płynącą z kontemplacji zjawisk, nie odnosi się do realnego istnienia przedmiotów. Pojęcie bezinteresowności w filozofii Shaftesbury’ego rozumiane jest jednak znacznie szerzej. Oznacza ono pewien sposób percypowania zjawisk poddanych kontemplacji i osądowi estetycznemu. Skoro zaś smak estetyczny opiera się na odrębnej władzy zmysłu wewnętrznego, podmiotowego warunku doświadczenia piękna, bezinteresowność odwołuje się także do określonej postawy, gdy obserwator porzuca własne, indywidualne upodobanie (związane z doznawaniem przyjemności, nie zaś piękna), a wydaje sąd, który ma mieć charakter obiektywny. Podając powody zepsucia smaku, Shaftesbury pisze m.in. (shrink)

"Adam Wiegner's work belongs to Polish analytical philosophy, but it falls outside of its main current, the Lvov-Warsaw School, which was influenced by Hume's ideas. Wiegner, influenced by neo-Kantianism, developed a non-Humean conception of "holistic empiricism," which anticipates some of the ideas of K. R. Popper and W. V. O. Quine. Some of his ideas remain original to this day. His main research interests included epistemology, philosophy of mind, philosophy of science especially philosophy of psychology, analytical history of philosophy, (...) and interpretation of traditional logic in terms of mathematical logic."--BOOK JACKET. (shrink)

From folk tales to movies, stories possess features which naturally suit them to contribute to the growth of virtue. In this article I show that the fictional exemplars help the learner to grasp the moral importance of internal states and resolves a tension between existing kinds of exemplars discussed by virtue ethicists. Stories also increase the information conveyed by virtue terms and aid the growth of prudence. Stories can provide virtuous exemplars, inform learners as to the nature of the virtues (...) and offer practice in developing situational judgement. As such they are a significant resource for virtue ethics and moral education. (shrink)

W. Matthews Grant's "Dual Sources Account" aims at explaining how God causes all creaturely actions while leaving them free in a robust libertarian sense. It includes an account of predestination that is supposed to allow for the possibility that some created persons ultimately spend eternity in hell. I argue here that the resources Grant provides for understanding why God might permit created persons to end up in hell are, for two different reasons, insufficient. I then provide possible solutions to these (...) two problems, compatible with Grant's account overall, that help show why God might allow hell. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that both defence and criticism of the claim that humans act ‘under the guise of the good’ neglects the metaphysical roots of the theory. I begin with an overview of the theory and its modern commentators, with critics noting the apparent possibility of acting against the good, and supporters claiming that such actions are instances of error. These debates reduce the ‘guise of the good’ to a claim about intention and moral action, and in so (...) doing have become divorced from the theory's roots in classical and medieval philosophy. Aristotle and Aquinas’ ‘guise of the good’ is primarily a metaphysical claim resting on the equivalence between actuality and goodness, from which conclusions about moral action are derived. I show the reasoning behind their theory and how it forms the basis for the claims about intention and action at the centre of the modern debate. Finally, I argue that the absence of its original foundation is apparent in recent attacks on the ‘guise of the good’. It is unsurprising that modern action theory and ethics have not always been able to comfortably accommodate the ‘guise of the good’; they are only telling half of the story. (shrink)

Are animals moral agents? In this article, a theologian and an anthropologist unite to bring the resources of each field to bear on this question. Alas, not all interdisciplinary conversations end harmoniously, and after much discussion the two authors find themselves in substantial disagreement over the answer. The article is therefore presented in two halves, one for each side of the argument. As well as presenting two different positions, our hope is that this article clarifies the different understandings of morality (...) in our respective fields and will help to offset confusion in interdisciplinary dialogue. In what follows, we each present our case. In the first section, Adam Willows argues that moral activity necessarily involves the use of reason, symbolic thought, and language and is on that basis an exclusively human affair. In the second, Marcus Baynes-Rock discusses his experience of relationality with other creatures; a relationality which, he argues, creates a shared understanding of obligations which are characteristically moral. (shrink)

How should you take into account the opinions of an advisor? When you completely defer to the advisor's judgment, then you should treat the advisor as a guru. Roughly, that means you should believe what you expect she would believe, if supplied with your extra evidence. When the advisor is your own future self, the resulting principle amounts to a version of the Reflection Principle---a version amended to handle cases of information loss. When you count an advisor as an epistemic (...) peer, you should give her conclusions the same weight as your own. Denying that view---call it the ``equal weight view''---leads to absurdity: the absurdity that you could reasonably come to believe yourself to be an epistemic superior to an advisor simply by noting cases of disagreement with her, and taking it that she made most of the mistakes. Accepting the view seems to lead to another absurdity: that one should suspend judgment about everything that one's smart and well-informed friends disagree on, which means suspending judgment about almost everything interesting. But despite appearances, the equal weight view does not have this absurd consequence. Furthermore, the view can be generalized to handle cases involving not just epistemic peers, but also epistemic superiors and inferiors. (shrink)

The foundation for a system of morals, this 1749 work is a landmark of moral and political thought. Its highly original theories of conscience, moral judgment, and virtue offer a reconstruction of the Enlightenment concept of social science, embracing both political economy and theories of law and government.

The resemblance is plain to see between Kripke’s Wittgenstein introducing bizarre rules such as quaddition (in illustrating the sceptical paradox against theories of meaning) and Goodman’s introducing the equally bizarre grue (in generating the new riddle of induction). But the two sorts of bizarre cases also differ in interesting respects. For those familiar with Goodman’s case, this similarity sparks a strong temptation to enlist to the meaning sceptic’s cause key elements of Goodman’s new riddle, which are missing from Kripke’s case. (...) In this essay, I characterize a natural way of doing just this, which targets dispositionalist solutions to the sceptical paradox. I also show that, despite initial appearances, this new objection to dispositionalism (the symmetry problem) is not nearly as worrisome as originally thought. The solution offered on behalf of semantic dispositionalists does require a trade-off, though, from the severe form of indeterminacy advanced by the meaning sceptic to a much milder thesis. (shrink)

A scholarly edition of a work by Adam Smith. The edition presents an authoritative text, together with an introduction, commentary notes, and scholarly apparatus.