This chapter outlines ways in which Wittgenstein’s opposition to scientism is manifest in his later conception of philosophy and the negative attitude he held toward his times. The chapter tries to make clear how these two areas of Wittgenstein’s thought are connected and reflect an anti-scientistic worldview he held, one intimated in Philosophical Investigations §122. -/- It is argued that the later Wittgenstein’s metaphilosophy is marked out against two scientistic claims in particular. First, the view that the scientific method is (...) superior to all other means of learning or gaining knowledge. Second, the view that scientific knowledge is superior to all other kinds of knowledge and understanding. Wittgenstein’s opposition to these claims is brought out through examining a fundamental aim of his later philosophy, producing the ‘kind of understanding which consists in “seeing connections”’ (PI §122), and his attempts to expose certain philosophical confusions. It is argued that these reflect his antiscientistic worldview. -/- Through discussion of Oswald Spengler’s influence on Wittgenstein, the chapter outlines how Wittgenstein’s opposition to scientism underwrites his negative cultural outlook and how this is connected with the anti-scientistic elements of his later philosophy discussed. The work of Ray Monk (1999; 1990) and Hans-Johann Glock (1996) is instrumental in what follows. (shrink)

Wittgenstein criticised prevailing attitudes toward the sciences. The target of his criticisms was ‘scientism’: what he described as ‘the overestimation of science’. This collection is the first study of Wittgenstein’s anti-scientism - a theme in his work that is clearly central to his thought yet strikingly neglected by the existing literature. The book explores the philosophical basis of Wittgenstein’s anti-scientism; how this anti-scientism helps us understand Wittgenstein’s philosophical aims; and how this underlies his later conception of philosophy and the kind (...) of philosophy he attacked. An outstanding team of international contributors articulate and critically assess Wittgenstein’s views on scientism and anti-scientism, making Wittgenstein and Scientism essential reading for students and scholars of Wittgenstein’s work, on topics as varied as the philosophy of mind and psychology, philosophical practice, the nature of religious belief, and the place of science in modern culture. (shrink)

“Tell me," Wittgenstein once asked a friend, "why do people always say, it was natural for man to assume that the sun went round the earth rather than that the earth was rotating?" His friend replied, "Well, obviously because it just looks as though the Sun is going round the Earth." Wittgenstein replied, "Well, what would it have looked like if it had looked as though the Earth was rotating?” What would it have looked like if we looked at all (...) sciences from the viewpoint of Wittgenstein’s philosophy? Wittgenstein is undoubtedly one of the most influential philosophers of the twentieth century. His complex body of work has been analysed by numerous scholars, from mathematicians and physicists, to philosophers, linguists, and beyond. This volume brings together some of his central perspectives as applied to the modern sciences and studies the influence they may have on the thought processes underlying science and on the world view it engenders. The contributions stem from leading scholars in philosophy, mathematics, physics, economics, psychology and human sciences; all of them have written in an accessible style that demands little specialist knowledge, whilst clearly portraying and discussing the deep issues at hand. (shrink)

A mysterious remark to Friedrich Waismann on 30 December 1929 marks the only occasion where Wittgenstein refers to both Heidegger and Kierkegaard. Yet although this has generated much controversy, little attention has been paid to the charge of nonsense that Wittgenstein here appears to bring against Heidegger; thus, the supporting argument that may be latent has not been unearthed. Through analysis of this remark, Wittgenstein's arguments in the Tractatus and 'A Lecture on Ethics', and Heidegger's account of anxiety (Angst) in (...) Being and Time, I argue that we can extract an argument against the central question of Heidegger's philosophy: the question of being. To understand this, I examine the Kierkegaardian ideas employed by Wittgenstein and Heidegger and attempt to show that this argument can be partly understood in Kierkegaardian terms. I further argue that examining what Heidegger means by 'being' (Sein) shows that Wittgenstein's argument does not meet its target. (shrink)

Volume 27, Issue 1, February 2019, Page 73-102.

The dominant interpretation of the later Wittgenstein as a naturalist is that he endorses a form of liberal naturalism. This chapter argues that liberal naturalism cannot be ascribed to Wittgenstein for four reasons: first, liberal naturalism offers an ontology; second, liberal naturalism can be construed as a theory; third, Wittgenstein sometimes appears to be hostile towards science; fourth, Wittgenstein does not reject all forms of supernaturalism. It is argued that Wittgenstein’s later philosophy can nonetheless be described as ‘naturalistic’ for two (...) reasons. First, observations concerning natural facts play an important role in his method of providing surveyable representations of grammar. Second, his opposition to metaphysics and the absence of recourse to metaphysical phenomena in his philosophical investigations. While ascribing naturalism to the later Wittgenstein is misleading because of the four caveats raised, the chapter suggests that if we are to describe the later Wittgenstein as a naturalist, his position can be described as such insofar as there are the two naturalistic strands in his later philosophy, both of which are important to his method of grammatical investigation. This position is dubbed ‘grammatical naturalism’. (shrink)

The dominant interpretation of the later Wittgenstein as a naturalist is that he endorses a form of liberal naturalism. This chapter argues that liberal naturalism cannot be ascribed to Wittgenstein for four reasons: first, liberal naturalism offers an ontology; second, liberal naturalism can be construed as a theory; third, Wittgenstein sometimes appears to be hostile towards science; fourth, Wittgenstein does not reject all forms of supernaturalism. It is argued that Wittgenstein’s later philosophy can nonetheless be described as ‘naturalistic’ for two (...) reasons. First, observations concerning natural facts play an important role in his method of providing surveyable representations of grammar. Second, his opposition to metaphysics and the absence of recourse to metaphysical phenomena in his philosophical investigations. While ascribing naturalism to the later Wittgenstein is misleading because of the four caveats raised, the chapter suggests that if we are to describe the later Wittgenstein as a naturalist, his position can be described as such insofar as there are the two naturalistic strands in his later philosophy, both of which are important to his method of grammatical investigation. This position is dubbed ‘grammatical naturalism’. (shrink)