Some argue that same-sex marriage is not an equal rights issue because, where same-sex marriage is illegal, heterosexuals and homosexuals have the exact same right to marry—i.e., the right to marry one adult of the opposite sex. I dispute this argument by pointing out that while societies that prohibit same-sex marriage equally permit individual heterosexuals and homosexuals to marry one adult of the opposite sex, same-sex couples in such societies are denied an important right that opposite-sex couples enjoy—i.e., the right (...) to marry. I argue that the right to marry is fundamentally, not an individual right, but a couple’s collective right, analogous to assembly rights. (shrink)

This article criticizes Mathias Risse and Richard Zeckhauser's recent utilitarian defense of racial profiling. I use a novel thought-experiment to argue that even if a negative phenomenon could be reduced by profiling members of certain groups who happen to be disproportionately associated with it, the practice can be implausible. Specifically, I explore the possibility that in a given society, platinum blondes have a higher per capita incidence of a serious sexually transmitted disease, D. And I argue that doctors and health (...) officials in the society would not be justified in profiling such blondes, given that there is nothing about being a platinum blonde that causes one to have D. (shrink)

Rape is an important topic in feminist philosophy and the real world. This paper argues that three influential feminists understate the gravity and brutality of rape. They are Andrea Dworkin, Catharine MacKinnon, and Rae Langton. I also propose an alternative analysis of rape that captures its appalling nature. Dworkin and MacKinnon construe rape as something that actors in pornography, with notoriously poor acting skills, can portray as pleasurable. Langton construes rape as a kind of sex act: as sex that is (...) “unwanted,” “unconsensual,” “refused,” or “forced.” I argue that rape and sex are categorically distinct. Rape is an act of violence, not an act of sex. I argue that rape occurs when 1) the genitals, fingers, or hands of one subject, or a foreign object, penetrate the genitals or anus of another subject and 2) one subject (the victim): (a) refuses to penetrate the other’s genitals or anus with one’s genitals, (b) refuses to have one’s genitals or anus penetrated by the other’s genitals, fingers, or hands, or a foreign object; or (c) is incapable of thus refusing (e.g., because one is unconscious, dissociating, or suffering debilitating fear). (shrink)

This paper argues that illegal migrant laborers who are currently in the United States should be granted permanent residency if they have contributed to its economy for a certain period of time, which I will not attempt to specify, and if they have not committed any serious crimes in the country . My argument is theoretical and tentative. For some of my points would benefit from empirical support, but there are no definitive statistics on the relevant issues. The aim, accordingly, (...) is to create a framework, and I hope a demand, for empirical investigations of illegal immigration that could lend factual support to my claims. (shrink)

This article challenges an important argument in the abortion debate, according to which at least early abortions are acceptable because they do not terminate the actual existence of something of moral significance (i.e., a ‘person’), but rather prevent a potentially significant entity from becoming actual, which happens whenever one uses contraceptives.This article argues that insofar as we see something as morally significant or valuable, we tend to think it wrong to deliberately terminate its actual existence and to deliberately prevent a (...) corresponding potential entity from becoming actual, a principle I call the ‘Inverse Proportional Value Principle’. After defending this principle and showing it to oppose the idea that abortion is acceptable since it simply prevents the existence of something of moral worth or value, I show this principle to sanction some abortions, given that the entity which stands to result from a pregnancy is sufficiently lacking in value. (shrink)

Reginald Williams offers a novel approach to the problem of evil.

This paper discusses, from a moral psychology perspective, the putative fact that many people's socio-economic status makes it difficult for them to live what their philosophical thinking suggests is a fully moral life—an under-appreciated fact, or better phenomenon, that I call 'culturo-socio-divergence'. Section 1 explicates my distinction between 'culture' and 'society' . Section 2 highlights some ways in which the culture and society in America can be seen as divergent, and section 3 discusses the significance of this divergence for moral (...) psychology, linking the experience of culturo-socio-divergence with that of both guilt and shame. Finally, section 4 sketches this paper's implications for future research. (shrink)

Thomas Nagel has recently discussed whether intelligent design theory is scientific and should be taught in public schools alongside the theory of evolution . Nagel writes: I do not regard divine intervention as a possibility, even though I have no other candidates. Yet I recognize that this is because of an aspect of my overall worldview that does not rest on empirical grounds or any other kind of rational grounds…. [S]omeone who can offer serious scientific reasons to doubt the adequacy (...) of [ET], and who believes in God, in the same immediate way that I believe there is no god, can quite reasonably conclude that the hypothesis of design should be taken seriously. , pp. 187–205, p. 192.). (shrink)

Thomas Nagel has recently discussed whether intelligent design theory is scientific and should be taught in public schools alongside the theory of evolution. Nagel writes: I do not regard divine intervention as a possibility, even though I have no other candidates. Yet I recognize that this is because of an aspect of my overall worldview that does not rest on empirical grounds or any other kind of rational grounds…. [S]omeone who can offer serious scientific reasons to doubt the adequacy of (...) [ET], and who believes in God, in the same immediate way that I believe there is no god, can quite reasonably conclude that the hypothesis of design should be taken seriously., pp. 187–205, p. 192.). (shrink)

Many who write on race consider it an ‘illusion’. Others argue that race is real, even if socially constructed, because the notion of race, and the categorizing of people in terms of race, has greatly affected their lives. This paper criticizes a reason that is often given for thinking that race is an illusion: the fact that there is no biological basis of race. I defend two primary claims. First, while there is no biological basis for membership in a socio-economic (...) class, by which I mean one's being relatively affluent or poor in a particular society, no one takes socio-economic class to be an illusion. Second, race is arguably a more fundamental reality than is socio-economic class. For one's racial identity can causally contribute to, and account at least partly for, one's membership in a socio-economic class. But membership in a socio-economic class does not thus contribute to, or account for, people's racial identities. (shrink)

Many people claim that you can't prove or disprove God's existence. But why would anybody think you could? What's such a proof or disproof supposed to look like?