While there are good reasons to think that Hegel would not engage with modern scepticism in the Science of Logic, this article argues that he nevertheless does so in a way that informs the text's conception of logic as the latter pertains to metaphysics. Hegel engages with modern scepticism's general concerns that philosophy should begin without unexamined presuppositions and should come to attain not only knowledge of truth, but corresponding second-order knowledge: knowledge of knowing truth. These concerns inform two needs (...) that Hegel formulates for first philosophy, which logic—by unifying with metaphysics, which is traditionally synonymous with first philosophy—is to satisfy. However, logic, for the Logic, is unified with metaphysics as a science of absolute knowing, the form of thinking involved in traditional metaphysics. As such, logic, for the Logic, is neither anti-metaphysical nor reducible to metaphysics, but is rather a science of metaphysical thinking, which, for Hegel, includes metaphysics. The article emphasizes how Hegel's construal of logic as a science of absolute knowing avoids running into the ‘swimming problem’ that Hegel raises against, broadly, epistemological forms of first philosophy. (shrink)

This paper identifies and articulates a historicist turn in theorising the human senses initiated by Feuerbach and Marx. Both philosophers retain their predecessors’ view that human needs determine human senses, but they identify historical contingencies of human needs that they treat as introducing historical contingency into the character of the human senses. In accounting for Feuerbach’s and Marx’s respective historicisations of the human senses, this paper challenges some commonplace ideas expressed by Honneth and Joas about German philosophical anthropology in general (...) as well as, more specifically, Marx’s critique of Feuerbach and the philosophical-anthropological legacy of Marxian thought. (shrink)

This article accounts for how Kant’s understanding of enlightenment gives normative, communicative structure to public reason as a practice. Kantian public reason is argued to be collegial. As public reasoners promoting our enlightenment, we should seek optimal scrutiny from a generally unrestricted, intellectually and epistemically diverse audience. To receive this scrutiny, we should communicate in a way that facilitates this audience’s ability to scrutinise our views – situating others as our colleagues – which in turn facilitates their promotion of their (...) own enlightenment. As a practice in which we help others promote their enlightenment by helping them help us promote ours, Kantian public reason is argued to be cooperative. But intriguingly, Kant offers a sufficient justification for this cooperative communication on first-personal grounds. The article details some of Kant’s more concrete thoughts on how we should communicate as public reasoners, and concludes by appraising his parsimonious justification of collegial communication as a resource for addressing contemporary concerns about public discourse. (shrink)

In this essay, I examine how Cavell's discussion of the challenges and attendant risks faced by artworks to be genuine rather than "fraudulent" informs his discussion of the challenges and attendant risks faced by art critics to offer interpretations rather than misinterpretations of artworks. Moreover, I clarify how this relation between Cavell's philosophy of art and his philosophy of criticism is mediated by his discussion of modernism. For Cavell, modernism does not so much introduce challenges for artworks as exacerbate them. (...) In doing so, modernism also exacerbates the challenges faced by art critics. In exacerbating rather than introducing these challenges, modernism has a revelatory significance for arts criticism. Namely, it reveals that the difference between imposing meaning upon an artwork ("reading into it") and illuminating an artwork ("hearing it out") is non-criterial, such that good arts criticism necessarily resembles bad, even "fraudulent" arts criticism. With this challenge in clear view, Cavell argues the art critic must accept the hermeneutical risk of imposing meaning upon a work in order to illuminate it by embracing rather than discounting or bracketing her subjectivity. Attempting to avoid this risk denies what modernism reveals about arts criticism, and accordingly, Cavell argues, it both fails and introduces new hermeneutical risks. (shrink)