Continental Philosophy

Philosophy of aesthetics and beauty has traditionally prioritized the sense of vision while deprioritizing the more basic-bodily and thus less “noble” sense of touch. This paper examines bodily aspects of how beauty appears in the experience of visual art and motivates the view that touch is fundamental to such experiences. We appeal to Merleau-Ponty to show the relevance given to touch in his phenomenology of aesthetics, to unfold the meaning of touch as “reversible,” and to understand how vision can be (...) conceptualized as a form of touch. Further, we present four cases of feeling touched by beauty in experiences of visual art collected through interviews with art museum visitors. The descriptions of these experiences show that when people open themselves to an artwork they also open themselves to themselves. Based on the qualitative descriptions, we discuss how Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of touch is revelatory of the meaning of feeling “touched” in experiences of beauty. (shrink)

The question of how other consciousnesses appear via media has forced us to re-think the classical phenomenological accounts of sociality. However, as the phenomenological account of empathy is very much centred around the perception of the other’s living body, it has faced challenges in discussing the empathic experience in media-based contexts, where we cannot perceive the other’s body, but something else, such as a screen or a text. In this article, I provide the concept for describing the perceived object in (...) media-based empathy: a living textual body, based on Edith Stein’s concept of Wortleib (a living word body) referring to words as “living,” as bearers of meaning in her early work On the Problem of Empathy [Zum Problem der Einfühlung]. I divide the term Wortleib in two different cases—the empathic and non-empathic object—and thereby argue that, while the object of media-based empathic experience cannot be the other’s body, it is an empathic Wortleib, a communicative empathic object. While Stein herself discussed media-based empathy merely in paper media, I demonstrate the unique usefulness of these concepts in analysing any media-based communication and thus the timeliness of her work in this respect. (shrink)

Defensores do princípio da precaução propõem com frequência mudanças nas práticas científicas, para que elas facilitem o mesmo objetivo do princípio: evitar ameaças incertas ao ambiente ou à saúde humana. A ciência deveria ser uma ciência precautória. Apesar da importância prática da ciência precautória e da sua proximidade com os debates sobre ciência e valores, ela ainda não foi sistematicamente examinada. Neste artigo, pretende-se contribuir para a literatura sobre a ciência precautória de dois modos: sistematizando sua literatura prévia e propondo (...) uma definição de um de seus elementos principais, a precaução epistêmica, como uma orientação específica para a gestão de riscos indutivos. Conclui-se com algumas objeções que tal definição levanta, bem como caminhos de pesquisas futuras para abordá-las. (shrink)

El presente estudio apunta a abordar la relación entre ágape y justicia en la problematización del reconocimiento llevada a cabo por Paul Ricoeur. Partiendo de que se trata de lógicas no sólo diferentes, sino que hasta podría decirse que contrapuestas, nuestra intención es indagar la posibilidad de una dialéctica que articule a ambas. En este sentido, resulta importante destacar que dicha dialéctica es una dialéctica del orden de la acción y no una dialéctica de carácter teórico especulativa.

I offer a new interpretation of Heidegger’s analysis of anxiety in Being and Time as an account of the relationship between individual agents and the public normative practices of their communities. According to a prominent recent interpretation, Heidegger’s discussions of anxiety, death and the “call of conscience” together explain how we can respond to the norms of our practices as reasons and subject them to critical reflection. I argue that this is only part of the story. Anxiety is an occasion (...) for Dasein to take responsibility for its ongoing activity of interpreting the possibilities for living and acting made available by the normative practices of its community, which is presupposed and overlooked from the perspective of everyday Dasein. Public normativity underdetermines Dasein’s conception of what it would mean to take up any of the possibilities available in its world as a way of living its own life. (shrink)

Der Beitrag widmet sich einer Erkundung des schöpferischen Eigen- potenzials von Ausdrucksgeschehen, dem entlang von Maurice Merleau-Pontys Phänomenologie der Expressivität nachgespürt wird. Expressivität zeigt sich hier als ein Übergangsphänomen, das in seinem Entstehen und seiner Prozessua- lität nachvollzogen wird. Indem Ausdrucksgeschehen in seiner Ereignishaftigkeit erkundet wird, rekurriert der Beitrag auf eine Form der Medialität, die einem reinen Tätigsein sowie einer starren Passivität bereits vorgelagert ist. Das Ar- gument kulminiert in der Theorie eines relationalen Gefüges von Subjektivität, Sinn, sozio-kultureller Welt und (...) Expressivität. (shrink)

In the recently published manuscript “The Argument against Need” (ca. 1963), Heidegger discusses the notion of being-in-itself (Ansichsein) with regard to entities that predate the existence of knowers. Section 1 introduces the problem of so-called “ancestral facts,” which Meillassoux and Boghossian have used to argue for a specific form of realism. Sections 2 identifies a specific understanding of time as the basis for their argument. Sections 3–4 show how Heidegger rejects this account of time. Section 5 describes the general form (...) of ontologies that deny entity independence (dependence ontology). Section 6 turns to Heidegger’s account of a resistance to ontological sense-making in what he calls “beingless” (seinlos) entities. Discussing work by Haugeland and Wrathall, I conclude in section 7 that Heidegger’s response to the “argument against need” is to reject the idea of unidirectional dependence in favor of a triadic interdependence between being, entities, and us. (shrink)

Recent scholarship on Jacques Derrida’s work has turned toward his political and institutional engagements. I further this body of research by outlining a twofold problematic regarding the issue of “parliament.” Its first dimension concerns what I call a poli-technic of lying, which denotes that politically impactful techniques of lying demand we follow the lacunae of the polis, the phenomenality of an international public sphere and technologies of public circulation, and the relationship between the construction of categories of “peoples,” “nations,” “borders,” (...) and their “authorities” with practices of force or violence. In the following, I consider Derrida’s relation to the International Parliament of Writers (IPW) as a supplementary institution from which examination of this problematic might be situated in light of alternative traditions predicated on hospitality, and on sheltering the other as a practice inextricable from a “frank concept of truth.” I also consider the emergent possibilities this approach opens for responding to immediate conditions – attacks on the lives of writers around the world, accelerating global displacement, intensifying border closures, and unchecked police enforcement. I look toward the political unit Derrida identifies as crucial for these actions: the city as a space for frank and open speech – the ville franche. (shrink)

Derrida’s description of the aporia of decision-making is herein used to demonstrate how ethico-political concerns can already be found within the articulation of time and space as they are experienced by mortal beings, broadly understood.

This paper gives an account of the most significant elements of Derrida’s ethical thought, drawing on the desert of the Hebrew Bible, which Derrida associates with a moral law that is ethically troubling. Partly with reference to Kierkegaard’s account of the story of Abraham and Isaac, Derrida examines how ethical law can become subordinate to the sovereignty of the power apparently at the source of ethics which may then destroy moral law. The political equivalent of this is the decision proposed (...) by Carl Schmitt, drawing on Kierkegaard. Derrida’s famous statement that “deconstruction is justice” is the recognition that justice, and ethics in general, is caught between the formality of law and the violence of the sovereign power. One outcome of this is sacrifice as substitution, where ethics becomes recompense for violation through sacrifice. Sacrifice is the offering of a substitute. The substitution becomes repeated and itself is then the source of violence contravening some sense of ethics. Derrida’s attempts to escape from these deserts include a poetics which recognises the subjective and the aesthetic in the interpretation of law. It also includes the development of a form of sacrifice which is the individual responding to violation in an individualised way which cannot be substituted. (shrink)

Jacques Derrida’s and Gilles Deleuze’s philosophies of justice share many similar features. For both, justice involves an overturning of law by extralegal means, made possible by an “undecidability” in the judgment-making process. To distinguish their conceptions of justice, we examine their implicit modes of non-classical reasoning with regard to “otherness,” building from Routley and Routley and Daniel Smith, to conclude that Derrida’s thinking on justice is at least paracomplete (or analetheic) while Deleuze’s is just paraconsistent (or dialetheic).

This paper intends above all to highlight three fundamental interconnected questions: (1) without reifying it in a theoretical-systematic philosophy, to highlight Derrida’s Deconstruction as a “philosophical idiom” – that of différance or of the ab-solute otherness – endowed, therefore, with specific “theoretical” assumptions (khôra, messianic and trace); (2) to highlight and to clarify the meaning of the “Derridian exception” concerning the issue of the animal and animality within the context of the sacrificial philosophical-cultural Westernness; (3) to highlight the relevance of (...) the issue of the animal and animality in order to re-think, in new terms, the question of the human itself – still essentially structured in the light of a metaphysical subjectivity –, underlining the invaluable contribution of Deconstruction to rethink the exceptionality of the human among the living beings and to bring the war for compassion to a successful end, thus contributing to the emergence of new Lights for the promise of the “coming” [“à-venir”] of another humanity and, consequently, of another civilization. (shrink)

This paper focuses on the relationships that Derrida establishes between three analytic discussions and three autoimmunities. The analytic discussions are (1) the antinomy of hospitality, related to what happens when the subject faces demands from strangers; (2) the antinomy of the death penalty, related to the meeting between the right to life and the right to end the life of another; (3) the antinomy of animality related to laws and what lies beyond them. The autoimmunities are (1) the autoimmunity of (...) inclusion: democracy is open only to its sovereign citizens while it claims to welcome all who are excluded; (2) the autoimmunity of rights and liberties: in liberal democracy, rights and liberties are meant to challenge sovereignty’s absolutism, but any attack on sovereignty is an attack on rights and liberties; (3) the autoimmunity of globalization: for democracy to work it requires protection provided by a supersovereignty, which limits the sovereignty of states, and hence, democracy. The paper follows Derrida’s connections between the questions of hospitality, the death penalty, and animality on the one hand, and the autoimmune aspects of democratic politics on the other, to argue that his deconstruction of democracy is an ethicization of democracy activated by the concept of sovereignty, and a deconstruction of sovereignty via ethics. (shrink)

This special issue of Angelaki on “Derrida: Ethics in Deconstruction” appears twenty years after the sad occasion of the death of Jacques Derrida in Paris on 12 October 2004, after an extraordinary...

This article develops a hermeneutic study of Heidegger’s text The Word of Nietzsche: “God is Dead”. We attempt to read Heidegger’s remarks in the context of the “period of transition” that, according to Nietzsche, is occurring in the history of western thought and culture. This essay unfolds in the following manner: beginning with Heidegger’s contention that Nietzsche’s philosophy is the “fulfilment” of Platonism, we go over the problem of nihilism in relation to the metaphysics of the will to power, which (...) for Heidegger requires revising Cartesian subjectivity in search of a new ontology. Heidegger’s critique of modernity encompasses a narrative that goes from “Plato” to “Nietzsche”, leading to a reconsideration of the notions of art and truth. Finally, we attempt to interpret the meaning of the “madman’s lament” voicing the passing of God. (shrink)

In this article, we consider Derrida’s grasp on counter-institution and outline a peculiar modality of ethics that it engenders. After evoking his counter-institutional public engagements in the introduction, we begin an analysis of the word counter-institution. In the first place, the polysemy of its prefix “counter” is exposed, followed by the claim that in Derrida’s philosophy this term denotes proximity and contact, rather than opposition – thus determining the architecture of the counter-institution. Furthermore, we discuss Derrida’s critique of traditional, sovereign (...) institutions that he saw as unjust and violent, relating it to his theory of decision, and making the claim that counter-institutions are inseparable from justice. In the second part, we conceptualize what is named the counter-ethics of promise and responsibility. By juxtaposing Derrida’s unorthodox views on the notions of promise and responsibility, we seek to formulate a counter-ethical thought that animates the relations in and of the counter-institution and challenges the limits of ethics. Finally, we propose that Derrida’s idea of unfaithful fidelity could be understood as the very condition counter-ethics, and by consequence, of deconstruction. (shrink)

This paper delves into the deconstruction of the notion of responsibility, drawing a correlation with the process of decomposition of the concept of sovereignty as discussed by Derrida in his last research works. We explore Derrida’s consideration of absolute responsibility as no longer passing through the figure of the sovereign. Derrida’s thought takes its distance from the philosophical and hegemonic determination of the notion of responsibility, for the conceptual system of its axiomatic defines responsibility based on the sovereign individual’s freedom (...) and makes responsibility the effect of his power. Yet, this definition condemns ethics to failure, since it does not account for the other supposed in the idea of response. Derrida incorporates absolute singularity, and consequently secrecy, into the structure of responsibility, enabling thought to encounter the absolute other. The text outlines the influence of Nietzsche and Celan in Derrida’s thought and develops an approach that sees in his work the effort to create a poetic revolution in the history of philosophy and knowledge by opening thought to radical alterity. (shrink)

This thematic issue of Angelaki covers the ethics in deconstruction in Jacques Derrida in the broadest way, so as to be an engagement with Derrida’s philosophy as a whole rather than the isolation...

This thesis engages Michel Foucault’s late work on ancient philosophy in relation to his earlier investigations of modern forms of government and events in his political present. Beginning with a reinterpretation of the function of style in Foucault’s oeuvre, it demonstrates that the ancient notion of the care of the self – the style of existence – unfolds as a critical project. The thesis considers Foucault’s last three lecture courses at the Collège de France: “The Hermeneutics of the Subject” (1982), (...) “The Government of Self and Others” (1983), and “The Courage of the Truth” (1984). It shows that what is at stake in the ancient notions of truth-telling and the technologies of the self is not reducible to an ethical, individual subject in Greco-Roman antiquity, but rather something that bears on Foucault’s previous critical work on modern forms of subjection, on his notion of critique, and on political, collective subjects in the present. No previous study has treated this relation between Foucault’s notion of the care of the self and his theory of critique. And while shorter attempts have noted their conceptual common basis in “virtue” and “government,” this thesis opens new perspectives. Through a formal analogy to Kant’s critical project, it proposes a model of three Foucauldian kinds of critique: the historical-philosophical practice of theoretical work, truth-telling in the political field, and the individual or collective “art of not being governed like that.” Moving between the theoretical work and lesser discussed materials – specifically Foucault’s engagement with the Polish trade union “Solidarność” and the French labor union CFDT – important continuities are identified. It is demonstrated that Foucault understands critique, the care of the self, and collective movements in his own time, not only by the same conceptual framework of government, virtue, and truth, but also as non-discursive forms or practices in which means and ends merge. This is significant in relation to Foucault’s definition of modern economic government in his lecture course on neoliberalism, “The Birth of Biopolitics” (1979): a government guided by an equally non-discursive “veridiction of the market.” Building on these continuities in Foucault’s oeuvre, it is concluded that the ancient notions of truth-telling and of the style of existence offer significant tools in the art of not being governed like that: as collective configurations of critique in the present. (shrink)

What things mean to us involves more than what they afford in a straightforward sense (e.g., motor affordances). One can think of bodily adornments, lines, or precious stones. Differently from tools like hammers, these things are used to be displayed, watched etc. The paper investigates this very important feature of human behaviour, focusing especially on the expressive possibilities, or salience, of tools. This is interpreted as an emergent property of our engagement with tools, for which tools matter to us because (...) of what they show, not just because of what we do with them in a strict sense. A phenomenological approach is obtained by building upon Heidegger's view of tools as structured by implicit “indications” of relevance; this approach is developed by engaging with debates on mark making, stone tools, and aesthetic experience. It is argued that the salience of things is a process where indications of relevance become explicit and relatively distanced from motor affordances; this alliance of explicitness and absence of action allows for things to "resonate" in us, inviting us to see tools as invitations to imagine, think, and remember. The paper considers examples of entanglements of salience and affordances, where tools and techniques shape symbols and imaginaries. (shrink)

This text goes as a reflection on the uses of the concept of mimesis as the core of Adorno’s thought. It starts with the proposals of the Dialectic of the Enlightenment, and then refers them to the way in which they reappear in the Aesthetic Theory, distinguishing the role of mimesis in he process of the production of the work and in that of its reception, both in art as in mass culture. Finally, it points to the possibility of enriching (...) the concept by connecting it with Benjamin. Adorno, mimesis, reception, culture industry, Benjamin. Resumen El texto se presenta como una reflexión en torno a los usos del concepto de mímesis como núcleo del pensamiento de Adorno. Se parte de los planteamientos de la Dialéctica de la Ilustración, para luego remitirlos a la manera en que reaparecen en la Teoría estética, distinguiendo el papel de la mímesis en el proceso de la producción de la obra y en el de su recepción, tanto en el arte como en la cultura de masas. Finalmente, se apunta a la posibilidad de enriquecer el concepto conectándolo con Benjamin. (shrink)

The thesis aims at covering two paths that can be found within the XX Century's continental philosophy. On one hand, the analysis will focus on what M. Theunissen called Heidegger's "Being and Time"'s 'social ontology'. On the other, the work will delve into young Herbert Marcuse's so-called 'heideggerian marxism' via questioning his works located between 1928 and 1933.

Heron Heart is a poem born out of reflecting on the nature of existence during long stretches of isolation, where the boundary of what is and is not a living being was challenged—the nonhuman more alive than the human. It evokes the absurdity of the banal out of the confusion and beauty of sensory experience, with hints of nostalgia for a mythological world that never existed but is ever-present.

O presente artigo pretende discorrer sobre o conceito de natureza possibilitado pela ontologia de Heidegger, que busca no pensamento grego seu sentido mais originário, e a crítica do filósofo ao conceito proporcionado pela metafísica clássica que teria provocado distopias na relação entre o homem e a natureza ao objetivá-la. Tal relação de domínio, além de evidenciar a necessidade de uma reflexão sobre o antropocentrismo, também e, por consequência disso, desvela-se através da crise ambiental vivida hoje por nós. Dessa forma, Heidegger (...) encontra tal sentido originário na palavra physis, o qual discuto nas páginas seguintes suas nuances a partir do que foi levantado pela obra do filósofo. Busca-se assim encontrar um sentido autêntico de natureza, antes do que foi assimilado pela tradição metafísica e desencoberto pelo ser humano como uma reserva ao seu dispor. (shrink)

The status of continuity in Deleuze’s metaphysics is a subject of debate. Deleuze calls the virtual, in Difference and Repetition, an Ideal continuum, and the differential relations that constitute the Ideal imply the continuity of this field. But, Deleuze does not hesitate to formulate the same field by the affirmation of divergence (incompossibility) that can be regarded as a form of discontinuity. It is, hence, unclear how these two ostensibly contradictory accounts might reconcile. This article attempts to reconstitute a Deleuzian (...) theory of continuity through Leibniz whose philosophy is equally subject to a tension between the law of continuity, prevalent in his mathematics and metaphysics, and the discontinuity or absolute individuality of monads. By reorienting The Fold around the motif of continuity a new conceptual space is opened for continuity qua heterogeneity-and-inseparability. Then, enfolding the conceptual personae of The Fold onto Difference and Repetition reveals the tacit though decisive presence of different types of continuity operational in Deleuze’s metaphysics that will be called divergent, intensive, torsional, and tenorsional continuities. (shrink)

In this paper I return to Hubert Dreyfus’ old but influential critique of artificial intelligence, redirecting it towards contemporary predictive processing models of the mind (PP). I focus on Dreyfus’ arguments about the “frame problem” for artificial cognitive systems, and his contrasting account of embodied human skills and expertise. The frame problem presents as a prima facie problem for practical work in AI and robotics, but also for computational views of the mind in general, including for PP. Indeed, some of (...) the issues it presents seem more acute for PP, insofar as it seeks to unify all cognition and intelligence, and aims to do so without admitting any cognitive processes or mechanisms outside of the scope of the theory. I contend, however, that there is an unresolved problem for PP concerning whether it can both explain all cognition and intelligent behavior as minimizing prediction error with just the core formal elements of the PP toolbox, and also adequately comprehend (or explain away) some of the apparent cognitive differences between biological and prediction-based artificial intelligence, notably in regard to establishing relevance and flexible context-switching, precisely the features of interest to Dreyfus’ work on embodied indexicality, habits/skills, and abductive inference. I address several influential philosophical versions of PP, including the work of Jakob Hohwy and Andy Clark, as well as more enactive-oriented interpretations of active inference coming from a broadly Fristonian perspective. (shrink)

A deeply personal reckoning with family, mental illness, and suicide, Dana Trusso captures the meaning of Nietzsche's armor fati--to love one's fate--through her surreal imagery and longing to heal intergenerational wounds. Lines are drawn from Lars von Trier's Melancholia, Sonic Youth's Experimental Jet Set, Trash and No Star, and lines she read from her aunt's journals as a child. -/- The photo is a sculpture of an earth goddess by Jean-Philippe Richard located in the botanical gardens of Èze, France. Nearby (...) is Le Chemin de Nietzsche, a steep hike from the seaside to mountainous ruins that is said to have inspired Thus Spoke Zarathustra. (shrink)

Western philosophical orthodoxy places many aspects of other people's lives outside the scope of our knowledge. Demonstrating an alternative to this view, however, this book argues that Jean-Paul Sartre's application of his unique psychoanalytic method to Gustave Flaubert is the culmination of his project to show that it is possible to know everything there is to know about another person. It examines how Sartre aims to revolutionize our way of thinking about others by presenting his existential psychoanalysis as the means (...) to knowledge of both ourselves and others. By so doing, it highlights how his determination to solve the longstanding philosophical conundrum about other minds drives him not only to incorporate insights from Descartes, Hegel, Husserl, Freud, Marx, and Beauvoir into his philosophy, but also to supplement and enhance his philosophy through the development and application of a new form of psychoanalysis. -/- Sartre's Existential Psychoanalysis integrates, for the first time, Sartre's psychoanalysis into his overarching philosophical project. By offering a critical interrogation of the role his psychoanalytical studies played in the development of his existentialism, Mary Edwards uncovers the overlooked philosophical significance of his existential psychoanalysis and brings it into a new and productive dialogue with current research in the fields of philosophy, psychology, and psychotherapy. (shrink)

Extensive and critical review of Perception and Reality in Kant, Husserl and McDowell, written by van Mazijk, Corijn focussing on his discussion of McDowell.

The first part of this entry details what is known about the personal encounters between Rudolf Carnap and Edmund Husserl. The second part looks at all the places in Carnap’s works where Husserl is cited.

_Riassunto_: Diversi studi hanno posto in risalto le affinità tra la filosofia critica di Wittgenstein e la psicoanalisi di Lacan. Questo lavoro passa in rassegna alcuni aspetti comuni ai due autori, delineando una prospettiva d’incontro teoretica e concettuale. Un punto d’incontro tra questi due pensatori comprende la fondamentale attenzione per il linguaggio e un atteggiamento critico verso la concettualizzazione classica della soggettività. Questo saggio tenta di sviluppare teoreticamente questi punti di contatto introducendo il concetto di soggettività senza interiorità, un soggetto (...) senza psicologia. In effetti, l’affidamento di Wittgenstein sulla grammatica e il ricorso di Lacan al significante portano allo stesso risultato: considerare il linguaggio in sé come matrice della soggettività. Da questa prospettiva la fondazione della soggettività non risiede più in una certa supposta sostanza metafisica bensì in una esteriorità radicale, nei giochi linguistici. _Parole chiave_: Wittgenstein; Lacan; Inconscio; Linguaggio; Grammatica _A subjectivity without interiority: Wittgenstein with Lacan_ _Abstract_: Several studies highlight affinities between Wittgenstein’s critical philosophy and Lacan’s psychoanalysis. The following article revisits certain points of both authors, proposing a theoretical and conceptual encounter between them. Indeed, the common ground between these two thinkers includes a fundamental focus on language and a critical approach to classic conceptualisation of subjectivity. This contribution attempts to theoretically developing this encounter by introducing the concept of subjectivity without interiority, a subject without psychology. In fact, Wittgenstein’s reliance on grammar and Lacan’s use of the signifier yield the same result: pointing to language itself as the matrix of subjectivity. From this perspective, the foundation of subjectivity no longer resides in some supposed metaphysical substance, but rather in a radical exteriority, in linguistic games. _Keywords_: Wittgenstein; Lacan; Unconscious; Language; Grammar. (shrink)

Kant’s practical philosophy revolves around the concepts of pure reason, autonomy, law and obligation. But for them, terms such as humanity and self-mastery (Selbstherrschaft) are also of great importance. According to Kant, these terms concretize the reason and goal of our ethical and legal-political actions. In a first step, the meaning of these terms at the end of the four Kantian questions (What can I know? What should I do? What can I hope? What is man?) is explained. In a (...) second step, Martin Heidegger’s criticism of humanism (and thus also of Kant) is presented and in a third step the consequences that his view of thinking has for law and politics are discussed: Heidegger’s thinking stands with his negation of philosophy, ethics and science in the service of a politics of immaturity. (shrink)