Kant: Teleological Judgment

It is well known that Kant connects judgment and feeling in the third Critique. However, the precise relationship between these two faculties remains virtually unexplored, in large part due to the unpopularity of Kant’s faculty psychology. This paper considers why, for Kant, judgment and feeling go together, arguing that he had good philosophical reasons for forging this connection. The discussion begins by situating these faculties within Kant’s mature faculty psychology. While the ‘power of judgment’ [Urteilskraft] is fundamentally reflective, feeling [Gefühl] (...) reveals itself as essentially non-discursive. Their systematic connection emerges through the principle of purposiveness [Zweckmäßigkeit], which the former legislates for the latter. I claim that we must understand this notion in terms of the suitability of the faculties for each other, as displayed in mere reflection. That is, we can only recognize the fitness of two things for each other through feeling, which, in turn, is the only way that we can engage in the activity of merely reflecting judgment. I conclude by gesturing at an even further way in which judgment and feeling are related, based on their mutual role in orienting all of the faculties of the human mind. (shrink)

Do plants represent according to Kant? This is closely connected to the question of whether he held plants are alive, because he explains life in terms of the faculty to act on one’s own representations. He also explains life as having an immaterial principle of self-motion, and as a body’s interaction with a supersensible soul. I argue that because of the way plants move themselves, Kant is committed to their being alive, to their having a supersensible ground of their self-activity, (...) and to their having desires (although these are not conscious). This has important ramifications for Kant’s teleology and philosophy of mind. (shrink)

In this essay I examine Kant's analogy with life from §65 of the Critique of the power of Judgment. I argue that this analogy is central for understanding his notion of a natural end, for his account of the formative power of organisms in the third Critique, and for situating Kant's account of this power in relation to the Lebenskräfte of the vitalists.

In the second Critique, Kant argues that for the highest good to be possible we need to postulate the existence of God and the immortality of the soul in a future world. In his other writings, however, he suggests that the highest good is attainable through mere human agency in this world. Based on the apparent incoherence between these texts, Andrews Reath, among others, argues that Kant’s texts reveal two competing conceptions of the highest good, namely a secular and a (...) theological conception. In this paper, I argue that Kant has a coherent conception of the highest good which applies to two different domains, namely the domain of the individual humans and the domain of the human species. (shrink)

Passt der Mensch als moralischer Akteur in die Welt? Während in früheren Ansätzen Kants nur der aus den Bedürfnissen der Praxis gespeiste Glaube blieb, hofft er in der "Kritik der Urteilskraft" zeigen zu können, dass sich die Überzeugung von einer moralkompatiblen Welt unabhängig rechtfertigen lässt – aus Ästhetik und Biologie. Der Autor liefert zunächst eine systematische Analyse von Kants Problemstellung: Was motiviert die Suche nach einem solchen Übergang zwischen Theorie und Praxis und was kommt als Lösung infrage? Dann schlägt er (...) eine innovative Lesart der Rolle der Biologie im Übergangsargument vor: Sie ist nicht als positiver Beitrag, sondern als naheliegender Einwand gegen das angestrebte Argument zu verstehen. Das wirft neues Licht insbesondere auf die Antinomie der teleologischen Urteilskraft. -/- Does man fit into the world as a moral actor? In Kant's earlier approaches, only faith catering to the needs of human practice remained to supply an answer to this question. In the "Critique of Judgment", though, Kant attempts to show that the conviction concerning the existence of a morally compatible world can indeed be independently justified – namely from aesthetics and biology. The author first provides a systematic analysis of Kant's problem: What motivates the search for such a transition between theory and practice and what can be considered a satisfactory solution? He then proposes an innovative reading of the role of biology in the transition argument: It is not to be understood as a positive contribution, but as an obvious objection to the argument pursued in the first place. This sheds new light in particular on the antinomy of teleological judgement. (shrink)

The antinomy of teleological judgment has increasingly been understood as a conflict between regulative principles. But it is not clear why regulative principles can be in conflict at all, since Kant otherwise takes the realization that two conflicting principles are regulative to be sufficient to resolve an antinomy. I argue that in Kant’s view regulative principles do not conflict with one another only if they are reducible to reason’s interest in systematicity. Given that the principles of this antinomy do conflict, (...) they must not be reducible to reason’s interest in systematicity. I argue that teleology is thus not reducible to reason’s interest because it is fundamentally unlawful. I then use this irreducibility to account for Kant’s appeal to the supersensible in this context. (shrink)

This paper contributes to the on-going research into the ways in which the humanities transformed the natural sciences in the late Eighteenth and early Nineteenth Centuries. By investigating the relationship between hermeneutics -- as developed by Herder -- and natural history, it shows how the methods used for the study of literary and artistic works played a crucial role in the emergence of key natural-scientific fields, including geography and ecology.

Kant’s Antinomy of Teleological Judgment is unique in offering two pairs of oppositions, one of regulative maxims, and the other of constitutive principles. Here I defend a traditional interpretation of the antinomy— as proposed, for example, by Stadler (1874), Adickes (1925), and Cassirer (1921)—that the antinomy consists in an opposition between constitutive principles, and is resolved by pointing out their legitimate status as merely regulative maxims. I argue against recent interpretations—for example, in McLaughlin (1990), Allison (1991), and Watkins (2009)—which treat (...) the regulative pair as itself antinomial. I then address several textual worries having to do with reconciling the traditional interpretation within the overall structure of the Dialectic of Teleological Judgment that have led these scholars to espouse the new view. Throughout the paper, I emphasize hitherto neglected parallels with Kant’s treatment of the antinomy of taste, which sheds light on understanding the antinomy of teleology. (shrink)

In this book, Toby Svoboda develops and defends a Kantian environmental virtue ethic, challenging the widely-held view that Kant's moral philosophy takes an instrumental view toward nature and animals and has little to offer environmental ethics. On the contrary, Svoboda posits that there is good moral reason to care about non-human organisms in their own right and to value their flourishing independently of human interests, since doing so is constitutive of certain virtues. Svoboda argues that Kant’s account of indirect duties (...) regarding nature can ground a compelling environmental ethic: the Kantian duty to develop morally virtuous dispositions strictly proscribes unnecessarily harming organisms, and Svoboda argues that this duty compels us to act in ways that benefit non-human organisms, given that doing so can enhance one’s virtues. Svoboda’s argument engages the recent literature on environmental virtue and provides an original argument for an environmental virtue ethic firmly rooted in Kant’s moral philosophy. (shrink)

In his Critique of Judgment (1790) Kant develops a teleology of nature. The concept of natural purpose leads him to the problem of the antinomy of teleological judgment. However, some ambiguity about what is said in the paragraphs concerned has frequently caused difficulties for the understanding of one of the core parts of the 3rd Critique. I argue that a coherent reading of §§69-71can nevertheless be achieved. In order to critically review and complete previous research I will primarily be focusing (...) on those passages which are notorious for their lack of clarity. The main problems regarding the interpretation of the antinomy’s identity can be solved. The results of this paper speak in favour of the currently prevailing view that holds the antinomy to be a genuine contradiction between two regulative principles. (shrink)

We received several critical comments regarding the "The Science of Spiritual Biology." We reply to those criticisms in order to further clarify some of the important points that were made. It is only to be expected that a strong emotional response may be evoked by the revolution in scientific thinking that the modern paradigm of cognitive biology presents. We have to be prepared to accept that, and maintain the integrity of the scientific approach.

"Living systems are cognitive systems, and living as a process is a process of cognition." -H.R. Maturana, The Biology of Cognition (1970/1980) Just as the cell has gradually come to be understood as a highly regulated and unctionally integrated whole, so too is the biosphere now recognized as a finely balanced ecological whole in which local disturbances can create world-wide climatic catastrophe. The oversimplified ideas of biology that characterized the field in its immature beginning led to the theories of a (...) progressive cumulative development or evolution to explain the present state of Nature. However, today, a more mature understanding of biology has brought with it the realization that Nature can not be the product of a gradual development, based only on the reductionist principles of chemistry and physics. In an ideal situation, where there are no strong interactions with the environment, isolated and purified chemicals may react in a mechanically simple manner, but in a living organism there are no isolated molecules. Everything within the cell interacts with everything else. The constituents of a cell are produced by the cell as much as they produce the cell itself. As the German philosopher Immanuel Kant understood, the unique judgment that allows us to identify a living organism as distinct from non-living matter, is that a living organism is both the cause and effect of itself. Thus, the life of a cell, as much as the life of the biosphere, can only be properly understood as an integrated organic whole. (shrink)

We received several critical comments regarding the "The Science of Spiritual Biology." We reply to those criticisms in order to further clarify some of the important points that were made. It is only to be expected that a strong emotional response may be evoked by the revolution in scientific thinking that the modern paradigm of cognitive biology presents. We have to be prepared to accept that, and maintain the integrity of the scientific approach.

a relação entre razão e natureza envolve um dos principais aspectos da crítica da teleologia de Kant. Visando destacar esta relação, investigarei o conceito de técnica da natureza, tal como introduzida na Crítica da faculdade de julgar. De acordo com Kant, a técnica da natureza permite as leis da razão a representarem o acordo dos princípios transcendentais da razão com a natureza. Deste modo, o conceito da técnica da natureza assume um papel prolífico ao expor, através de uma analogia com (...) as faculdades humanas, a atividade produtiva da natureza, como se sua atividade fosse orientada a fins.The relationship between reason and nature embodies one of the main aspects of Kant‟s critique of teleology. In order to highlight this relation, I shall investigate the concept of the technique of nature, as it has been introduced in Critique of the Power of Judgment. According to Kant, the technique of nature allows the laws of reason to represent the agreement of the transcendental principles of reason with nature. Thus, the concept of the technique of nature assumes a fruitful role by exposing, through an analogy with human faculties, the productive activity of nature, as if its activity were oriented towards ends. (shrink)

A commentary on §§ 64-68 of Kant's "Critique of the Power of Judgment". Nach einer allgemeinen Definition von zweckmäßigen Gegenständen und deren Binnendifferenzierung in künstliche und natürliche Zwecke, setzt Kant in § 64 mit einer vorläufigen Definition des eigentlichen Untersuchungsgegenstandes ein. Dinge sind genau dann Naturzwecke, wenn sie von sich selbst Ursache und Wirkung sind. Kant veranschaulicht diese Definition am Beispiel eines organischen Gegenstandes: an einem Baum. In § 65 soll die vorläufige Definition von Naturzwecken präzisiert und von einem bestimmten (...) Begriff abgeleitet werden. Kant führt die Selbstverursachung von Organismen zunächst auf eine Bildungskraft im Inneren der Dinge zurück. Da diese Kraft aber nicht erfahrbar ist, und da sich der Mensch natürliche Organismen dennoch nur durch die Wirksamkeit einer solchen Kraft erklären kann, wird sie als ein a priori regulatives Prinzip der menschlichen Urteilskraft gedeutet, das keinen gegenstandskonstitutiven, sondern einen bloß forschungsheuristisch–regulativen Charakter hat. In den §§ 66 und 67 versucht Kant zu zeigen, daß der Mensch die Idee der Teleologie der Natur als apriorisch–regulatives Prinzip bei der Beurteilung einzelner natürlicher Organismen (§ 66) und der Natur als System der Zwecke im ganzen verwendet (§ 67). In § 68 wertet Kant die Ergebnisse der "Analytik“ wissenschaftstheoretisch aus. Da die Teleologie der Natur auf einem unabhängigen, immanenten Prinzip beruht, ist sie eine eigenständige systematische Wissenschaft, die vor allem von der Theologie, aber auch von der mathematischen Naturwissenschaft verschieden ist. (shrink)

This paper examines how in the ‘Critique of teleological judgment’ Kant characterized the concept of natural purpose in relation to and in distinction from the concepts of nature and the concept of purpose he had developed in his other critical writings. Kant maintained that neither the principles of mechanical science nor the pure concepts of the understanding through which we determine experience in general provide adequate conceptualizations of the unique capacities of organisms. He also held that although the concept of (...) natural purpose was derived through reflection upon an analogy to human purposive activity in artistic production and moral action, it articulates a unique notion of intrinsic purposiveness. Kant restricted his critical reflections on organisms to phenomena that can be given to us in experience, criticizing speculations on their first origins or final purpose. But I argue that he held that the concept of natural purpose is a product of the reflecting power of judgment, rather than an empirical concept, and represents only the relation of things to our power of judgment. Yet it is necessary for the identification of organisms as organized and self-organizing, and as subject to unique norms and causal relations between parts and whole. (shrink)

The Critique of the Power of Judgment (a more accurate rendition of what has hitherto been translated as the Critique of Judgment) is the third of Kant's great critiques following the Critique of Pure Reason and the Critique of Practical Reason. This entirely new translation of Kant's masterpiece follows the principles and high standards of all other volumes in The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant. This volume includes: for the first time the indispensable first draft of Kant's (...) introduction to the work; the only English edition notes to the many differences between the first (1790) and second (1793) editions of the work; and relevant passages in Kant's anthropology lectures where he elaborated on his aesthetic views. All in all this new edition offers the serious student of Kant a dramatically richer, more complete and more accurate translation. (shrink)

This project develops an underlying problem within Kant's practical works concerning the application of the categorical imperative. While it is often thought that Kant does not consider the need to bridge the gap between an abstract, universal, moral law and an agent's proposed maxims as problematic, he repeatedly offers strategies for overcoming exactly such a problem. This study undertakes a detailed examination of three distinct strategies in Kant's works that either have been or could be used in the attempt to (...) overcome this problem of practical judgment. The first two strategies are explicitly presented by Kant in the Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals and the Critique of Practical Reason respectively. Both Kant's attempt to provide greater determinacy to the moral law in the Groundwork and his introduction of a symbolic representation to mediate between reason's a priori principle and our proposed maxims in the Critique of Practical Reason are found to be fragmentary and incomplete solutions to the problem of applying the moral law. The third strategy is developed from the positive contributions of the previous two in conjunction with the implicit possibilities excavated from Kant's account of reflective, teleological judgment in the Critique of Judgment. What emerges is a rich account of moral deliberation and judgment that does not simply mimic theoretical judgment. Instead, a reflective procedure of practical judgment is suggested as an auxiliary to the more orthodox and formal model of Kantian deliberation. (shrink)

I propose a unified reading of Kant's third critical work, The Critique of Judgment, as a sustained argument that "purposiveness without a purpose" is the a priori, transcendental principle of judgment, a "subjective" yet necessary condition for the practice of judging and for the possibility of experience. I argue that Kant's principle of purposiveness is a temporal-formal structure of the subject's judging activity, a structure of anticipation that unites present and past moments as "towards" the future. Such purposiveness is a (...) necessary principle of judgment, I argue, for it enables the judging subject to unify the contingent, heterogeneous information "given" in experience not only as homogeneous but also as empirically heterogeneous. For Kant, we must be able to judge purposively without a purpose, if we are to be able to form empirical concepts or understand particulars in our experience. But purposiveness is a "merely subjective" principle, according to Kant, because it guides the subject's activity but does not and cannot characterize objects or ground objective claims. The function of purposiveness as a principle by which the judging subject can unify the heterogeneous as heterogeneous is, I argue, exhibited in the unity we attribute to organisms in teleological judgment, and instantiated most purely or clearly in the act of aesthetic appreciation. Thus for Kant, in aesthetic experience the subject reveals its nature as projectively temporal, utterly distinct from objects, governed by anticipation and history, not chronology and mechanism. (shrink)

The main claim in this paper is that because organisms have teleological constitutions, the reduction of biology to physical science is not possible. It is argued that the teleology of organisms is intrinsic and not merely projected onto them. Many organic phenomena are end-oriented and reference to ends is necessary for explaining them. Accounts in terms of functions or goals are appropriate to organic parts and processes. siis is because ends as systemic requirements for survival and health have explanatory significance (...) with respect to the processes that contribute to and constitute them. Reductionism cannot accommodate this sort of higher-level to lower-level explanation and so cannot account for why lower-level phenomena are as they are. Reductionism, it is claimed, is ultimately descriptive and not explanatory because it cannot regard teleological requirements as themselves basic. In seeking to explain them away it forfeits explanatory power. (shrink)