Rights and Democracy

(OPEN ACCESS) In this paper, I criticize two views on how political equality is related to equally distributed political power, and I offer a novel, pluralist account of political equality to address their shortcomings—in particular, concerning their implications for affirmative action in the political domain, political representation, and the situation of permanent minorities. The Equal Power View holds that political equality requires equally distributed political power. It considers affirmative action—e.g., racial or gender electoral quotas—, representation, and more-than-equal power to permanent (...) minorities pro tanto objectionable. The Equal Status View, in contrast, holds that political equality concerns equal relations and status, and it is only contingently related to equally distributed power. I argue that while the Equal Status View is right that equal power can be insufficient for—or even objectionable from the viewpoint of—political equality, it is wrong to conclude that equal power has no independent significance in an account of political equality. My pluralist account shows that political equality entails not only status-based requirements but also independent egalitarian requirements to distribute political power equally. This account provides a finer-grained understanding of affirmative action in the political domain. It justifies affirmative action but holds that it should only be used to realize equal political status until thorough-going social reform allows us to maintain both equal political status and equally distributed political power at the same time. Similarly, representation should be amended with power-balancing institutions, and permanent minorities should enjoy equal status with minimal compromise to power equality. (shrink)

Efficiency requires legislative political institutions. There are many ways efficiency can be promoted, and so an ongoing legislative institution is necessary to resolve this choice in a politically sustainable and economically flexible way. This poses serious problems for classical liberal proposals to constitutionally protect markets from government intervention, as seen in the work of Ilya Somin, Guido Pincione & Fernando Tesón and others. The argument for the political nature of efficiency is set out in terms of both Pareto optimality and (...) aggregate welfare maximisation, and similar arguments can be generalised to other social values. (shrink)

The fear that business corporations have claimed unwarranted constitutional protections which have entrenched corporate power has produced a broad social movement demanding that constitutional rights be restricted to human beings and corporate personhood be abolished. We develop a critique of these proposals organized around the three salient rationales we identify in the accompanying narrative, which we argue reflect a narrow focus on large business corporations, a misunderstanding of the legal concept of personhood, and a failure to distinguish different kinds of (...) constitutional rights and the reasons for assigning them. Corporate personhood and corporate constitutional rights are not problematic per se once these notions are decoupled from biological, metaphysical, or moral considerations. The real challenge is that we need a principled way of thinking about the priority of human over corporate persons which does not reduce the efficacy of corporate institutions or harm liberal democracies. (shrink)

Academic freedom is under attack, both in authoritarian democracies, such as Hungary and Turkey, and in liberal Western democracies, such as the United States, the UK, France and Germany. For example, Gender Studies are being targeted by right-wing governments in Eastern Europe, and in France President Emmanuel Macron has attacked post-colonial and critical theories as “Islamo-gauchisme“, portraying them as a danger to the Republic. However, dominant discourses about academic freedom and free speech in the global north, lately especially in France (...) and Germany, focus on an alleged threat to academic freedom through “political correctness” and “cancel culture”, that, under scrutiny, often turn out to be exactly the opposite, namely defences of plurality and critical voices. (shrink)

This article aims to evaluate the contribution of Bentham’s ideas to the jurisprudential debate in view of their relevance vis a vis their contemporary reception. The focus is on Bentham’s revolutionary idea of publicity with its spill-over effects on contemporary debates on the rule of law and accountable and transparent governance. As far as the method is concerned, after having examined Bentham’s ideas on the rule of law and the debate they raised, the focus in the second section of this (...) article is specifically on his conception of publicity. Some critical remarks then show that Bentham’s focus on publicity and transparency has been rightly interpreted in the contemporary debate as an important contribution. However, it is their justification that it is judged to be problematic. In fact, the assessment of the fundamental importance of publicity for the rule of law and transparent and accountable governance leads to a critical engagement with contemporary readings of Bentham’s scholarship, in primis that of Gerald Postema, with a development of the latter’s republican interpretation. The direction of travel that is proposed is towards a more liberal republicanism. The article not only shows how Bentham’s contribution should be revaluated in view of contemporary interpretations, but also proposes directions for further research developments according to which contemporary conceptions of regulation need to take a reflexive turn while aiming at legitimate legality at the same time. (shrink)

Lachlan Umbers defends democracy against Jason’s Brennan’s competence objection, by showing that voting even incompetently does not violate the rights of others, as the risk imposed is negligible, and furthermore lower than other permissible actions, e.g. driving. I show there are costs in taking this line of argument. Accepting it would make arguing for the duty to vote more difficult in two ways: since voting incompetently is permissible, and not voting imposes less risk than not voting, then not voting is (...) permissible; in terms of fairness, voting incompetently is worse than not voting, if voting incompetently is permissible, then there cannot be a fairness-based duty to vote. (shrink)

Some Confucian scholars have recently claimed that Confucian political meritocracy is superior to Western democracy. I have great reservations about such a view. . . .

Since Austin and Searle, performatives are taken to be crucial for the construction of social reality. More recently, performatives have been proposed to be essential for the construction of personal identities, too. I intend to analyze the postmodern assumption according to which this identity construction is in the power of individuals, an assumption which presupposes a view of performatives as endowed with unconstrained power – that is, with a power that is not subject to objective constraints. I will consider some (...) reasons to reject this view. The first is rooted in Judith Butler’s idea that – since normative approaches to political correctness undesirably reduce freedom of speech in the name of equality – we should seriously consider how offensive performatives may fail, due to objective constraints on their felicity. A second reason to reject the postmodern view of performatives lies in the consideration of narcissism as an individual and political issue. Narcissism in the political sphere can be described as a transformation of the “passion for equality” in an individualistic appetite, deaf to everything else, and especially to social constraints and responsibilities. A different – less narcissistic and more social – model of the self is provided. (shrink)

In 2016, the United Nation’s General Assembly adopted a non-binding resolution regarding ‘The Promotion, Protection and Enjoyment of Human Rights on the Internet’. At the heart of this resolution is the UN’s concern that ‘rights that people have offline must also be protected online.’ While the UN thus recognises the importance of the Internet, it does so problematically selectively by focusing on protecting existing offline rights online. I argue instead that Internet access is itself a moral human right that requires (...) that everyone has unmonitored and uncensored access to this global medium, which should be publicly provided free of charge for those unable to afford it. Rather than being a mere luxury, Internet access should be considered a universal entitlement because it is necessary for people to be able to lead minimally decent lives. Accepting this claim transforms our conception of the Internet from a technology to that of a basic right. (shrink)

أول شيء يجب أن نضع في اعتبارنا هو أنه عندما نقول أن الصين تقول هذا أو الصين يفعل ذلك، ونحن لا نتحدث عن الشعب الصيني، ولكن من المختلين الاجتماعيين الذين يسيطرون على الح ش ص - الحزب الشيوعي الصيني، أي القتلة المتسلسلين الشيخوخة السبعة (SSSSK) من ال (هـ) اللجنة الدائمة للحزب الشيوعي الصيني أو الأعضاء الخمسة والعشر في المكتب السياسي وما إلى ذلك. -/- خطط الح ش ص للحرب العالمية الثالثة والسيطرة الكاملة وضعت بوضوح في منشورات الحكومة الصينية والخطب وهذا (...) هو "حلم الصين" لشي جين بينغ. إنه حلم فقط للأقلية الصغيرة (ربما بضع عشرات إلى بضع مئات) الذين يحكمون الصين وكابوس للجميع (بما في ذلك 1.4 مليار صيني). ويمكّن ال10 مليارات دولار سنويا هم او دمىهم من امتلاك او السيطرة على الصحف والمجلات والقنوات التلفزيونية والاذاعية ووضع اخبار مزيفة في معظم وسائل الاعلام الرئيسية في كل مكان كل يوم. وبالإضافة إلى ذلك، لديهم جيش (ربما الملايين من الناس) الذين يصطادون جميع وسائل الإعلام وضع المزيد من الدعاية وغرق التعليق المشروع (الجيش 50 سنتا). -/- وبالإضافة إلى تجريد العالمالثالث من الموارد، فإن التوجه الرئيسي لمبادرة الحزام والطرق التي تبلغ قيمتها تريليونات الدولارات هو بناء قواعد عسكرية في جميع أنحاء العالم. إنهم يرغمون العالم الحر على خوض سباق تسلح ضخم عالي التقنية يجعل الحرب الباردة مع الاتحاد السوفياتي تبدو وكأنها نزهة. -/- على الرغم من أن SSSSK، وبقية الجيش في العالم، وتنفق مبالغ ضخمة على الأجهزة المتقدمة، فمن المرجح جدا أن WW3 (أو الارتباطات الصغيرة المؤدية إلى ذلك) سوف تهيمن على البرمجيات. ليس من المستبعد أن SSSSK، مع ربما أكثر المتسللين (المبرمجين) العمل بالنسبة لهم ثم كل ما تبقى من العالم مجتمعة، سوف يفوز الحروب في المستقبل مع الحد الأدنى من الصراع المادي، فقط عن طريق شل أعدائهم عبر الشبكة. لا أقمار صناعية، لا هواتف، لا اتصالات، لا معاملات مالية، لا شبكة كهرباء، لا إنترنت، لا أسلحة متطورة، لا مركبات، قطارات، سفن أو طائرات. -/- هناك مساران رئيسيان فقط لإزالة الح ش ص، والإفراج عن 1.4 مليار سجين صيني، وإنهاء المسيرة المجنونة إلى الحرب العالمية الثالثة. السلميهو شن حرب تجارية الشاملة لتدمير الاقتصاد الصيني حتى يُضاق ء بالجيش ويخرج ح ش ص. -/- بديل لاغلاق الاقتصاد الصيني هو حرب محدودة، مثل ضربة مستهدفة من قبل يقول 50 طائرات بدون طيار الحرارية على المؤتمر 20 من الح ش ص، عندما يكون جميع كبار الأعضاء في مكان واحد، ولكن هذا لن يحدث حتى عام 2022 حتى يمكن للمرء أن يضرب الجلسة العامة السنوية. وسيتم إبلاغ الصينيين، مع وقوع الهجوم، بأنه يجب عليهم إلقاء أسلحتهم والاستعداد لإجراء انتخابات ديمقراطية أو الدخول في العصر الحجري. والبديل الآخر هو شن هجوم نووي الشامل. المواجهة العسكرية أمر لا مفر منه نظراً للمسار الحالي للحزب الشيوعي الصيني. ومن المرجح أن يحدث ذلك على الجزر في بحر الصين الجنوبي أو تايوان في غضون بضعة عقود، ولكن مع إنشاء قواعد عسكرية في جميع أنحاء العالم يمكن أن يحدث في أي مكان (انظر النمر الرابض وما إلى ذلك). الصراعات المستقبلية سيكون لها جوانب صعبة وناعمة مع الأهداف المعلنة للحزب الشيوعي الصيني للتأكيد على الحرب السيبرانية عن طريق القرصنة وشل أنظمة التحكم في جميع الاتصالات العسكرية والصناعية، والمعدات، ومحطات الطاقة، والأقمار الصناعية، والإنترنت، والبنوك، وأي جهاز أو مركبة متصلة بالشبكة. وتقوم القوات الخاصة ببطء بإيفاد مجموعة من الغواصات المأهولة والمستقلة السطحية والجوفية أو الطائرات بدون طيار القادرة على إطلاق أسلحة تقليدية أو نووية قد تكون نائمة في انتظار إشارة من الصين أو حتى تبحث عن توقيع سفن أو طائرات أمريكية. في حين تدمير الأقمار الصناعية لدينا، وبالتالي القضاء على الاتصالات بين الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية وقواتنا في جميع أنحاء العالم، وأنها سوف تستخدم لها، جنبا إلى جنب مع طائرات بدون طيار لاستهداف وتدمير قواتنا البحرية متفوقة حاليا. وبطبيعة الحال، فإن كل هذا يتم تلقائيا على نحو متزايد من خلال الذكاء الاصطناعي. -/- [بي فر] الحليف كبيرة من ال [ش ك] الحزب ديموقراطيّة من ال [أوسا]. الخيار هو إيقاف الح ش ص الآن أو مشاهدة وهم يوسعون السجن الصيني على العالم كله. -/- وبطبيعة الحال، فإن المراقبة الشاملة والرقمنة في حياتنا أمر لا مفر منه في كل مكان. أي شخص لا يعتقد ذلك هو عميق من اتصال. -/- وبطبيعة الحال، فإن البصريات هي التي تتوقع من المختلين اجتماعياً الصينيين أن يحكموا العالم في حين أن المتشائمين (الذين يعتبرون أنفسهم واقعيين) يتوقعون الذكاء الاصطناعي الاعتلال الاجتماعي (أو كما أسميه - أي الغباء الاصطناعي أو الاعتلال الاجتماعي الاصطناعي) لتولي زمام الأمور، ربما بحلول عام 2030 أولئك المهتمين في مزيد من التفاصيل على مسار مجنون من المجتمع الحديث قد استشارة أعمالي الأخرى مثل الانتحار من قبل الديمقراطية- نعي لأمريكا والعالم الطبعةالثالثة 2019 والأوهام الطوباوية الانتحارية في 21ش القرن: الفلسفة والطبيعة البشرية وانهيار الحضارة 5th ed (2019) . (shrink)

Political theorists have long criticized policies that deny voting rights to convicted felons. However, some have recently turned to democratic theory to defend this practice, arguing that democratic self-determination justifies, or even requires, disenfranchising felons. I review these new arguments, acknowledge their force against existing criticism, and then offer a new critique of disenfranchisement that engages them on their own terms. Using democratic theory’s “all-subjected principle,” I argue that liberal democracies undermine their own legitimacy when they deny the vote to (...) felons and prisoners. I then show how this argument overcomes obstacles that cause problems for other critiques of disenfranchisement. (shrink)

Cet article analyse le risque de corruption que les arrêts Citizens United de 2010 et l’apparition des Super-PACs font peser sur le système électoral états-unien. Lors de la dernière campagne présidentielle, plus de 730 millions de dollars ont été investis dans des publicités électorales par de riches contributeurs et des entreprises privées regroupés en Super-PACs. Nous montrons que cet afflux d’argent consacré à des publicités politiques expose la démocratie américaine à trois formes de « corruption grise », en favorisant la (...) banalisation de pratiques contestables et en troublant la frontière entre ce qui est licite et ce qui ne l’est pas. (1) Déplafonné, le soutien financier aux candidats risque de s’apparenter à de la subornation; (2) certaines des techniques publicitaires employées semblent réduire l’exercice de conviction démocratique à une tentative de corruption de l’électeur; (3) enfin les immenses inégalités d’influence politique que ce système de financement induit participent de la corruption des affaires démocratiques en favorisant leur captation par un petit nombre d’individus fortunés. Nous mettons en évidence que le refus systématique de la Cour Suprême d’envisager ces phénomènes comme des vecteurs de corruption se fonde sur une conception discutable de la démocratie comme système de libre concurrence pour le pouvoir politique. Comprendre la démocratie à partir de son impératif d’égalité permet à l’inverse de rendre visible la corruption à laquelle son système de financement électoral expose la démocratie américaine. (shrink)

Police and authorities have increasingly adopted "command and control" strategies to the policing of intentionally peaceful protest crowds. These strategies work to close down access to a physical space in which a protest is to occur and thus in turn they effectively restrict the capacity of a citizen to engage in the democratic right of peaceful protest.

Abstract: Democracy is regularly heralded as the only form of government that treats political subjects as free and equal citizens. On closer examination, however, it becomes apparent that democracy unavoidably restricts individual freedom, and it is not the only way to treat all citizens equally. In light of these observations, we argue that the non-instrumental reasons to support democratic governance stem, not from considerations of individual freedom or equality, but instead from the importance of respecting group self-determination. If this is (...) correct, it implies that a state may choose democracy, but its right to self-determination means that it is also free, in principle, to decide in favor of some nondemocratic alternative. (shrink)

Benhabib argues that the tension between universal human rights and democratic self-determination cannot be resolved. Distinguishing between the principle of rights, on the one hand, and context-specific `schedules of rights', on the other hand, helps, however, to specify the scope of both norms. I show that applying this idea to questions of citizenship requires further elaboration in three respects: (1) Benhabib's argument for porous rather than open borders, which does not fully address the challenge of global distributive justice; (2) norms (...) for access to citizenship, which need to cover also transnational affiliations between sending states and their external populations; and (3) necessary constraints on democratic self-determination. I suggest replacing the principle of self-determination with a principle of self-government that does not include a unilateral right to determine the territorial or membership boundaries of the polity. (shrink)

This article argues that people have legitimate interests in privacy that deserve legal protection on democratic principles. It describes the right to privacy as a bundle of rights of personal choice, association and expression and shows that, so described, people have legitimate political interests in privacy. These interests reflect the ways that privacy rights can supplement the protection for people's freedom and equality provided by rights of political choice, association and expression, and can help to make sure that these are, (...) genuinely, democratic. Feminists have often been ambivalent about legal protection for privacy, because privacy rights have, so often, protected the coercion and exploitation of women, and made it difficult to politicise personal forms of injustice. However, attention to the differences between democratic and undemocratic forms of politics can enable us to meet these concerns, and to distinguish a democratic justification of privacy rights from the alternatives. (shrink)

The theory of rights is crucial as a means of relieving the tension between basic rights and democracy, and as a means of resolving the problem of allocating competence between the constitutional court and the legislature. To some theorists, no tension between basic rights and democracy exists, for the latter presupposes the former. To others, among whom I include myself, tension does exist, for basic rights, in lending protection to certain persons and groups, limit the possibilities of political decision. In (...) this connection it is important to take up the problem of the necessary conditions for realizing basic rights. One of these conditions concerns the delimiting of the scope of institutional action that is found, so to speak, in the space between the constitutional justices and the legislature, the latter as representative of the popular will. (shrink)

This work examines the development and performance of federal independent regulatory bodies in Canada in the period up to 1979, with particular attention to the operation of legislative schemes that include executive review and appeal powers. The author assesses the impact of the exercise of these powers on the administrative law process, and proposes new models for the generation, interpretation, implementation, review, and enforcement of regulatory policy. The study includes a series of representative case studies based on documentation and extensive (...) interviews with individuals drawn from government, agencies, and other parties, including counsel for public interest groups. This enables author, writing from her experience as a participant-observer embedded in the public interest legal sector, to draw on the experiences and perspectives of a broad range of participants in the regulatory process, including but not limited to those dealing with the regulated energy, transportation, communications, and foreign investment sectors. Legal principles identified as emergent in leading judicial decisions in administrative law are used to assess the powers and practices used in executive reviews and appeals. The author finds those powers and practices to be flawed and proposes changes. The proposed models are designed to accord with emerging legal principles and avoid flaws of the types identified in the review and appeal provisions. This work, written under contract with the Administrative Law Project of the Law Reform Commission of Canada, formed one part of a comprehensive study of administrative law at the federal level in Canada. (shrink)