Truth

Traditional debates between semantic temporalists and eternalists appeal to the efficacy of temporal operators and the intuitive (in)validity of instances of temporal reasoning. In this paper, I argue that such debates are inconclusive at best and that under-explored arguments concerning perceptual experience, memory, and knowledge offer more productive means of advancing debates between temporalists and eternalists and rendering salient several significant potential costs and benefits of these views.

À l'heure des fake news et des sciences alternatives, on pourrait facilement croire que tout est relatif. Cet essai voudrait pourtant suggérer le contraire. De nombreux malentendus circulent sur les concepts de vérité, de connaissance ou de réalité, déformés par l'idée-même de post-vérité. En nous proposant de nous méfier de nos préjugés métaphysiques les plus ancrés et d'œuvrer à une authentique connaissance métaphysique, cet essai de philosophie engagée nous invite à nous installer dans un espace académique et démocratique des raisons, (...) seul à même de garantir la liberté de conscience. Il démontre ainsi que les idéaux de vérité et de connaissance constituent moins un rempart ou un déni de la vie qu'ils ne sont les meilleurs alliés de nos idéaux de solidarité et de justice sociale"--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

In the last century, philosophers turned their attention to language. One place they have looked for clues about its nature is Plato’s Cratylus, which considers whether names are naturally or conventionally correct. The dialogue is a source of annoyance to many commentators because it does not take a clear position on the central question. At times, it argues that language is conventional, and, at other times, defends the view that language is natural. This lack of commitment has led to a (...) longstanding dispute over the outcome of the dialogue. I argue that the Cratylus provides no clear resolution to this problem because it presupposes certain unexamined metaphysical commitments about the nature of reality, which are in need of thorough investigation. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work.This work is in the public domain in (...) the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work.As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

In this essay I argue that Shelley's "A Defense of Poetry" is best understood as a defense of poetic language, which is in turn best understood as a defense of metaphorical language. According to Shelley, the metaphors of the poets reveal (extra-linguistic) reality, and have a truth value – they are true insofar as they capture reality. The literal language of "mere reasoners" of science and philosophy, by contrast, only reveals relations between ideas already known, and their statements are true (...) in virtue of the meanings of the words. Shelley's essays has been misunderstood because writers on metaphor such as David Cooper and Richard Rorty have assumed that metaphors are neither true nor false, and that defenders of metaphorical language such as Shelley are defending non-truth-apt language. Even those writers on metaphor who believe that metaphors are truth-apt, such as Raymond Gibbs, fail to understand that Shelley should be included in their number. (shrink)

This article develops an interpretation and defense of Husserl’s account of the omnitemporality of idealities. I first examine why Husserl rejects the atemporality and temporal individuation of idealities on phenomenological grounds, specifically that these attributions prove countersensical in how they relate idealities to consciousness. As an alternative to these conceptions, I develop a two-sided interpretation of omnitemporality expressed in modal terms of actuality and possibility, the actual referring to appearances in time and the possible, to reactivation at any time. In (...) defense of this interpretation of omnitemporality, I consider influential criticisms against Husserl’s account of idealities as they concern time, particularly whether the historical genesis of idealities compromises their omnitemporality by binding them to time. Ultimately, I argue that the transcendental historicity of idealities, despite being relevant to the question of validity and access, proves indifferent to their omnitemporality. (shrink)

Sometimes, political bald-faced lies pass for truth. That is, certain groups of people behave according to them – behave as if the political bald-faced lies were true. How can this phenomenon be explained? I argue that to explain it we need to take political bald-faced lies to be performative utterances whose goal is to bring about a worldly state of affairs just in virtue of making the utterance. When the former US-President tweeted ‘we won the election’, people stormed Capitol Hill (...) to protest election fraud and some were killed. In this way, the bald-faced lie was successful in passing for truth. My performative view of political bald-faced lies is to be preferred over various other views such as the contempt for truth view (Lynch 2021), the deception view (Lackey 2013), and the value-signaling view (Stanley 2012). These alternative views fail to adequately account for how political bald-faced lies pass for truth. (shrink)

Разум — очень короткое слово, но это самая совершенная и восхитительная вещь, фрагмент души вселенной, или, как благочестивее сказать для тех, кто изучает философию по Моисею, очень точная копия божественного образа. Филон Александрийский. Об изменении имён. λογισμὸς δὲ βραχὺ μὲν ὄνομα, τελειότατον δὲ καὶ θειότατον ἔργον, τῆς τοῦ παντὸς ψυχῆς ἀπόσπασμα ἤ, ὅπερ ὁσιώτερον εἰπεῖν τοῖς κατὰ Μωυσῆν φιλοσοφοῦσιν, εἰκόνος θείας ἐκμαγεῖον ἐμφερές. Φίλων ο Αλεξανδρεύς. Περί των μετονομαζομένων και ων ένεκα μετονομάζονται.

"Principles of So-Called 'Material' and 'Formal' Truth. A Logical, Philosophical and Juridical Analysis" Concepts of material and formal truth have a long and well-grounded tradition in the doctrine of law. It seems, however, that they need some clarification and conceptualisation in purely philosophical and logical terms. In this paper, we propose such a theoretical analysis. These considerations are followed by a review of the key aspects of the current Polish legislation, which is written from the point of view of the (...) conclusions reached through the first level of analysis. (shrink)

Наивный реализм, упомянутый мной в определении субъектологии, — это скольжение по поверхности вещей и явлений, восприятие их внешней формы, доступной для органов чувств непосредственно, в котором отсутствует знание и понимание их причин, взаимосвязей, и внутреннего содержания, которые приобретаются лишь исследованием и размышлением, иначе называемом познанием и жизненным опытом. Всё это непостигаемое в объекте и постулируемое как принципиальная невозможность постижения природы вещей и явлений, положено в основу представления Иммануила Канта о вещи в себе, представления, которое стало частью мировоззренческой системы другого представителя (...) немецкой схоластики — Артура Шопенгауера. В этой традиции отрицания самой возможности познания проявляется иррациональный страх и неверие в силу человеческого разума, хотя основатель этой традиции, имеющей происхождение в античной философии, противоречил самому себе, веря в силу рассудка и рационального мышления. Разрешить это противоречие впервые попытался основатель психоанализа, и хотя ему не удалось довести начатое им дело до логического завершения, он заложил фундамент теоретического здания, строительство которого сегодня в значительной степени завершено благодаря моему вкладу в общее дело. (shrink)

Der Titel stellt die alte Pilatusfrage «Was ist Wahrheit?» im Zeitalter interdisziplinärer Umbrüche aus heutiger Sicht neu. Dazu wird die Wahrheit in der Ästhetik, Ethik, im Gewissen, in Technik und Hermeneutik neu reflektiert. Der Bogen spannt sich über klassische Begriffe bis zu den soziologischen Deformationen der Wahrheit durch den Pluralismus. Die Globalisierung der heutigen Informationsgesellschaft über PC und Internet brachte die Wahrheit aus der «Mode». Dazu wird ein Paradigmenwechsel vorgeschlagen, der auf Zusammenhängen zwischen apriorischen Erkenntnissen, unentscheidbaren Aussagen und dem Mysterium (...) beruht. Letztlich wird die Frage nach der «Wahrheit des Seins» als ihr transzendentales Spezifikum gestellt. Das objektive Maß der Wahrheit berührt neu die Klarheit der Wahrheit des Seins gegenüber der Widersprüchlichkeit des Irrtums. Titel und Thematik sind ein wissenschaftlich kompatibler Beitrag im Dialog zwischen Vernunft und Glaube als interdisziplinäre neue Antwort auf die alte Pilatusfrage. (shrink)