Within Hindu religious contexts, a guru plays a crucial soteriological role, and is sometimes viewed as being as good as God. Questions of a guru’s sphere of epistemic authority thus have far-reaching socioreligious implications. In this paper, I highlight one such implication within the Caitanya Vaiṣṇava tradition. I then analyze various Caitanya Vaiṣṇava texts in order to precisely define the parameters of a guru’s epistemic authority within this tradition. I suggest that the statements made by gurus within this tradition are (...) of a bipartite nature and describe how an understanding of this bipartite nature can lead to social progress within the tradition. In particular, I highlight how the teachings of the Caitanya Vaiṣṇava tradition can be made consistent with contemporary socially progressive values. I also consider some objections and respond to these. (shrink)

Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇavas frequently assimilate and recast ancient and established ideas and practices to suit and justify their own theology and goals. The final aim of this strategy is to promote their version of mature emotional bhakti, as devotional participation. Their depictions of mature divine interactions are often mapped by way of rasa theory, originating as ancient poetic and dramatic aesthetic theory. Although only explicitly used to map aspects of mature religious experience, this paper explores an often-neglected side of the tradition’s (...) pedagogy, namely its tacit appeal to rasa theory to explain practices meant primarily for ordinary practitioners. An example of this strategy appears in the sixteenth century Gauḍīya treatise, Ṣaṭ-sandarbha. The author, Jīva Gosvāmī, offers a reformulated account of a typical set of Pāñcarātra meditation rituals. However, although the rituals are necessarily performed in the imagination, he paradoxically warns that the generated mental images should not be considered imaginative. By correlating his explanations of these ritual visualisations with elements of his yet to be depicted rasa theory, a consistent and non-problematic role of ritual imagination can be revealed. Since Jīva offers nothing explicit to arrive at this conclusion, this paper infers how a prominent Gauḍīya seems to be reformulating even ordinary ritual by way of rasa theory. This analysis acts as an individual example of a broader strategy in Gauḍīya texts. (shrink)

The primary function of Sanskrit kāvya was always to please the readers. Literary theoreticians like Abhinavagupta often considered esthetic experience as a supramundane (alaukika) experience where the readers transcend their mundane attachments. Viśvanatha compared it to the experience of knowing brahman, the ultimate truth. But this does not mean that Sanskrit kāvya was devoid of any pragmatic concerns and was exclusively concerned with esthetic bliss. This paper examines how the purvamīmāmsā theory of bhāvanā was effectively employed by Sanskrit literary theoreticians (...) in Early India to make the readers of Sanskrit kāvya self-fashion themselves according to the existing notions about the practice of puruṣārtha-s. This mechanism, which literary critics from Kuntaka onwards explicitly mentioned, capacitated kāvya with a symbolic power to influence the worldview of readers and to make them conform to the existing dharmavidhi (legal injunction with respect to the four aims of human life). How did the idea of bhāvanā function in the composition of Sanskrit kāvya to self-fashion the readers? And how did the writers of kāvya precondition their texts so that readers should self-fashion themselves? The present paper explores these two crucial questions which shed light on the pragmatic use of Sanskrit kāvya. (shrink)

This paper discusses the reliability of the criteria for determining Śaṅkara’s authorship established by Paul Hacker. His analysis of terminological peculiarities is based on only one of Śaṅkara’s works—the commentary on the Brahma-Sūtras. Therefore, doubt arises as to whether these criteria also apply to other works that we can claim to be authentic. First, it will be argued that the commentaries on the Bṛhadāraṇyaka- and Taittirīya-Upaniṣad are works that can be—with reasonable certainty—considered authentic. When applied to these two works, Hacker’s (...) criteria work remarkably well, and the commentaries on the Taittirīya- and Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad share the same terminological and conceptual features with the Brahma-Sūtra-Bhāṣya. Moreover, in most cases, it is possible to distinguish the usage of some terms and concepts from Sureśvara and Padmapāda. On the other hand, Sureśvara and Padmapāda use some of these terms in a quite similar way as Śaṅkara, but differently than the later Advaitins, indicating that a sharp line between Śaṅkara on the one hand and Sureśvara and Padmapāda on the other cannot be drawn in many cases. Also, the writings of these authors—especially Padmapāda—represent a transitional phase in the development of certain Advaita Vedānta concepts although the outlines of some peculiarities by which the later Advaita Vedānta differs from Śaṅkara can already be found sketched by Śaṅkara himself. (shrink)

This paper shall make an attempt to critically reflect on the conceptualization of emotions in the Indian Philosophical systems. To bring out the insight, the paper is divided into three main sections. The first section of the paper entitled ‘The Body-Emotions-Mind Complex and the Question of Self: Understanding the Dualistic Tradition’ will make an analysis of emotions and the mind-body complex vis-à-vis the question of self or consciousness in Indian Philosophy with special reference to the study of Advaita Vedānta and (...) the philosophical position of Upaniṣadic teachings. It will also incorporate the Nyāya account of emotions in the Indian philosophical system. The second section of the paper is entitled as ‘Triguṇa and the Emotional Experience: A Perspective in Sāṃkhya Philosophy’. It will reflect on the systematic presentation of Sāṃkhya philosophical system on account of its relation between the two ontological realities — puruṣa and prakṛti. It is this prakṛti which is constituted of the three guṇas — sattva, rajas and tamas; and therefore is the embodied self having its association with emotions. The third section of the paper entitled ‘Understanding Religious Emotions: Towards a Positive Representation of Emotions in Indian Philosophy’ will make an attempt to critically reflect on the necessary shift required in conceptualizing emotions in the Indian Philosophical systems. That is to say, from a negative connotation of emotions to a more significant positive account of emotions in human-spiritual life. This necessary shift will be directed towards the understanding of Religious Emotions — faith and devotion which can serve as a guiding principle to justify the soteriological approach of Indian Philosophy, i.e. towards pure consciousness. Thereby the paper shall explore the consideration of the relevance of emotions in the Indian Philosophical System. (shrink)

The article attempts to deal with the proposition that human being’s incapacity to imagine its own death, the state of non-being necessitates the thinking of the animal. A critical and close reading of specific Brāhmaṇa and Mahābhārata texts would spotlight that it is man’s rationalizing capacity that disavows and denies the question of intelligibility of the actions of the animal. The animal is the undisclosable which man keeps and brings to light as such. The article would further investigate if the (...) question of our forgetfulness toward the fact that we are born in debt to death has any linkage to the sacrificial logic of killing animals as elaborated in Brāhmaṇical hermeneutics. It examines how the ethical is thoroughly coextensive with the animal’s act of hospitality/hostility as an affective, purposive and reasoned response toward the other. In the course of the analysis of the jantu and pakshî upākhyāns in the Àraṇyak and Śanti Parvas of the Mahābhārata, the article tries to understand and explore if the experience of the animalitas is intrinsic to the structure of human reason, complicating the nature and notion of a priori. (shrink)

Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇava thinkers adapted rasa theory to a context of devotion to the god Kṛṣṇa. In doing so, bhayānaka-rasa, the aestheticized experience of horror, presents interesting complexities. This paper examines the conceptualizations of bhayānaka-rasa by four Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇava authors: Rūpa Gosvāmin, Jīva Gosvāmin, Kavi Karṇapūra, and Baladeva Vidyābhūṣaṇa. Between them, they discuss three distinct modes of bhayānaka-rasa in a devotional context: a devotee’s fear after committing an offense against Kṛṣṇa, fear of some dreadful being who the devotee thinks might hurt (...) Kṛṣṇa, and fear of Kṛṣṇa’s display of his cosmic form. This paper also briefly examines the Rūpa’s explicit rejection of the fear felt by Kaṃsa as a case of devotional bhayānaka-rasa. A central concern for the Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇava authors is whether fear, a typically unpleasant emotion, can attain the status of a rasa and how it is subordinated to more direct forms of devotion. This paper argues that these thinkers make an important contribution to reconceptualizing bhayānaka-rasa, particularly highlighting Jīva’s Gosvāmin’s argument that the real object of bhayānaka-rasa is not the person who serves as the source of fear, but is Kṛṣṇa, out of love for whom such fear is felt. (shrink)

The study aims to address the existing research gap through a thematic comparison between the aesthetics of Kant and Abhinavagupta. This paper explores Kant’s notion of aesthetic judgment based on disinterestedness with Abhinavagupta’s analysis of sādhāraṇīkaraṇa. We argue that the notions of “disinterested judgment” in Kant and sādhāraṇīkaraṇa in Abhinavagupta points towards the impersonal nature of aesthetic delight which makes the universality of aesthetic experience possible. Hence, aesthetics in both Kant and Abhinavgupta are not the personal and subjective experience but (...) a kind of universality based on the ability to experience the impersonal joy. However, the notion of aesthetic delight in Kant is confined to the agreeable mental states only while in Abhinavgupta the notion of rasa includes both positive as well as the negative mental states like fear, disgust, etc. In this regard, the paper will also analyze the affinity between notion of sensus communius in Kant and sahṛdaya in Abhinavagupta which highlights the importance of aesthetic community and the impersonal nature of aesthetic delight. (shrink)

This analysis holds that just as wisdom is good for its own sake, the effervescent perfuming of aesthetic pleasure in rasa, camatkāra, need not be useful for a goal or purpose. However, there is an intellectual virtue in the act of aestheticizing the affective response of wonder. The “here and now” of the aestheticized emotion of wonder, adbhutarasa, is a moment of focus and attention regained as a logically atemporal, even timeless moment. As the carvaṇā process unfolds, adbhutarasa invites an (...) epistemic agent to give time through focused attention, a contemplative tarrying, or an unhurried attentional prolongation. Looking across Platonic, Cartesian, and Kantian traditions to answer the question of epistemic value in rasa experiences, I argue that an agent is moved, and moves into an evaluative mode through the lenses of the sublime and taste. Renewed vigor to see, feel, and contemplate how things are, thickens epistemic emotions. The agentive freedom of the rasika to affectively resonate with ideas re-cognitively makes adbhuta a vehicle of inquiry like none other. (shrink)