Recent developments in artificial intelligence (AI) promise cognitive optimization in many areas of our lives, ranging from automated decision-making to superintelligence. In a predominant narrative, the black-box of machine learning systems is identified as one of the biggest obstacles from an epistemic point of view. The problem is expected to be solved by algorithmic counteractions emerging from the field of explainable artificial intelligence (XAI). However, deeper questions about a meaningful cognitive division of labor between AI algorithms and human actors who (...) use these systems are vastly ignored. The article aims to replace the dominant anthropomorphizing metaphors by a reconceptualization based on philosophy of technology. The new framework allows to interpret AI technology as an epistemic tool, which co-shapes a specific milieu of reflection and which is based on an epistemic model of automated knowledge production. This re-conceptualization offers a new perspective on AI technologies, where epistemic empowerment and epistemic sovereignty are in the center. (shrink)

The capacity of human knowers to turn their cognitive powers upon themselves has long fascinated philosophers. My book Transparency and Reflection grew out of an attempt to comprehend a fundamental thought from Kant about the significance of this capacity for self-consciousness: namely, that it transforms the general character of human knowing, giving rise to a distinctively rational form of cognition and supplying the basis for a distinctively philosophical understanding of our own minds and of the world with which they engage. (...) In seeking to understand these Kantian ideas, however, I found myself struggling with difficulties that led me to re-think my approach, moving away from a Kantian formulation of these points and toward one inspired by ideas from Sartre. In the present essay, I describe the difficulties that led me from Kant to Sartre, and I also seek to explain how, in spite of this shift in perspective, my book bears out various fundamental Kantian thoughts about the significance of human self-consciousness. (shrink)

The modern program of operationalizing the mind, from Descartes to Kant, in the form of the externalization of human mind functions in logic and calculations, and its continuation in the program of formalization from the middle of the 19th century with Boole, Peirce and Turing, have led to the form of rationality that has become machine rationality: the digital computer as a logical-mathematical machine and algorithms as machine-rational interpretations of human thinking in the form of problem solving and decision making. (...) The modern program of the operationalization of the mind can be understood as the first program of an "artificial intelligence" on paper. With the advent of digital computers, it was transformed into the programs of "strong" and "weak" AI. As early as 2015, machine learning methods surpassed human competencies in image recognition and other fields, such turning AI increasingly into "superhuman AI." Thus, the philosophical question is, how to deal with this development as humans? (shrink)

This paper aims to determine the ontology of virtual reality from a historical and systematic point of view. The term “virtual reality” is often used synonymously with “illusion”, “immersion”, “simulation” or “fiction”. Against this anti-realistic view, the paper argues that virtual reality is a genuine kind of reality that has always been part of our life. To this end, I will analyze the ontology of virtual reality by using the example of banknotes and referring to Lynne Baker’s “constitution view”. Finally, (...) I shall attempt to define the term “virtual reality” from a philosophical point of view by distinguishing it from the concepts of simulation and illusion. (shrink)

Among legal scholars, P. J. A. Feuerbach is considered one of the most important German jurists of the 19th century: not only has he established Germany’s modern doctrine of penal law and the Bavarian penal code of 1813, but he is also the founder of the theory of psychological force, i.e. the idea of the threat of punishment (not punishment itself!) as deterrence. Whereas one cannot comprehend Feuerbach’s legal doctrines without their original philosophical justification, namely his concept of the legal (...) subject as a citizen of two worlds, most contemporary interpreters ignore this aspect of Feuerbach’s theory of punishment. Against this reductionist interpretation of Feuerbach, by reconstructing his philosophy of punishment, this article exposes both the theoretical potential and shortcomings of Feuerbach’s main philosophical concepts. (shrink)

This paper argues that the common argument, that a state’s monopoly of violence is a necessary condition for peace, is flawed. First, it rests on anthropological assumptions about violent tendencies in human nature that may be valid for our society but cannot claim to correctly picture the (universal) human nature. Secondly, monopolies of violence are in reality less functional than they would need to be; most importantly, their agents distribute more violence than necessary or legitimate. Given their structural and institutional (...) nature, this is hardly surprising, maybe even unavoidable. Therefore, the claim that a monopoly of violence is an indispensable or at least the best means to establish peace should be viewed more critically. For this reason anarchist proposals should not only not be scorned, they should rather be openly discussed and re-evaluated. (shrink)

In my article, I intend to show that human self-optimization has been a fundamental question of practical philosophy from the very beginning, and that it is worth taking note of supposedly “old” models also with a view to today’s discussion. Three models will be discussed; two go back to Plato, the third to Aristotle. Although the two Platonic models form powerful anthropological narratives, the Aristotelian model opens up a variety of perspectives, especially in practical terms, on how the question of (...) self-optimization can be thought of from a philosophical perspective. (shrink)

This article considers aspects of Philippa Foot’s theory of naturalist realist metaethics. It addresses the question of whether human nature can function as a direct source of normativity or whether it is more of a metanormative framework that is open to norm-creation based on the agent’s rational volitional activity. This gives rise to the question of whether the source of moral normativity is not in fact the agent’s practical rationality since natural facts may conflict and therefore cannot constitute a direct (...) guide for the articulation of moral norms. Our interpretation is based primarily on Foot’s Natural Goodness, and identifies the tensions between the broader and narrower meanings of the conception of human nature. In the first step we discuss the broader meaning of human nature. In the second we consider the narrower meaning of human nature, practical rationality. In conclusion we show that in its broader sense human nature cannot function as a proper source of moral normativity; rather, it is a metanormative framework for making moral judgements. Within this framework practical rationality operates as human nature in the narrower sense and only it can be considered the source of moral normativity. (shrink)

Kant’s highest good consists of happiness and the worthiness of happiness, that is, morality. The question of the exact connection between these two parts is disputed. Some argue that Kant proposed different, sometimes contradictory, concepts of the highest good. First, the highest good is said to consist in the distribution of happiness in relation to morality. Second, the highest good is said to describe a maximal or best state in which the greatest morality is associated with the highest happiness. This (...) paper will show how the problematic relationship between the two elements of the highest good can be resolved and explain the different versions of the highest good. (shrink)

A groundbreaking text for the account of the problem of evil in German idealism. Here is a brief review for the German audience.

In a subject-philosophical perspective, a musical work embodies the creativity of a subject that has become a construction. As a temporal movement itself, it first expands internally sound-temporally as well as sound-spatially: in the form of an invented succession of tones and, derived from this by negation, also of a simultaneity of sounds (level 1). The content of this imagined temporal-spatial formation can be individual associations, feelings, sensations, moods and atmospheres, which can be conceptually interpreted as musical units (level 2). (...) If the subjectively imagined musical units are then also successfully objectified in the musical material of the external world, the subject realizes and changes itself in it as a tonally individual expression of itself (level 3). (shrink)

The article presents Hönigswalds version of transcendental philosophy, putting focus on the mediation of epistemological principles and empirical states of affairs. It is shown, that Hönigswald provides an original account of transcendental philosophy, that goes far beyond the common ones, that we know from the Marburg School of Neo-Kantianism.

This is the third part of a „controversy“, in which I respond to comments from Vera Hoffmann-Kolss, Johannes Hübner, Boris Kment, Kathrin Koslicki, Annina Loets, and Ulrich Metschl concerning my earlier paper „Möglichkeit ohne mögliche Welten“ („possibility without possible worlds“).