The computational and the representational language-of-thought hypotheses

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 46:e269 (2023)
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Abstract

There are two versions of the language-of-thought hypothesis (LOT): Representational LOT (roughly, structured representation), introduced by Ockham, and computational LOT (roughly, symbolic computation) introduced by Fodor. Like many others, I oppose the latter but not the former. Quilty-Dunn et al. defend representational LOT, but they do not defend the strong computational LOT thesis central to the classical-connectionist debate.

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David Chalmers
New York University

Citations of this work

Is Religious Belief a Kind of Belief?Tim Crane - 2023 - Neue Zeitschrift für Systematicsche Theologie Und Religionsphilosophie 65 (4):414-429.

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References found in this work

The Language of Thought.J. A. Fodor - 1978 - Critica 10 (28):140-143.
On the proper treatment of connectionism.Paul Smolensky - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (1):1-23.
Representations: Philosophical Essays on the Foundations of Cognitive Science.Jerry A. Fodor - 1983 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 34 (2):175-182.

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