Defending the Free-Will Intuitions Scale: Reply to Stephen Morris

Philosophical Psychology 28 (6):808-814 (2015)
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Abstract

In our paper, “The Free-Will Intuitions Scale and the question of natural compatibilism” , we seek to advance empirical debates about free will by measuring the relevant folk intuitions using the scale methodology of psychology, as a supplement to standard experimental methods. Stephen Morris raises a number of concerns about our paper. Here, we respond to Morris's concerns

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Author Profiles

Oisín Deery
York University
Taylor Davis
Purdue University