What a Difference Emotions Make

In Timothy O'Connor & Constantine Sandis (eds.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Action. Oxford, UK: Wiley‐Blackwell. pp. 191–199 (2010)
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emotions and what a difference they make   model of the explanation of intentional action ‐ the ‘belief–desire model’ (BD)   influential way of cashing out BD ‐ Humean theory of motivation (HTM)   ‘pro‐attitude’ sense of ‘desire’ ‐ entailing the very definition of intentional action   emotions, motivating different kinds of behavior, not only intentional actions aiming at some end   expressive action, cannot be explained in terms of goal‐directedness   mere evaluations and the ‘felt’ or ‘affective evaluations’ ‐ characteristic of emotion   emotions' concern‐based evaluative content ‐ explaining why sometimes they do provide goals for action   Quinn, distinguishing between explanation ‐ of an action and its “rationalization”   agents, cultivating their emotions over time

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9781444323528   9781405187350

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10.1002/9781444323528.ch25

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Sabine Döring
University Tübingen

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References found in this work

The moral problem.Michael Smith - 1994 - Cambridge, Mass., USA: Blackwell.
Actions, Reasons, and Causes.Donald Davidson - 1963 - Journal of Philosophy 60 (23):685.
The possibility of altruism.Thomas Nagel - 1970 - Oxford,: Clarendon P..

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