Abstract

This article examines the integrated approach to theorizing happiness in the Yang Zhu chapter of the book associated with the Daoist master Liezi. While ancient critics famously denounced Yang Zhu as an amoral, pleasure-seeking hedonist, I argue the Yang Zhu chapter offers an individually rational but socially non-conformist approach to well-being of considerable relevance to contemporary scholarship on happiness. Not only does the chapter offer an intriguing and counter-intuitive argument about what constitutes and causes well-being, but its philosophical implications address a large number of inescapably foundational conceptual questions that can serve as metrics for evaluating theories of happiness in general. These questions include the scope of happiness (i.e. who?, what?, when?, where?, how much?) causation (i.e. how?, why?), and purpose (i.e. why should it matter?) while also addressing possible tensions between subjective and objective experiences, uniform and diverse causality, individual and collective outcomes, relative vs. absolute happiness, and immediate vs. lasting fulfillment.